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Abstract
This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as
‘linguistic conventionalism’) – i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms
of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the
history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can
be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic
approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting
and viable research program.
The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the
commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged
and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was
meant to play in “making a consistent empiricism possible”.
Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections.
Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be “created” by convention, the
objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the ob-
jection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what
the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly empirical matter.
In part C, finally, I turn to objections which purport to show that there are limits to
what can be explained in terms of linguistic convention. Specifically, I consider whether
we need to assume a non-conventional distinction between admissible and inadmissi-
ble linguistic rules, a non-conventional consequence relation, or a non-conventional
starting-point in order to get the linguistic approach off the ground. An overarching
question is whether we are forced to take some logic for granted in a way which would
undermine the explanatory ambitions of the approach.
I argue that some of the prominent objections rely on misunderstandings, that some
can be answered head-on, and that some point to genuine challenges and constraints
which put pressure on the linguistic approach, but do not warrant a wholesale rejection
of the view. Instead, they point to areas where further work is needed.
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Introduction
‘The philosophical problem of necessity’, Dummett tells us in a much-quoted
passage, ‘is twofold: what is its source and how do we recognize it?’ (1959:
327) A once popular response to this problem – which, of course, was a
problem long before Dummett’s formulation of it – goes roughly as follows:
The source of necessity lies in language and specifically in the
conventionally adopted rules that govern the use of linguistic
expressions. We are able to recognise necessity insofar as we
know what these rules are and can reflect upon them.
This rough idea has been given various names, including ‘linguistic conven-
tionalism’ and ‘the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth’. I shall call it ‘the
linguistic approach to modality’, or just ‘the linguistic approach’.
Although this view is not without contemporary defenders,1 it is now
rather unfashionable. Two important developments are often said to be
responsible for this: the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction2 and
1Alan Sidelle (1989; 2009), Jody Azzouni (1990; 2014), Amie Thomasson (2007a;
2007b: ch. 3; 2009; 2013), and Jared Warren (2015a; 2015b; 2017) have all provided
recent defences of the idea. In addition, Hans-Johann Glock has defended a broadly
speaking Wittgensteinian approach (2003a; 2003b: ch. 3; 2008), and Richard Creath has
defended Carnap’s views against some of Quine’s objections (1987; 1990a; 2003).
2The classic attack is of course due to Quine (1951), but White, Goodman and Tarski
all voiced similar concerns at the time (cf. e.g. White 1950; Goodman, Quine, and White
1947; Tarski 1944; and Frost-Arnold 2013: 94–101).
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Kripke’s discovery of necessary a posteriori truths.3 The full story, how-
ever, is bound to be more complicated, and has to do with related but
broader changes in the philosophical climate, such as the demise of logical
positivism, the weakening of Wittgenstein’s influence, the backlash against
“ordinary language philosophy”, and the revitalisation of “robust meta-
physics”.
However, while the linguistic approach is currently unpopular, it is not
neglected. Instead, it remains a quite popular target. It remains a target,
it seems, not so much because there are occasional defenders, but because
it is regarded as superficially – perhaps very superficially – appealing, and
because it is perceived to have a certain grip on philosophers even if they
do not explicitly endorse it – perhaps even explicitly reject it. Thus, for
instance, Theodore Sider includes an attack on the linguistic approach in
Writing the Book of the World (2011: §6.5), and prefaces this attack by
noting that while few self-identify as ‘conventionalists’, there are a number
of prevalent tendencies that would be explained by ‘latent logical conven-
tionalism’ (Sider 2011: 97–8). The view is therefore deemed worthy of the
occasional refutation.
In addition to the various objections that are levelled against it, there is,
I think, a more general reason why many are now suspicious of the linguistic
approach. If necessity has its source in language, it may be thought, then
this makes the discovery of necessary truths, and perhaps even philosophy
in general, a far less significant enterprise than it would be if necessity has
its source in something like the deepest and most general features of reality.
Accepting the linguistic approach, it may be felt, pushes us that much closer
to Stephen Hawking’s depressing view of the history of philosophy:
Philosophers reduced the scope of their enquiries so much that
3Whether Kripke deserves sole credit here is contentious. According to Peter Hacker
(2006: 131), William Kneale had already argued that there are a posteriori necessities in
1949 (cf. Kneale 1949: 78–89), and Quentin Smith (1995a; 1995b) argues that Ruth Bar-
can Marcus (1961) got there before Kripke. Scott Soames, however, is quite determined
to defend Kripke’s claim to priority (1995; 2006).
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Wittgenstein, the most famous philosopher of this century, said, ‘The
sole remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of language.’ What
a comedown from the great tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to
Kant! (1988: 193)
But thinking of modality as having its source in language does not force
us to think of modal inquiry, or philosophy in general, as a trivial or in-
significant matter. This only follows if we also hold that everything which
is related to language is somehow superficial, or conceive of things in terms
of a crude distinction between what is “really the case” and what is “merely
a matter of how we speak”.
A quite opposite view would be that the world – the world that mat-
ters to us as thinkers, knowers and agents – is a world which is, to a great
extent, shaped by how we represent it in language. Whether or not lan-
guage is a strict prerequisite for thought, it can hardly be denied that it is a
prerequisite for engaging with the world in the way that we do. In any rea-
sonably sophisticated case of knowledge, we are dealing with linguistically
structured knowledge, and the world we know is a linguistically structured
world.
Against this background, becoming clearer about the conceptual struc-
tures we use to orient ourselves in the world should not be thought of as
“mere knowledge of language” and irrelevant to our attempts to under-
stand the world around us. Rather, the “analysis of language” could very
well be said to be a transcendental investigation in something quite like
Kant’s sense. Pursuing the linguistic approach would then hardly be much
of a comedown from a tradition where Kant’s achievements are among the
finest. So, while the linguistic approach to modality does indeed stand in
opposition to the more robustly metaphysical tendencies in contemporary
philosophy, the opposing picture need not be a deflationary, trivialising one
– it could be rather more Kantian.
As may be suspected, my aim is to defend the linguistic approach. This
aim is motivated, not by an unshakable confidence that this approach is
3
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correct, but by its already mentioned superficial appeal, together with the
suspicion that the reasons given for discarding it are far less decisive than
they are typically taken to be. What I will try to establish is that the
linguistic approach deserves to be taken seriously, and that if it should turn
out to be unsatisfactory, this will be the result of a careful investigation of
what it can and cannot explain, not because it is fundamentally incoherent,
rests on a “category mistake”, or the like.
Consequently, my defence will be minimal in a certain sense. I shall
have nothing to say, for instance, about ‘problem cases’ for the linguis-
tic approach – cases, that is, which the linguistic approach may seem ill
equipped to handle (the necessary a posteriori and colour exclusion cases
may come to mind). Given the current state of the discussion, attempts to
deal with such cases are bound to seem somewhat irrelevant. There are, it
will be said, much more fundamental reasons for rejecting the approach.4
Indeed, my aim is not to carry out the linguistic approach, but, rather,
to clear the way for such a project by articulating what the commitments
of the approach are, and by responding to objections that are taken to
disqualify it prior to detailed investigations of which necessary truths it is
capable of accounting for. If I achieve this aim, we shall be in a better
position to see what would be required in order to deal with various cases
within the framework of the linguistic approach, but it will be an open (and
interesting) question whether we can in fact do so.
The thesis falls into three main parts. Part A introduces the linguis-
tic approach in more detail, with a focus on developing an account of its
distinctive commitments. This is not a straightforward task. After all,
a standard objection to the linguistic approach is that it amounts, upon
scrutiny, to little more than a family of metaphors, pictures and slogans
that resist proper explication. This, I will argue, is too pessimistic, but
getting a grip on the commitments of the view is not a matter of hitting
4For an illustration of this, see Stephen Yablo’s review (1992) of Alan Sidelle’s at-
tempt (1989) to defend the linguistic approach from the objection that it cannot handle
the necessary a posteriori.
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upon a satisfactory one-line explication; we need to look at the historical
context in which it was developed and the various concerns it was meant to
address. This is unfortunate insofar as it means extra work, but fortunate
insofar as the history of early analytic philosophy is interesting.
Part B focuses on various objections which purport to show that there is
something thoroughly misguided with the general idea behind the linguistic
approach. I argue that none of them warrant this conclusion: Some can be
straightforwardly answered; others point to genuine constraints which an
adherent of the linguistic approach must keep in mind, but do not suffice
to undermine the view.
Then, in Part C, I turn my attention to a notion which (perhaps surpris-
ingly) will have played a relatively minor role so far: namely convention. I
consider a number of objections which question how much work this notion
can do in this context, and which suggest that we are forced to take some
logic for granted in a way which undermines the explanatory ambitions of
the linguistic approach.
However, as the historical investigations in Part A will have made clear,
the notion of convention, though certainly important, is not the be-all and
end-all of the linguistic approach. Against this background, I argue that
although there are limits to what can be termed ‘conventional’ here, none of
these objections suffice to undermine the general idea behind the linguistic
approach or show that there are in principle reasons why the explanatory
project is doomed to failure. That being said, some of the these objec-
tion raise thoroughly difficult issues, and point to genuine challenges which
future work on the linguistic approach will need to take into account.
5

Part A
Articulating the Linguistic Approach

1
The Commitments of the Linguistic
Approach
The aim of this chapter is to articulate how we should think of the commit-
ments of the linguistic approach. I begin (1.1) by providing some typical
characterisations of the linguistic approach, taken from both historical and
contemporary sources. These will serve both to identify the relevant tradi-
tion, and to highlight the variations that can be found within it. Next (1.2),
I introduce the worry that, upon scrutiny, such formulations do not pro-
vide us with a satisfactory conception of just what the linguistic approach
amounts to.
Attempts to spell out such formulations face two prominent pitfalls: We
might end up making the linguistic approach trivial, in the sense that no
particular account of the source of necessity is singled out, or we may end
up making it obscure, in the sense that we lose our grip on how to assess
whether it is correct or not. These pitfalls are illustrated in sections 1.3
and 1.4 respectively.
Finally, in sections 1.5 and 1.6, I argue that the way to avoid these
problems is to understand the linguistic approach in terms of a second-order
commitment to a form of explanation when it comes to modal matters.
1. The Commitments of the Linguistic Approach
1.1 Paradigmatic Characterisations
Let us begin by introducing some standard formulations of the linguistic
approach from its heyday, stretching from the late 20’s to the early 50’s.1 At
the time, the view was orthodox enough that C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford
could remark passingly, in their textbook Symbolic Logic, that ‘the facts
which the principles of logic state are simply facts of our own meanings in
the use of language: they have nothing to do with any character of reality,
unless of reality as exhibited in human language-habits.’ (1932: 212)
Historically, the linguistic approach is associated primarily with the logi-
cal positivism of the Vienna Circle, certain time-slices of Wittgenstein, and,
to a slightly lesser extent, the “ordinary language philosophy” that used to
be prevalent in Oxford.
Already in the Aufbau, Carnap wrote that ‘Logic (including mathemat-
ics) consists solely of conventions concerning the use of symbols, and of
tautologies on the basis of these conventions.’ (1928a: 178) Those attending
Schlick’s lectures in 1933–34 were taught that ‘logical laws are sign-rules,
and thus rules that are ultimately laid down by ourselves, and could also
have been different.’ (1987: 107) And Hans Hahn argued that ‘logic [. . . ]
does not deal with any objects at all; it only deals with the way we talk about
objects’ (1933b: 29; emphasis in original). Thus, for instance, the laws of
excluded middle and non-contradiction are said to ‘express agreement about
the use of negation’2 (1933b: 32–3). These ideas greatly impressed A. J.
Ayer who confidently introduced them to Britain by announcing that all
necessity is analyticity and that analytic statements ‘simply record our de-
1While the approach was far from universally accepted, it was much discussed. Cf.
the symposia by Broad, Porteous and Jackson (1936), Ayer, Whiteley and Black (1936),
and Britton, Urmson and Kneale (1947), as well as papers by Quine (1936), Stebbing
(1936), Hardie (1938), Ewing (1940), Lewy (1940), Malcolm (1940) and Kneale (1946).
2There is another (partial) translation of this text (by Arthur Pap) in Ayer (1959).
Here it is said that it is a convention about the use of negation which is expressed. How-
ever, the original German has ‘Verabredung’, and reserving ‘convention’ for ‘Konvention’
seems like a good idea in this context. The German text can be found in Schulte and
McGuinness (1992).
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termination to use words in a certain fashion.’ (1936a: 114)
Wittgenstein, who discussed these ideas with members of the Vienna
Circle, wrote that: ‘the connexion which is not supposed to be a causal,
experiential one, but much stricter and harder, so rigid even, that the one
thing somehow already is the other, is always a connexion in grammar.’
(1978: Part I, §128) ‘Grammar’, moreover, ‘is not accountable to any re-
ality. It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and
so they themselves are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent
are arbitrary.’ (1974: Part I, §X.133) Thus: ‘the only correlate in language
to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule.’ (1974: Part I, §X.133; cf. also
1953: §372) Similar ideas were picked up, to varying degrees, by some of
Wittgenstein’s students and associates.3
Strawson, moreover, writes, in his Introduction to Logical Theory, that
all concepts of ‘logical appraisal’ may be explained in terms of inconsis-
tency, and that it is ‘our own activity of making language through using
it, our own determination of the limits of the application of words, that
makes inconsistency possible’. (1952: 9) ‘Behind inconsistencies between
statements’, therefore ‘stand rules for the use of expressions.’ (1952: 10)
Certainly, we can find differences between these authors (and, indeed,
between various formulations by the same author).4 Still, a distinct tra-
dition has, correctly to my mind, been identified here, centred around the
common idea that the special status of necessary (or logical)5 truths is due,
in some sense, to the conventionally adopted rules that determine the cor-
rect use of the relevant expressions. This, moreover, is generally contrasted
with the idea that logical necessities concern ‘reality’ or ‘objects’.
Turning now to more recent characterisations of the linguistic approach,
here are three typical examples, taken from Gillian Russell, Theodore Sider
3Including Wisdom (1938: 463), Lewy (1940), Malcolm (1940), Britton (1947), Laze-
rowitz (1972), and Ambrose (1974).
4For a systematic overview of some such differences, see Lambros (1975).
5Though the passages from Schlick, Hahn, Strawson, and Lewis and Langford men-
tion only logic specifically, it is quite clear, at least in Schlick’s and Hahn’s case, that
the explanation is supposed to account for necessary truths more generally.
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and Bob Hale, respectively:
My target in this paper is a view that has sometimes been called the
‘Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth’ and sometimes ‘Conven-
tionalism about necessity’. It is the view that necessity is grounded
in the meanings of our expressions – meanings which are sometimes
identified with the conventions governing those expressions – and
that our knowledge of that necessity is based on our knowledge of
those meanings or conventions. (G. Russell 2010: 267)
Behind the picture,6 I suspect, there lies an identifiable – and mis-
taken – philosophical doctrine: the doctrine of logical convention-
alism. [. . . ] Logical conventionalism originated in “the linguistic
theory of the a priori” [. . . ] The core of the view is that an ana-
lytic truth, for instance the truth that all horses are horses, is true
purely by virtue of linguistic conventions. By adopting certain rules
governing the use of logical words like ‘all’, language users somehow
make ‘all horses are horses’ true. (Sider 2011: 97–8)
Conventionalism – the thesis that necessary truths are simply truths
guaranteed by conventions governing the use of words – is in some
ways the clearest form of the doctrine of truth in virtue of meaning.
In my view, the reasons for its failure are equally clear and decisive.
(Hale 2013: 117)
There are interesting and important differences between these brief charac-
terisations. Firstly, Sider talks about truth by virtue of linguistic conven-
tions, Hale of truth guaranteed by such conventions, and Russell of necessity
being grounded in these. While the ‘by virtue of’ and ‘grounded in’ locutions
may be equivalent (perhaps only by being equally obscure), ‘guaranteed by’
is different. The existence of an aunt guarantees the existence of a niece or
a nephew, but that is not to say that the existence of the niece or nephew
6The ‘picture’ in question is the idea that logical expressions are formal and therefore
not “worldly” in some sense. Sider opposes this because he wants to argue that logical
expressions can carve the joints of worldly structures.
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is grounded in the existence of the aunt. Moreover, there is surely a big
difference between the idea that linguistic conventions can guarantee the
truth of sentences, and the idea that they can make sentences true, which
is how Sider puts it.
Secondly, Russell suggests that necessity can, on this view, be grounded
in meaning without being grounded in convention, whereas Sider and Hale
do not leave this possibility open. Related to this, Russell’s way of putting
it suggests that what she calls ‘the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth’
might be characterised as the view that necessity should be explained in
terms of analyticity. Sider, on the other hand, takes ‘the linguistic theory
of the a priori’ to be a particular view about what analyticity is.
Finally, in Russell’s formulation it is necessity which is grounded in
the meanings or conventions according to the conventionalist, whereas on
Sider’s it is truth.
These differences notwithstanding, as with the historical examples there
is enough in common here that we can take these passages to discuss the
same distinct tradition in the philosophy of modality and logic. It is this
tradition that I will refer to using the label ‘the linguistic approach’. To be
sure, the central thesis remains rather vague, and perhaps it will turn out
that inclusion in the tradition is best seen as a matter of family resemblance.
But it is legitimate to talk of a distinct tradition here, both historically and
as a matter of doctrine.
1.2 A Quinean Concern
It hardly needs pointing out that the characterisations provided above
would have to be developed a lot further in order to provide us with any-
thing like a satisfactory answer to Dummett’s twofold problem. What we
have here is only a starting-point.
Or so it seems, but it might be objected that it is generous to think
that we have even this much. For one standard objection to the linguistic
13
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approach is, not so much that it is mistaken, but that it is simply unclear,
upon scrutiny, what it amounts to. Characterisations like the above – and
related slogans such as ‘truth by convention’ and ‘truth in virtue of meaning’
– it is said, crumble once we try to make them explicit, providing us little
guidance, in the end, as to just what is being claimed and how we are to
assess whether it is true or not. Here is Quine’s formulation of the worry:
Consider, however, the logical truth ‘Everything is self-identical’, or
‘(x)(x = x)’. We can say that it depends for its truth on traits of the
language (specifically on the usage of ‘=’), and not on traits of its
subject-matter; but we can also say, alternatively, that it depends
on an obvious trait, viz., self-identity, of its subject matter, viz.,
everything. The tendency of our present reflections is that there is
no difference.
I have been using the vaguely psychological word “obvious” non-
technically, assigning it no explanatory value. My suggestion is
merely that the linguistic doctrine of elementary logical truth like-
wise leaves explanation unbegun. I do not suggest that the doctrine
is false and some doctrine of ultimate and inexplicable insight into
the obvious traits of reality true, but only that there is no real dif-
ference between these two pseudo-doctrines. (1960a: 355–6)
The context here is Carnap’s views on logical truth,7 and it is noteworthy
that Quine chooses the label ‘pseudo-doctrine’ to express his dissatisfac-
tion. After all, Carnap himself frequently complained that philosophical
disputes involved pseudo-doctrines aimed at addressing pseudo-questions
(cf. in particular: 1928b; 1932; 1950), and I suspect that Quine chose this
label precisely to alert Carnap to the fact that he was objecting on grounds
that he thought Carnap, of all people, would have to acknowledge.
7Though it is worth noting that the version which appears in Schilpp (1963) opens
with a preface where Quine concedes that he is unable to state his objections in Carnap’s
terms and that this ‘perhaps counts in favor of Carnap’s position.’
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To get to the core of Quine’s objection, then, it is useful to consider
what motivated Carnap’s own dissatisfaction with the “pseudo-doctrines”
of traditional metaphysics:
Even in the pre-Vienna period, most of the controversies in tradi-
tional metaphysics appeared to me sterile and useless. When I com-
pared this kind of argumentation with investigations and discussions
in empirical science or in the logical analysis of language, I was often
struck by the vagueness of the concepts used and by the inconclu-
sive nature of the arguments. I was depressed by disputations in
which the opponents talked at cross purposes; there seemed hardly
any chance of mutual understanding, let alone of agreement, because
there was not even a common criterion for deciding the controversy.
(Carnap 1963a: 44–5)
One nice feature of this passage is that it brings out that Carnap’s hostility
towards traditional metaphysics was motivated, not by a dogmatic pre-
sumption in favour of verificationism, but by a belief in the importance of
communal standards in intellectual enquiry. As the positivists saw things,
wildly speculative and sometimes genuinely dangerous metaphysical sys-
tems were allowed to develop without any checks and balances – standards
to which intellectual inquiry could be held accountable. The lack of such
standards was perceived to be a serious obstacle to progress, both intellec-
tually and politically.
This is precisely what Quine thinks is lacking in the present context.
In calling the linguistic approach a pseudo-doctrine, he is expressing his
concern that a debate between an adherent of this approach and someone
who advocates, say, ‘some doctrine of ultimate and inexplicable insight into
the obvious traits of reality’ is going to be precisely the kind of debate that
Carnap himself would want to avoid, because it would be lacking ‘a common
criterion for deciding the controversy’.
The demand for some such criterion is clearly a sensible one. However,
this is not to say that we have to accept anything like the stringent standards
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of Quine or the logical positivists. We need not demand, that is, that
the linguistic approach must have empirical significance or be capable of
something like formal proof. What we do need is an appropriately detailed
account of which kinds of considerations would speak in favour of it, and
what would speak against it. This, then, is our initial question:
What are the distinctive, practically workable, commitments of
the linguistic approach?
In asking for distinctive commitments, we are asking for commitments that
suffice to pin down an answer to the Dummett’s question – that is, commit-
ments which single out a particular account of the source of necessity and
modal knowledge. It is not enough, however, to pin down such an answer.
We also need to know what could actually be done to show that the an-
swer is a good or a bad one. This is the point about asking for practically
workable commitments. What does a proponent of the approach need to
do? What is required from a refutation? We are not, of course, asking
for a decision procedure, but an appropriately vague description of what a
defence or refutation of the approach would look like.
The difficulty is that these two demands often pull in opposite directions.
As we will see, attempts at explicating the kinds of characterisations we
looked at in section 1.1 frequently leave us with no distinctive commitments
at all, and natural strategies for rectifying this introduce notions which
obscure how the relevant issues are to be settled, or, alternatively, end up
rendering the linguistic approach obviously mistaken. This general pattern
is quite recognisable in the literature. Thus, for instance, we find Arthur
Pap complaining that ‘to the extent to which a radical linguistic theory is
true it is mostly trivial, and to the extent that it is not trivial, it is either
false or meaningless’ (1958: 163).
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1.3 The Threat of Triviality
As we saw in section 1.1, the linguistic approach is sometimes characterised
as the view that necessary truths are truths which are ‘guaranteed by the
linguistic conventions’. It is natural, therefore, to suggest that an adherent
of the linguistic approach is committed to something along the lines of:
(Guarantee). A sentence S is a necessary truth iff the truth
of S is guaranteed by the conventions governing the use of words
occurring in S.
We do, of course, have a good grasp on how to assess whether biconditionals
are true or not: The question is whether the concept on the left-hand side is
coextensional with that on the right-hand side. This, however, presupposes
that we have an adequate grasp on when these concepts apply, and this
is not clear when it comes to the right-hand side here. How do we settle,
in any given case, whether the truth of a sentence S is guaranteed by the
relevant linguistic conventions or not? Indeed, this is precisely the kind of
question we find Quine pressing in the passage above.
A straightforward suggestion would be to spell out the notion of a guar-
antee modally, so as to get:
(Modal). A sentence S is a necessary truth iff, necessarily,
any sentence governed by the same linguistic conventions will
be true.
Any immediate concern here is that this appeal to necessity comes with a
circularity threat since necessity is precisely what we are trying to account
for. This, however, is not the problem I want to focus on, since it is not
too difficult to see that suggestions along these lines are heading for trouble
regardless of this.
The problem, essentially, is that accepting (Modal) is consistent with
just about any view concerning the source of necessity, and so fails to pro-
vide us with any distinctive commitments. To see this, note that anyone
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who thinks that the linguistic conventions determine which proposition any
given sentence expresses will be committed to the left-to-right direction of
(Modal). If a sentence S is necessary – if, that is, it expresses a necessary
proposition – and the relevant conventions suffice to ensure that it expresses
the proposition that it does, then it follows that any sentence governed by
the same conventions will be true and indeed necessarily so. This, however,
might simply be due to the fact that the conventions suffice to correlate the
given sentence with a necessary proposition. Nothing follows about where
that necessity ultimately came from.
As Theodore Sider puts it when rejecting a close cousin of (Modal)
– namely the idea that necessary truths “automatically” become true once
endowed with meaning via the linguistic conventions:
The mere fact that it is necessarily true that it is raining if it is rain-
ing ensures that ‘If it is raining then it is raining’ is “automatically”
– in the current sense of ‘automatically’ – true once it has been given
its meaning. Conventionalism thus understood says little more than
that logical and other analytic truths are necessary; nothing is left
of the intuitive idea of their truth being grounded in conventions.
(Sider 2011: 101)
Now, it is certainly far from clear that we should accept that the linguis-
tic conventions always suffice to determine what propositions a sentence
expresses (even a modest amount of semantic externalism should make us
sceptical of this). The point, however, is not that it is mandatory to accept
(Modal), but that its status turns out to be largely independent of the
questions we are interested it.8 Even assuming it be true, we are not forced
into any particular view about the source of necessity.
Although (Modal) might not seem like a promising candidate to begin
with, the problem just noted generalises to various other proposals we find
8I might add that there are some complications with the right-to-left direction of
(Modal). A sentence like ‘this sentence is meaningful’ is arguably such that, necessarily,
any sentence governed by the same linguistic conventions will be true. Still, this sentence
isn’t necessary. Edward Craig seems to overlook such cases in the presentation of an
argument which has informed the present discussion (cf. Craig 1975: 3–5).
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in the literature. In the writings of the logical positivists, for instance, we
frequently find passages such as:
To ascertain the truth of some sentences, e.g., “Some dogs are black”,
it is further necessary to know certain facts of the world. In the case
of other sentences, e.g., “all black dogs are black”, this is not neces-
sary; to understand them is a sufficient basis for the determination
of their truth. (Carnap 1963a: 915)
However, we can accept this passage in its entirety without committing
ourselves to a particular view about what is responsible for the special
status of the latter sentence. Simply put, we are in Euthyphro territory: Is
the sentence necessary because understanding it suffices for knowing that it
is true, or does understanding it suffice for knowing that it is true because it
expresses a necessary proposition? The problem with (Modal) and related
formulation is that they do not pin down answers to such questions.
1.4 The Threat of Obscurity
As the Euthyphro analogy suggests, the problems in the previous section
arose because we were not being explicit on what is meant to explain what.
The linguistic approach is meant to be a view about why necessary truths
are necessary, but (Modal) and nearby suggestions only claim a correlation
and are thus too coarse to capture this.
This suggests a straightforward fix. Why not just build the explanatory
relation into our formulation of the commitments of the linguistic approach?
As the passages quoted in section 1.2 indicate, there is no shortage of lo-
cutions in the philosopher’s vocabulary which could be used here. Popular
choices include: logical necessity is grounded in linguistic matters; it is due
to language; it is reducible to linguistic facts; linguistic conventions act
as truth-makers for necessary truths, or perhaps necessity-makers (Sidelle
1989: 10); modal facts obtain in virtue of linguistic facts; and the list goes
on.
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Picking a particularly popular candidate, an alternative way of spelling
out (Guarantee) would be:
(Ground). A sentence S is a necessary truth iff the truth of
S is grounded in the conventions governing the use of words
occurring in S.9
This does, I suppose, suffice to pin down a partial answer to Dummett’s
question, but the problem now is that it becomes less clear how to settle
whether it is correct or not. This is not to say that the notion of grounding
is inherently obscure and never useful. But even if we suppose that we
understand the notion perfectly well, it remains the case that we do not
have a good practical grasp on how to settle, for any particular grounding
claim, whether it is true or not.
We are, effectively, just back in the predicament Quine complained
about. How are we to settle whether the truth (or necessity) of ‘everything
is self-identical’ is grounded in the linguistic conventions or, say, some ob-
vious fact about reality? Whatever we think of the notion of grounding in
general, it is difficult to see that it is suited to advance matters here. Briefly
put: insofar as Quine had a point in his objection to Carnap, appealing to
something like grounding is hardly a solution. It does not provide us with
an improved grasp on, so to speak, the ‘rules of the game’.
A further problem with this strategy is that grounding is a hyperinten-
sional notion, which would mean that insofar as the grounding relation is
itself understood to be objective and language-independent it would be off
limits to the adherent of the linguistic approach. If grounding relations are
objective, language-independent features of reality, then there is not much
point in denying that modality is.
At this point we are confronted with something like a dilemma: We could
either refrain from appealing to something like grounding, and stay silent
9In fact, Russell (2010: 267), Sider (2011: 101) and Hale (2013: 117) all appeal to
grounding to characterise the linguistic approach, although, as we have seen, Hale also
employs other, non-equivalent notions.
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on what explains what, thereby running the significant risk of ending up
with no distinctive commitments at all. Or we could use some such notion
to stipulate a particular explanatory relationship, but then risk losing our
grasp on how to settle the question.
1.5 A Different Perspective on Explanation
The way forwards is to approach the notion of explanation from a different
perspective. It is indeed correct that the linguistic approach is a view
about what explains necessity, and this needs to figure in an account of its
commitments. However, we need not think of this in terms of a commitment
to a claim along the lines of (Ground). Rather, the linguistic approach
should be viewed as a commitment to actually carrying out an explanatory
project of a particular kind.
The notion of grounding can be said to encapsulate a form of realism
about explanation (Bliss and Trogdon 2016). According to the grounding-
enthusiast, to say that X explains Y is to say that the objective relation of
explanation – grounding – holds between X and Y. The problem of arguing
about this then presents itself in the form: How can we settle whether this
relation is really there in a given case?
It is, however, possible to think of explanation along different lines.
Explanation, it may be said, is something we do. To say that X explains
Y is just to say that we can make Y intelligible in terms of X. If we can
do this, we should be content – at least until and unless we discover new or
remaining problems. As long as the explanation is a good explanation by all
internal/operational criteria, there is no point in worrying about whether
we are in fact tracking the (supposedly) real explanatory relations.
On such a conception, committing to ‘X explains Y ’ is not to be un-
derstood as a commitment to there being a relation of grounding holding
between X and Y, but as a commitment to actually providing a detailed
account which makes Y intelligible in terms of X. This is not, it is im-
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portant to note, to say that a good explanation is nothing more than an
explanation which is psychologically convincing. As Michael Scriven puts
it in the context of discussing historical explanations:
In so far as there are different respects in which one can be said to
lack understanding of an act, a condition, a tendency a law, etc., so
far there are different ways in which it can be explained. For histor-
ical explanations this does not have the consequence that explana-
tions are judged by some purely subjective standard of empathetic
acceptability, since to say that an historical phenomenon is under-
stood is not to say that someone (or everyone) thinks he understands
it. There are objective tests for understanding just as for knowing
or inferring. (1959: 452)
Rejecting the idea that explanations are aimed at tracking objective ex-
planatory relations is consistent with maintaining that explanations are
offered, so to speak, within ‘the space of reasons’. Someone who wishes to
reject a proposed explanation cannot merely insist that they are not satis-
fied with it. They should be able to say just why they think the explanation
doesn’t work – by, e.g., pointing to a gap or denying some claim which the
explanation relies on. Correspondingly, someone who offers an explanation
cannot simply ignore such challenges by insisting that they do, after all,
find the explanation enlightening.
Of course, there are no algorithms for determining just what challenges
we are obliged to take seriously, but this is as it should be. The point is
just that we do, after all, have a good grasp on how to evaluate expla-
nations: We assess whether what is appealed to in the explanation (the
‘explanans’ in somewhat antiquated terminology) is true, we look for gaps,
hidden assumptions, vicious circularities and so on.
Now, the grounding enthusiast may well try to appropriate this and
say that these are simply the criteria we use to determine whether the
grounding relation is present. This is not something I want to quarrel with
here, but I do want to maintain that an appeal to grounding would remain,
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as Wittgenstein might have put it, an ‘idle wheel’ in this context. For even
if it said that our ability to make Y intelligible in terms of X somehow
indicates that X metaphysically grounds Y, this still wouldn’t affect how
we actually assess proposed explanations. For all practical purposes the
question is just whether the explanations work by our operational criteria.
1.6 Characterising the Commitments
Let us now consider how this can inform our conception of the distinctive
practical commitments of the linguistic approach. The suggestion is that
this approach should be seen, not so much as a commitment to a particular
claim, but as a commitment to offering explanations of how necessary truths
get to be necessary which appeal only to “linguistic matters” – i.e. matters
related to conventionally adopted rules governing the use of linguistic ex-
pressions. We can thus think of the commitments of the linguistic approach
in terms of a restriction on what resources we can draw on when offering
explanations of necessary truths. Just what these resources are (what gets
to count as a linguistic matter in the above sense) is indeed a substantial
question which we shall say more about in the next two chapters.
The point, for now, is that if we assume that we have a decent grasp on
this (and we do, of course, have some grasp on this already), then this does
provide us with a conception of the distinctive and practically workable
conception of the commitments of the linguistic approach. An adherent of
this approach needs to provide detailed explanations, purporting to show
how the necessity of actual cases of necessary truth can be understood in
terms of the rules that govern how we represent the world in language. The
debate will then focus on:
(A) Whether these are in fact good explanations. In particular:
(i) Whether the explanans is indeed true.
(ii) Whether there are any problematic gaps or hidden assumptions
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in the explanation.
(B) If so, whether the restriction to ‘linguistic matters’ is in fact respected.
(C) If so, whether there are recalcitrant cases which seem to resist expla-
nation along similar lines.
This, then, is our reply to the Quinean concern: If the question is how we
are to decide between the linguistic approach and ‘some doctrine of ultimate
and inexplicable insight into the obvious traits of reality’, the answer must
be that the devil is in the details. We need to see detailed explanations and
assess them according to (appropriate versions of) the above criteria.10
I am, then, advocating a change in perspective, relative to some recent
discussions, when it comes to how we should approach the commitments of
the linguistic approach. The focus should be, not on whether some claim
along the lines of ‘necessary truths are truths guaranteed by the linguistic
conventions’ is true or not, but on whether an explanatory project of a
particular kind can be carried out.
This is, I should add, also how adherents of the linguistic approach
saw things – at least in their best moments. In Carnap’s Introduction
to Semantics, for instance, L-truth (‘truth based on logical grounds’) is
explicated as truth based on the semantic rules of the relevant language.
However, the suggestion is not that these rules somehow manage to fix or
guarantee the truth of certain sentences. If it were, then we would indeed
be right to ask, with Quine, how to assess whether or not this is so. Instead,
what Carnap says is that a sentence is L-true if it can be shown to be true
using only the semantic rules of the language, without referring to “facts”
(1942: 78). The question then becomes whether the rules are in fact up for
the job Carnap has envisaged for them .11
10It is worth noting that Quine himself would presumably be unmoved by this. But
that is because he would reject the idea that there is such a thing as necessary truth
which calls for explanation.
11Carnap’s account in his post-syntax period is not always given the attention it
deserves in discussions of the linguistic approach, but Philip Kitcher’s discussion of what
he calls ‘conceptualism’ is a welcome exception (1984: ch. 4).
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Russell once remarked that the advantages of postulating what we want
‘are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil’ (1919: 71). It is
natural, perhaps, to suggest that this applies to the linguistic approach as
well. This charge, however, is unfair if the commitments of the approach are
understood along the above lines – honest toil is then very much needed.12
12In fact, the demands are arguably greater on the adherent of the linguistic approach
than on those advocating a robustly realist view of modality. The realist, after all, can
accept that there are brute facts about modality which we may have no way of accounting
for (cf. D. Lewis 1986: 103).
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The Roots of the Linguistic Approach
In this chapter and the next I will argue that the linguistic approach, as
it emerged in the writings of the logical positivists, is best understood as
a variation on a fundamentally Kantian theme. More specifically, my con-
tention is that it should be understood as a linguistic turn (inspired by
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus), with a strong emphasis on convention (inspired
by Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism), on what we may call Kant’s
‘subjective-constitutive strategy’.
There are therefore three main historical influences which we need to
consider in order to get a firm grasp on how the linguistic approach is meant
to work: i) Kant’s subjective-constitutive strategy, ii) Wittgenstein’s lin-
guistic turn, and iii) Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism. In this chapter
I introduce these ideas and the resources they provide us with when it comes
to addressing the problem of necessity. An overarching theme will be that
both the linguistic turn and Poincaré’s conventionalism can themselves be
understood as instances of the subjective-constitutive strategy, and that
these developments improve on Kant’s original version in various respects.
In the next chapter, then, I shall look at how these ideas came together in
the writings of the logical positivists.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce three important influ-
ences on the linguistic approach, and to explain how these ideas are meant
to work when it comes to addressing the problem of necessity with which we
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started. This will then feed back into our account of the practically work-
able commitments of the linguistic approach, since we shall then be able to
say more about what an explanation in accordance with this approach can
and cannot appeal to, without undermining the ideas that motivated it in
the first place.
2.1 Kant’s Subjective-Constitutive Strategy
Some may find it odd to include Kant as a key influence on the logical
positivists, especially when the issue is how to think about necessity and
the a priori.1 After all, the rejection of the synthetic a priori came to be
one of the central tenets of logical positivism. This contrast is indisputable
(although it is disputable whether the positivists were faithful to Kant’s
analytic-synthetic distinction when voicing their opposition). But although
the positivists disagreed with Kant on this issue of how to categorise our
knowledge, there is, I shall argue, a deep affinity between Kant’s strategy
for explaining the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, and the posi-
tivists’ strategy for explaining the possibility of analytic/logical knowledge.
Such a connection would not be very surprising since no one in the
German speaking world at the time could have escaped Kantian influence.
Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that Kant was an important early
influence on some of the most prominent members of both the Vienna Circle
and the Berlin Society. Schlick, Carnap and Reichenbach, for instance, were
all brought up on (neo-)Kantian ideas.2 Moreover, as I shall go on to argue,
1The positivists tended not to distinguish these. It is sometimes said that they failed
to see that a distinction could be drawn, but this is potentially unfair since they typically
maintained that neither notion was rigorous enough for their purposes, and preferred to
provide some explication for the (single) phenomenon they thought needed explaining.
2For more on Schlick’s Kantian roots, see Coffa (1991: ch. 9) and Friedman (1983).
Carnap acknowledges Kant as an early influence in his autobiography (1963a: 4) – an
influence which is evident in his dissertation Der Raum (published as Carnap 1922). For
more on this, see Richardson (1998: ch. 6) and Carus (2007: ch. 4). Reichenbach, finally,
refers to himself as ‘originally Kantian’ (1936: 4), and his first major work (1920), though
partly a discussion of the departures from Kant that the theory of relativity mandates,
is as much a discussion of which Kantian elements should be retained.
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the positivists may also have inherited some Kantian ideas via Poincaré and
(more contentiously) Wittgenstein.
I should say that my aim in what follows is not to provide the best
possible Kant exegesis (clearly a task for an entirely different occasion), but
to highlight certain features of the Kantian framework which are important
to the understanding of the linguistic approach.
Kant’s Problem
The Critique of Pure Reason was written to address the question of how
synthetic a priori judgements are possible, and specifically how such judge-
ments get their necessity and strict universality (Kant 1787: B3–4). Kant
too, then, is concerned with the problem of necessity; for it is the fact that
we have knowledge of necessities which leads him to search for an alterna-
tive, non-empirical, source of knowledge.
By the time he started working on the Critique, Kant had become con-
vinced that this problem was unsolvable within the framework of his in-
augural dissertation. There he had argued that ‘things which are thought
sensitively are representations of things as they appear, while things which
are intellectual are representations of things as they are.’ (Kant 1770: 2:392)
Moreover, sensibility (i.e. the faculty which provides the basis for ‘thinking
things sensitively’) was said to be that ‘in virtue of which it is possible for
the subject’s own representative state to be affected in a definite way by
the presence of some object.’ (1770: 2:392) Since intellectual representation
does not involve being affected in this way, such representations are a priori.
Two years later, in his famous letter to Marcus Herz, Kant explains why
he is now dissatisfied with this framework:
I silently passed over the further question of how a representation
that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can
be possible. [. . . ] if such intellectual representations depend on our
inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed
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to have with objects – objects that are nevertheless not possibly
produced thereby? (1772: 10:130–1)
This question, Kant thinks, could not be answered while retaining his earlier
assumptions. The following three theses cannot all be maintained:
(Independence.) The intellect provides us with representa-
tions of things as they are in themselves (independently of how
they are presented to us).
(Apriority.) These representations are not due to us be-
ing affected by the objects.
(Justification.) We are justified in thinking that these
representations agree with what these objects are actually like.
The problem, which I shall refer to as ‘the problem of inexplicable agree-
ment’, is that (Independence) and (Apriority) together make it inex-
plicable why there should be agreement between our representations and
how things actually are, thereby undermining (Justification). Indeed,
there is, potentially, a more fundamental problem here: If we are not af-
fected by the objects, how do we get to represent them at all (rightly or
wrongly)?3
The Copernican Revolution
Kant’s response, of course, was not to reject either (Apriority) or (Jus-
tification), but (Independence), maintaining instead that ‘we can
cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.’
(1787: Bxviii) This is the subjective element of what I am calling Kant’s
‘subjective-constitutive strategy’: A priori knowledge is essentially self-
knowledge. More accurately, it is reflective knowledge of what we ourselves
3These problems clearly have a lot in common with what is sometimes referred to as
‘Benacerraf’s problem’ (cf. Benacerraf 1973).
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contribute in cognition and thought. When I know a priori that any ob-
ject I encounter must have certain features, what I really know is something
about the subjective principles that determine what can be experienced and
thought by me. I know, that is, that the objects I encounter will be in ac-
cordance with the subjective principles which make experience and thought
possible:
There is therefore only one way possible for my intuition to precede
the actuality of the object and occur as an a priori cognition, namely
if it contains nothing else except the form of sensibility, which in me
as subject precedes all actual impressions through which I am affected
by objects. For I can know a priori that the objects of the senses can
be intuited only in accordance with this form of sensibility. (1783:
4:282)
We can have a priori knowledge of geometry, for instance, because such
knowledge concerns, not a domain of independently existing geometrical
objects, but rather the principles which structure our experiences of outer
objects and make such experiences possible. I know that I won’t encounter
a counterexample to (for Kant) Euclidean geometry, because this geometry
provides the structure which all my outer experiences must conform to.
Obstacles to Genuine Necessity
Suppose that we grant both that there are such subjective principles which
govern what can be experienced and thought, and that we can have some
sort of transcendental insight into the workings of these principles. Would
this ensure that what we know on this basis is genuinely necessary? Many
have thought not. Here, for instance, is Bertrand Russell:
The thing to be accounted for is our certainty that the facts must
always conform to logic and arithmetic. To say that logic and arith-
metic is contributed by us does not account for this. Our nature
is just as much a fact of the existing world as anything, and there
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can be no certainty that it will remain constant. It might happen,
if Kant is right, that to-morrow our nature would so change as to
make two and two become five. This possibility seems never to have
occurred to him, yet it is one which utterly destroys the certainty
and universality which he is anxious to vindicate for arithmetical
propositions. (1912: 134–5)
Kant, Russell thinks, is at most able to explain why we do not presently
experience counter-arithmetical states of affairs. But unless we can be con-
fident that our cognitive faculties must remain fixed, we are not entitled
to reject the hypothesis that we might nevertheless on day encounter such
states of affairs in experience. Let us call this ‘the objection from alteration’.
Moreover, even if we suppose that the nature of our minds must re-
main fixed, Kant’s position, as Russell understands it, is hardly capable
of accounting for the genuine necessity and strict universality of a priori
propositions. Nothing has been said, after all, to rule out the possibility
that there could be counter-arithmetical states of affairs, but that, because
they are counter-arithmetical, they cannot be experienced by us. Russell,
touches upon this concern too, when he writes:
Reflection, moreover, seems to make it clear that, if there is any
truth in our arithmetical beliefs, they must apply to things equally
whether we think of them or not. [. . . ] Thus, Kant’s solution unduly
limits the scope of a priori propositions’ (1912: 135–6).
Let us call this ‘the objection from restriction’.
A variation on this gives us a third objection: If the constitution of our
minds does not just filter the input so that only what is in accordance with
arithmetic gets through, but actively structures the input so as to be in
accordance with arithmetic, then the worry arises that while we can only
experience things to be in accordance with arithmetic, they might really be
counter-arithmetical. This is reminiscent of one of Barry Stroud’s objections
to the use of ‘transcendental arguments’ in the analytic tradition:
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The skeptic can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to make
language possible if we believe that S is true, or if it looks for all the
world as if it is, but that S needn’t actually be true. (1968: 255)
Let us call this ‘the objection from distortion’.
At this point, Kant’s strategy seems quite unsuited to account for the
strict universality and genuine necessity of a priori propositions. Take a
proposition of the form ‘all X are Y ’. The objection from restriction forces us
to retreat to: ‘all X capable of being perceived by us are Y ’. The objection
from distortion takes us to: ‘all X capable of being perceived by us seem
to be Y in experience’. And the objection from alteration, finally, leaves
us with: ‘all X capable of being perceived by us seem to be Y to us unless
there is a change in our cognitive faculties’.
The Subjective-Constitutive Strategy
These objections, however, rest on an oversimplified interpretation of Kant’s
ideas. While this interpretation correctly identifies the importance of sub-
jective principles, it neglects the crucially constitutive role which these are
meant to play.
Many interpreters of Kant have been puzzled by the fact that he not
only argues that since space is a form of intuition, we cannot assume that
things in themselves are spatial, but instead makes the stronger claim that
things in themselves must be non-spatial, and that space is a mere form of
intuition:
If we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitu-
tion of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of
objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would
disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but
only in us. (1787: A42/B59)
Shouldn’t he rather have remained agnostic about the objective reality of
space, and thus allowed for the so-called ‘neglected alternative’ (Hogan
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2010: 30) – namely that space is both a form of intuition and objectively
real?
The answer is that this alternative is not neglected. Rather, it is pre-
cisely by denying that space is objectively real that Kant thinks he can
establish the genuine necessity of for instance geometry:
Pure mathematics, and especially pure geometry, can have objective
reality only under the single condition that it refers merely to objects
of the senses, with regard to which objects, however, the principle
remains fixed, that our sensory representation is by no means a rep-
resentation of things in themselves, but only of the way in which
they appear to us. From this it follows, not at all that the proposi-
tions of geometry are determinations of a mere figment of our poetic
phantasy, and therefore could not with certainty be referred to ac-
tual objects, but rather, that they are valid necessarily for space and
consequently for everything that may be found in space, because
space is nothing other than the form of all outer appearances, under
which alone objects of the senses can be given to us. (1783: 4:287)
It is because space is ‘nothing other than the form of all outer appearances’,
that the propositions of geometry are ‘valid necessarily’ rather than ‘deter-
minations of a mere figment of our poetic phantasy’. And the best way to
appreciate Kant’s reasoning here is to consider precisely worries like those
introduced in the previous section.
One such worry was that Kant’s strategy can only guarantee that, e.g.,
any triangle encountered in experience must conform to the theorems of
(Euclidean) geometry, but that there might really be counterexamples to
those theorems. If, however, space is a mere form of intuition, then this
worry makes no sense. The domain of spatial objects cannot be greater
than the domain of objects that I can encounter in outer intuition. Instead,
the principles that govern the form of outer intuition are at the same time
constitutive of the spatial objects, so that the notion of a spatial object is
automatically a notion of an object capable of being experienced.
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This is the point of Kant’s insistence that ‘the conditions of the pos-
sibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the
possibility of the objects of experience, and on this account have ob-
jective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori.’ (1787: A158/B197) Indeed,
Kant is quite explicit that this is what is meant to block worries like those
considered above:
If this subjective condition regarding form were not at the same time
the universal a priori condition under which alone the object of this
(outer) intuition is itself possible; if the object (the triangle) were
something in itself without relation to your subject: then how could
you say that what necessarily lies in your subjective conditions for
constructing a triangle must also necessarily pertain to the triangle
in itself? (1787: A48/B65)
It is, then, by making the principles constitutive of the relevant objects that
Kant thinks he can solve, or rather dissolve, the problem of inexplicable
agreement. The point of denying that, e.g., the triangle is something “in
itself”, is that this gets rid of the idea that there is a subject-independent
standard to which our theorems of geometry must agree – thereby dissolving
the worry that the verdicts we reach concerning triangles via a priori rea-
soning could still fail to agree with what triangles are actually like. Briefly
put, the focus on subjective principles is meant to allow for the possibility of
knowledge without input from external objects via the senses, and making
these principles constitutive is meant to remove the notion of an external,
subject-independent standard of correctness which judgements reached by
reflecting on these principles could nevertheless fall short of.
We can summarise the main tenets of Kant’s subjective-constitutive
strategy as follows:
(A) The starting-point is a problem of agreement between our judgements
and reality in the absence of any external input.
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(B) The answer takes place against the backdrop of a distinction between
form and matter in experience and thought.
(C) The formal principles are said to be contributed by the subject rather
than the objects of knowledge. Therefore, in so far as the form in
concerned, there is no need from input from the objects.
(D) The subjective-formal principles are said to be constitutive of the rel-
evant objects. That is, the objective (subject-independent) reality of
these objects is denied, meaning that there is no subject-independent
standard of correctness which our judgements could fall short of. This
is meant to dissolve the problem of inexplicable agreement.
Difficulties with the Kantian Answer
Before considering how these ideas were transformed by Poincaré and (ar-
guably) Wittgenstein and later came together in the logical positivists’ ac-
count of logical/necessary truth, I shall highlight four difficulties with the
specifics of Kant’s answer. This will allow us to see how the developments
that lead to the linguistic approach might be said to improve on Kant.
Firstly, it is fair to say that Kant’s claim that space and time are ideal
has proved difficult to swallow. While Kant was eager to stress that his
transcendental idealism is compatible with ‘empirical realism’ (1787: A370),
others, it turned out, found this less comforting that he himself did. In ad-
dition to the sheer radical nature of the idea that space and time disappear
once the subject is removed from the equation, there are other potential
problems: Can we, for instance, make sense of sensation as a kind of input
from objects without the notion of spatial distinctness? There is, of course,
a vast amount that could be said here, but on the face of it at least, idealism
about space and time is an obstacle to accepting the Kantian position.
A second but related problem concerns how Kant argues for this thesis.
At least on the above interpretation the strategy is dialectically peculiar.
Kant is relying on the claim that e.g. geometry could be genuinely necessary
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only if space is ideal, and thus argues from the genuine necessity of geometry
to the ideality of space. But we are given little reason to prefer modus
ponens over modes tollens here, and as a consequence, it is not clear what
reason we have to think that Kant is right about the ideality of space.4
Thirdly, while Kant’s subjective-constitutive strategy might provide a
response to the objections from restriction and distortion, it is not obvious
that he has a satisfactory response to the objection from alteration. Russell
asked, recall, for reassurance that we will never wake up to find that 2+2
has become 5. The subjective-constitutive strategy does provide a potential
response: While we may not be able to rule out a change in our cognitive
faculties, different subjective principles would be constitutive of different
objects, and so could not give rise to counterexamples to what we now take
to be necessary.
However, though such a response may be possible, it is far from clear
that it is plausible in Kant’s case. It is not clear, for instance, that a form
of outer intuition governed by a different geometry would simply be con-
stitutive of different objects. Even if Kant had been right about Euclidean
geometry providing this form, he was never, it seems, in a position to rule
out that this might change in such a way that, say, hyperbolic geometry
takes over this role. And why shouldn’t we say that, if so, then we would
encounter counterexamples – in the form of for instance non-Euclidean tri-
angles – to what was initially held to be necessary?
Fourthly, although Kant’s appeal to subjective principles may succeed in
explaining how we can do without external input in the case of knowledge of
necessities, we are left with the question of how we get to have insight into
the workings of these subjective principles. How, that is, are we supposed to
know what the subjective-constitutive principles are? Why isn’t this just an
empirical question that should be settled by something like experimental
psychology? Kant’s strategy requires something like an epistemology of
“transcendental psychology”, but it is not clear what this would be.
4Paul Guyer criticises Kant along these lines (cf. 1987: 362–9; 2008: 91–5 2014: 74).
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2.2 Poincaré’s Geometric Conventionalism
In the next chapter I will argue that the linguistic approach to modal-
ity should be viewed as a version of the subjective-constitutive strategy.
Clearly, though, there are significant differences between Kant’s position
and that arrived at by the logical positivists, and one obvious such differ-
ence concerns the positivists’ appeal to the notion of convention.
The positivist largely inherited the emphasis on convention from
Poincaré’s work on the nature of geometry. In this section I argue that
although Poincaré of course departs from Kant in a number of ways, his
conception of geometry does not depart from the subjective-constitutive
strategy as such. In fact, the appeal to convention is particularly well-
suited to the needs of this strategy – allowing us to address some of the
problems just outlined regarding the specifics of Kant’s solution.
Poincaré and Kant
Although Poincaré’s conception of geometry differs from Kant’s in a number
of ways, the overall context is ‘conspicuously Kantian’ (Ben-Menahem 2006:
42). The conclusion to chapter 4 of Science and Hypothesis is particularly
helpful when it comes to identifying the Kantian as well as the anti-Kantian
elements of his position:
Geometry [. . . ] is not concerned with natural solids: its object is
certain ideal solids, absolutely invariable, which are but a greatly
simplified and very remote image of them. The concept of these
ideal bodies is entirely mental, and experiment is but the opportunity
which enables us to reach the idea. The object of geometry is the
study of a particular “group”;5 but the general concept of a group
pre-exists in our minds, at least potentially. It is imposed on us not
5The context here is Klein’s ‘Erlangen program’ (1872). The idea is to associate each
geometry with a group of transformations on a geometrical space, so that the geometrical
properties are those which are invariant under such transformations. For more on this,
see e.g. Brannan, Esplen and Gray (2012: ch. 8).
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as a form of our sensitiveness, but as a form of our understanding;
only, from among all possible groups, we must choose one that will be
the standard, so to speak, to which we shall refer natural phenomena.
(1902: 70)
The talk about geometry as concerned with ideal bodies whose concept is
entirely mental and, moreover, forms of sensitiveness and understanding
clearly echoes Kant. Like Kant, Poincaré aims to explain the peculiar sta-
tus of geometry by emphasising the active role of our cognitive faculties.
Geometry is saved from being ‘approximate and provisory’ because it is not
an (empirical) study of solid bodies, but rather the study of a group that
pre-exists in our minds (at least potentially) and to which we refer natural
phenomena. ‘Space’, he writes in his preface, ‘is another framework which
we impose on the world.’ (1902: xxv)
There are, however, two clear departures from Kant here: Firstly, ge-
ometry is relocated from our sensitivity to our understanding. Secondly,
and more significantly for our purposes, we are said to have a choice when
it comes to which geometry we shall ‘impose on the world’. Because of this,
geometry cannot be synthetic a priori, and so Poincaré concludes that a
new epistemological category is needed: ‘The geometrical axioms are there-
fore neither synthetic a priori intuitions nor experimental facts. They are
conventions.’ (Poincaré 1902: 50)
Poincaré’s claim that we have a choice when it comes to geometry is, of
course, based on the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries.6 But the point
is not simply that there are consistent alternatives to Euclid. This, after
all, is not bad news for Kant; if denying a Euclidean postulate invariably
led to contradiction, this would render geometry analytic, at least by one
of Kant’s criteria (1783: 4:267).
Poincaré’s point, rather, is that if the geometrical axioms were synthetic
a priori, they would be ‘imposed on us with such a force that we could
6It is worth noting, though, that Poincaré holds this choice to be quite restricted,
since he assumes that ‘the movement of an invariable figure is possible’ (1902: 47), and
so thinks (we would say mistakenly) that we must use a geometry of constant curvature.
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not conceive of the contrary proposition, nor could we build upon it a
theoretical edifice.’ (1902: 48) One lesson of Poincaré’s famous ‘hyperbolic
world’ thought experiment, however, is that, not only can we consistently
deviate from Euclidean geometry:
there is nothing [. . . ] to prevent us from imagining a series of rep-
resentations, similar to our ordinary representations, but succeeding
one another according to laws which differ from those which we are
accustomed to. We may thus conceive that beings whose education
has taken place in a medium in which those laws would be so different
might have a very different geometry than us. (1902: 64–5)
Had things been different, it is quite conceivable, Poincaré thinks, that we
would have used a different geometry. Consequently, it cannot be synthetic
a priori in Kant’s sense. Still, Poincaré insists that we should not say that a
different geometry would be empirically confirmed in such a scenario, and it
is Poincaré’s line of reasoning here that allows us to see his conventionalism
as an instance of the subjective-constitutive strategy.
Against the Empiricist Conception of Geometry
Poincaré’s complaint that ‘if [geometry] were experimental, it would only be
approximate and provisory’, can hardly be expected to convince someone
who thinks that geometry is an empirical matter. As Yemina Ben-Menahem
puts it: ‘It is almost as if he said “Were it empirical, it would be empirical.”’
(2006: 46)
He does, however, have other arguments. In particular, he is adamant
that no experiment could ever force us to accept a particular geometry
(1902: 75). It is a mistake, for instance, to think that we could settle this
by experimenting on light rays:
If Lobatschewsky’s geometry is true, the parallax of a very distant
star will be finite. If Riemann’s is true, it will be negative. [. . . ] But
what we call a straight line in astronomy is simply the path of a ray
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of light. If, therefore, we were to discover negative parallaxes, or to
prove that all parallaxes are higher than a certain limit, we should
have a choice between two conclusions: We could give up Euclidean
geometry, or modify the laws of optics, and suppose that light is not
rigorously propagated in a straight line. (Poincaré 1902: 72–3)7
Now, as many have pointed out,8 this argument is puzzling since it appears
to be relying on Duhemian considerations which are plainly too general to
establish a specific thesis about geometry. Moreover, such considerations
apply to subjects that are paradigmatically empirical, and so the fact that
they can be applied here is not much of an argument against the empiricist
conception of geometry.
It is clear, however, that Poincaré had something different in mind. Hav-
ing argued, using essentially Duhemian considerations, that some principles
of mechanics could be regarded as conventions, he considers precisely the
charge that he has failed to secure a special status for geometry, but replies:
Such a conclusion would be illegitimate. The experiments which have
led us to adopt as more convenient the fundamental conventions of
geometry refer only to bodies which have nothing in common with
those that are studied by geometry. [. . . ] On the other hand, the
fundamental conventions of mechanics and the experiments which
prove to us that they are convenient, certainly refer to the same
objects or to analogous objects. (1902: 136–7)
The real reason, then, for denying that geometry is empirical, is, not that
we cannot experiment on geometrical objects in isolation, but that we can-
not experiment on geometrical objects at all. ‘Experiments only teach us
the relations of bodies to one another. They do not and cannot give us
the relations of bodies and space, nor the mutual relations of the different
7According to legend, Gauss attempted to determine the geometry of space by exper-
imenting on light rays transmitted between three mountain tops. It is, however, doubtful
that this happened (cf. A.I. Miller 1972).
8E.g. Friedman (1995: 301–2), Ben-Menahem (2006: 57–8), and Stump (2015: 46).
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parts of space.’ (Poincaré 1902: 79) We can, of course, go about measuring
physical objects, but, since ‘physical entities do not come labeled with their
geometrical identities’ (Ben-Menahem 2006: 55), we would then have to
ask: ‘How shall we know that any concrete magnitude which I have mea-
sured with my material instrument really represents the abstract distance?’
(Poincaré 1902: 74)
Conventionalism
Part of the motivation for Poincaré’s conventionalism, then, is his conviction
that the subject-matter of geometry (the ideal solids and abstract distances)
are forever beyond the reach of experiment. Since, then, this is settled
neither by experience nor by our form of intuition, we have no choice but to
settle it by convention – based, if possible, on considerations of convenience.
Now, this conclusion is consistent with a rather limited form of “prag-
matic” conventionalism, according the choice must be settled by convention
since we could never know what the true geometry is – even though there
is a fact of the matter. Poincaré, however, explicitly rejects this idea, in-
sisting that ‘one part of space is not by itself and in the absolute sense of
the word equal to another part of space’ (Poincaré 1908: 418).9 Instead,
the very notion of equal distance is constituted by our choice of geometry.
Consequently, Poincaré’s conventionalism takes on a more radical form:
What, then, are we to think of the question: Is Euclidean geometry
true? It has no meaning. We might as well ask if the metric system
is true, and if the old weights and measures are false; if Cartesian
co-ordinates are true and polar co-ordinates false. One geometry
cannot be more true than another; it can only be more convenient.
(1902: 50)
Thus, when Poincaré says that geometry is a matter of convention, he is
not just saying that since we can have no evidence in favour of a particular
9This rejection seems to be based mainly on roughly speaking verificationist argu-
ments (cf. in particular Poincaré 1908: 418).
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geometry, we are equally justified in making any choice we see fit; he is
saying that – as with our choice of units or coordinate system – there is
no standard of correctness which our choice of geometry could fall short
of. There is, therefore, no room for a problem of inexplicable agreement
concerning how we know that the geometry we use is the objectively correct
one.
This is why Poincaré’s conventionalism should be seen as a version of
the subjective-constitutive strategy. Both Kant and Poincaré maintain that
the reason why geometry isn’t ‘approximate and provisory’, is that it is a
framework which the subject imposes on the world, and they both deny
that it makes sense to worry that the geometry we impose on the world
could fail to agree with the real geometry. The reason is, in both cases,
that the very notion of a real (subject-independent) geometry is rejected.
We can summarise Poincaré’s argument for geometric conventionalism
as follows:
(1) Space does not come with a built in metric: ‘One part of space is not
by itself and in the absolute sense of the word equal to another part
of space’ (Poincaré 1908: 418).
(2) So, if there is such a thing as an objectively correct metric/geometry,
it would have to be pinned down by the relations holding between
objects existing in space: ‘Space is in reality amorphous and the things
which are therein alone give it a form.’ (Poincaré 1908: 417)
(3) But since these objects and the relations between them do not come
with built in geometric identities, they do not bear on this issue: ‘How
shall we know that any concrete magnitude which I have measured
with my material instrument really represents the abstract distance?’
(Poincaré 1902: 74)
(4) So, there is no such thing as the objectively correct metric.
(5) So, the metrical properties of space are of subjective origin.
(6) But, pace Kant, we are not forced by the structure of outer intuition
to impose any particular metric on the world.
43
2. The Roots of the Linguistic Approach
(7) So, the metric, and therefore the choice of geometry, is a matter of
convention.
Convention and the Subjective-Constitutive Strategy
I maintain, then, that although Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism is ob-
viously different from Kant’s conception of geometry, it remains an instance
of the subjective constitutive-strategy. In fact, the notion of convention is
remarkably well-suited to the needs of this strategy, since it nicely incor-
porates both the subjective and the constitutive aspects. Consider, for
instance, how Richard Creath characterises this notion:
To say that postulates are laid down by convention commits one to
the idea that there are alternative postulates that could have been
chosen, but were not. It commits one likewise to the idea that no
further epistemic justification for the choice of postulates is required.
Conventions are not designed to reflect antecedent and independent
facts; if they were thus designed one would have to show that they
had done so. (1992: 147)
Thus, to say that something is a matter of convention is to say: i) that
it is something which we have decided upon (perhaps implicitly), and ii)
that in making this choice we are not subject to any external standard of
correctness. It is precisely this combination of subjective origins and lack
of external standards of correctness that is characteristic of the subjective-
constitutive strategy.
Moreover, the appeal to convention allows us to avoid some of the short-
comings related to the specifics of Kant’s proposal. In particular, we have a
much better grip on what it takes for something to be a matter of conven-
tion, than we have on what it takes for something to be a transcendental
form/category of intuition/reason. We noted above that Kant provides lit-
tle argument in favour of the idea that space is a transcendental form of
intuition. Moreover, it is far from clear how we might go about arguing for
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this. It is comparatively clear, however, how to argue that something is a
matter of convention: We do this by arguing that there are several equally
valid alternatives. Indeed, C. I. Lewis went as far as saying that this is our
only way of knowing that something is of subjective origin:
Such legislation can be recognized as our own act because the a priori
principle which is definitive [. . . ] has alternatives. [. . . ] if what is a
priori sprang from a transcendent mind, acting in unalterable ways,
it never could be known to be our own creation or distinguished from
those facts of life which are due to the nature of the independently
real. (1929: 232)
Conventionalism, we may say, provides us with a particularly perspicuous
form of the subjective-constitutive strategy.
Poincaré’s account also improves on Kant’s in a different way. Although
he was no transcendental idealist, Poincaré can be said to advocate the
“ideality” of space insofar as it concerns geometry. He agrees with Kant,
for instance, that a triangle is not something “in itself”, in the sense that
it does not make sense to worry that our geometry misclassifies something
as a triangle even though it really isn’t. In Poincaré’s case, however, this
does not involve denying the objective reality of space, but only involves
denying the objective reality of the metric of space. Poincaré’s “idealism”,
therefore, is much less severe than Kant’s.
2.3 Wittgenstein’s Linguistic Turn
So far in this chapter I have introduced the subjective-constitutive strategy
as a possible strategy for dealing with the problem of necessity, and I have
argued that the appeal to convention that we find in Poincaré’s work on
geometry is well-suited to the needs of this strategy. The guiding thought,
recall, is that these ideas make their way into the linguistic approach (as
developed by members of the Vienna Circle), and that we can use this
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to provide a more definite account of the distinctive practically workable
commitments of this approach.
In this section, I consider another key influence on the linguistic ap-
proach: the linguistic turn that we find in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I will
argue that, like Poincaré’s conventionalism, this turn can be understood as
a continuation of the subjective-constitutive strategy, and that it allows us
to avoid some of the problems with the specifics of Kant’s position.
This means that I will be outlining a broadly speaking Kantian inter-
pretation of the Tractarian conception of logic. However, as with all things
Tractatus, this is bound to be controversial, and I do not think that we
have adequate grounds for advancing this as anything like ‘the one true
interpretation’. Rather, I shall be content to argue that there is a possi-
ble interpretation according to which the Tractarian account of logic is a
linguistic version of the subjective-constitutive strategy. In the next chap-
ter, moreover, I shall suggest that, independently of whether this was what
Wittgenstein had in mind, it was something like this interpretation which
informed the logical positivists and made it into the linguistic approach.
Logic as the Form of Linguistic Representation
Kantian readings of the Tractatus have been around for some time. Erik
Stenius, for instance, wrote in his 1960 book that: ‘Wittgenstein was in
essential respects a Kantian philosopher; his anti-Kantianism meant only
that he – like other Kantians – transformed the system of Kant and thus
created a Kantianism of a peculiar kind.’ (1960: 214)10 Although I’m not
convinced that it is helpful to describe the Tractatus as a form of Kantianism
(for this, the discontinuities are perhaps a few too many), I do agree that
there is a level at which the Tractatus can be read as a transformation of
Kantian ideas.
10Others who find significant Kantian elements in the Tractatus include: Pears (1971:
45–7; 1987: ch. 1) Glock (1992; 1996; 1997) and Hacker (1989: 22–3; ch. 4).
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The project which set Wittgenstein on the path which led to the Trac-
tatus was to ‘both characterize the notion of logical truth and explain its
nature.’ (Potter 2009: 49) It does perhaps not require too much of a squint to
formulate Wittgenstein’s initial question as: ‘How are logically true propo-
sitions possible?’, and although there is very little epistemology in the Trac-
tatus, it is clear that Wittgenstein was concerned with the question of how
we can recognise logical truths as such.11
From early on, moreover, Wittgenstein thought that key to these ques-
tions was to provide ‘an account of the structure of propositions’ (Potter
2009: 49). This appeal to structure already suggests a Kantian analogy:
Wittgenstein’s answer takes place against the background of a distinction
between the formal/structural features present in all linguistic represen-
tation and what we talk about in such representation. And in parallel
with Kant’s proposal, he holds that logic is special because it concerns
these formal features alone (2.18–2.2; 6.12). ‘Logic’, that is, ‘comprises
the most general preconditions for the possibility of representation.’ (Glock
2013: 573)
Thus, as Kant maintained that anything met with in outer intuition
must conform to Euclidean geometry because this geometry provides the
form of outer intuition and so makes experience possible, so Wittgenstein
maintains that anything represented in language must be ‘logical’ because
logic provides the form of linguistic representation and so makes such rep-
resentation possible: ‘To present in language anything which “contradicts
logic” is as impossible as in geometry to present by its co-ordinates a figure
which contradicts the laws of space’ (1922: 3.032).12
Admittedly, this remark is somewhat puzzling since Wittgenstein would
not want to deny that it is possible to formulate contradictions, and so it
seems that we can, in a sense, present something which contradicts logic in
language. However, the point, I take it, is that there are certain features
11Both the truth-tables (4.31–4.46) and, in particular, the ab-notation (6.1203) can
be seen as addressing this question.
12I am using the Ogden translation unless otherwise noted.
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which all linguistic representations must have, and that there can be no
linguistic representation which contradicts this. These features then ensure
that contradictions close off the entire logical space (4.463), which is why
they are false no matter what is the case (4.464). Correspondingly, these
formal features are also shown in the fact that certain truth-functional
constructions yield tautologies – propositions which leave the entire logical
space open (4.463) and are therefore true independently of what is the case
(4.464).
According to Wittgenstein, then, the peculiar status of logical truths is
due to them being guaranteed to be true by the formal features which all
linguistic representations must have. The form of linguistic representation
ensures that nothing illogical could be represented as true.
Uncritical Realism?
Here, though, we also encounter a potential departure from Kant’s strategy.
It is crucial for Kant, after all, that the form of experience is of subjective
origin, since ‘we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have
put into them.’ (1787: Bxviii) Wittgenstein, however, is explicit that the
form of linguistic representation is also, in some sense, the form of the
world: ‘The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies, shows the
formal – logical – properties of language, of the world.’ (6.12) ‘The logical
propositions describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they present it.’
(6.124)
Even those who are sympathetic to the idea that there are Kantian
elements in the Tractatus, and its account of logical necessity in particular,
have tended to think that the analogy breaks down at precisely this point:
Although for the Tractatus necessity is a matter of logical syntax,
its ultimate source is not subjective, the structure of the mind or
of language, but lies in a metaphysical essence of reality, albeit an
ineffable one. (Glock 1997: 296)
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That is to say: although logic arises from the formal features which all
linguistic representation must exhibit, the source of these features lies, in
turn, in the metaphysical structure of the world as laid out in the 1’s and
2’s. Pears is particularly explicit about this, and quite rightly labels this
conception ‘uncritical realism’ (1987: 9), in direct opposition to Kant and
the subjective-constitutive strategy:
The idea is that in all our operations with language we are really
running on fixed rails laid down in reality before we even appeared on
the scene. Attach a name to an object, and the intrinsic nature of the
object will immediately take over complete control and determine the
correct use of the name on later occasions. Set up a whole language
in this way, and the structure of the fundamental grid will inexorably
dictate the general structure of the logical system. (Pears 1987: 10)
A Different Interpretation
However, this interpretation is not easy to square with what Wittgenstein
says elsewhere. He insists, for instance, that ‘theories which make a propo-
sition of logic appear substantial are always false’ (6.111), but if Glock and
Pears are right, then there is a clear (though admittedly ineffable) sense
in which propositions of logic are indeed substantial, since they are con-
cerned (again, in some ineffable sense) with the metaphysical structure of
the world. This has fuelled an alternative interpretative tradition, and go-
ing down this route, I shall argue, allows us to push the Kantian analogies
further, and to see Wittgenstein’s conception of logic as an instance of the
subjective-constitutive strategy.
According to this interpretation, it is a mistake to think that the form
of representation is dictated by a metaphysical structure outside of our
language. Indeed, Hide Ishiguro (1969) and Brian McGuinness (1981), and
more recently Marie McGinn (McGinn 2006), have all argued that Wittgen-
stein should not be read as doing metaphysics in the traditional sense in
the opening 1’s and 2’s of the Tractatus:
49
2. The Roots of the Linguistic Approach
It was not Wittgenstein’s intention to base a metaphysics upon logic
or the nature of our language. He was not saying that there is
something by which our grammar is determined, and therefore he did
not try to infer features of the world from our language. (McGuinness
1981: 62)
Rather, they argue, the seemingly metaphysical picture (of objects, states
of affairs etc.) must itself be understood from within language: ‘Remarks
that purport to be about the essential structure of the world are seen, on
reflection, to be nothing more than a description of what is essential to a
system for representing possible states of affairs in propositions’ (McGinn
2006: 159). This ‘has nothing to do with metaphysics and everything to
do with the logical order of a system of representation, or with everything
that is essential to the rules whereby language is projected onto reality.’
(McGinn 2006: 159)
For example, ‘an object in the Tractatus which is the reference of a
name or simple sign can be viewed as simply the truth-value potential of a
certain expression.’ (McGuinness 1981: 65) That is to say, the criterion for
being an object is a language-internal one. An object is the meaning of a
particular kind of linguistic expression which functions within language in
a particular way. There is no need to invest the objects with any further
metaphysical significance, and so, pace Pears, they cannot be viewed as
dictating the correct use of names from the outside.
In favour of this view, we may note that Wittgenstein says that ‘if
everything in the symbolism works as though a sign had meaning, then it
has meaning.’ (3.328)13 Though this can hardly be said to be conclusive
evidence, it is not straightforward to reconcile this remark with a robustly
13This remark has an interesting history which, to some extent, supports the
McGuinness-Ishiguro interpretation. In the original German (and the Pears-McGuinness
translation) there is no reference to the symbolism. This was explicitly added by Wittgen-
stein, and he wrote to Ogden: ‘Here I made the translation more explicit than the Ger-
man text.’ (Wittgenstein 1973: 25) As I understand him, what he wants to make explicit
is precisely that if by all language-internal criteria a sign has meaning, then there is no
further question as to whether it does have meaning.
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realist construal of the “metaphysics” of the Tractatus. Such a construal
would seem to bring with it (as it typically does) the possibility of a certain
kind of scepticism: Why couldn’t it happen that everything seemed to be
in perfect order within our language, but that we were nevertheless failing
to latch on the objects, or failing to use the signs in accordance with the
actual possibilities for combining objects?
Clearly, much more would have to be said in order to satisfactorily decide
between these interpretations. My aim, however, is the more modest one of
arguing that if we adopt this more anti-metaphysical reading, then we can
push the Kantian analogy further than Glock and Pears do.
‘Logic Is Transcendental’
The key point is that against the background of the McGuinness-Ishiguro
interpretation, the idea that logical propositions mirror the form of the
world does not constitute a fundamental break with the Kantian strategy.
Kant, after all, would be happy to say that the form of outer intuition is
mirrored in the form of the world as long as this is understood to be the
phenomenal world. And if, now, ‘the form of the world’ in the Tractatus is,
in accordance with the McGuinness-Ishiguro interpretation, made sense of
via language-internal considerations – via, that is, considering how expres-
sions behave within the symbolism – then we are here dealing with some-
thing akin to Kant’s phenomenal world. That is to say: the world whose
form is mirrored in logic is already a linguistically representable world. As
Wittgenstein famously puts it: ‘the limits of the language (the language
which I understand) mean the limits of my world.’ (5.62)
The idea that the Tractarian world should be understood along the lines
of Kant’s phenomenal world does, however, call for some serious qualifica-
tion. It is quite clear that the Tractarian position differs significantly from
Kant’s since there is no room, in the Tractatus, for anything like Kant’s
noumenal world (this, I take it, is the point of remarks such as 5.64). Still,
the point I am making stands: The form of the world, given the anti-
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metaphysical reading, is a notion which only makes sense insofar as the
world is approach via language (compare: the geometry of the world is a
notion which only makes sense insofar as the world is approached via outer
intuition).
Once the idea of the form of the world is conceived along these lines, we
may indeed say that ‘logic is transcendental’ (6.13) in something quite like
Kant’s sense. Logic concerns the principles that govern how the subject
represents the world in language and make such representation possible.
These principles may be said to be subjective, not because we can view
logic as something the subject imposes on the world (that would call for a
conception of something like a noumenal world after all, and this we cannot
have), but in the sense that they are intelligible only from the subject’s
point of view – via considerations that are internal to the symbolism. This
might be what Stenius has in mind when he writes:
For Wittgenstein, too, the form of experience is ‘subjective’ in the
transcendental sense, the metaphysical subject being the ‘subject’
which uses and understands language, and which must be distin-
guished from the empirical self, which is part of the world describable
in language. (1960: 220–1)
It is noteworthy, moreover, that ethics too is said to be transcendental
(6.421), and that in the Notebooks, we find Wittgenstein elaborating on
this as follows:14 ‘Good and evil only enter through the subject. And the
subject is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world.’ (1979a: 79;
emphasis in original). Although, the Notebooks (being notebooks) must be
used with some care, this does support the idea that logic too, in some
sense, ‘only enters through the subject’.
I hope to have shown, then, that if we understand the “metaphysics” of
the Tractatus along the lines of Ishiguro, McGuinness and McGinn, then
14Admittedly, there are a number of textual complications here. Though the English
translation of the Notebooks has Wittgenstein saying that ethics is transcendental, this
appears to be a mistranslation since the German has ‘transcendent’ (1979a: 79). In the
Tractatus, however, he does indeed use ’transzendental’.
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we can push the analogy between Kant’s explanation of the synthetic a
priori and Wittgenstein’s explanation of logical truth further than is typ-
ically suggested. Indeed, we have gone some way towards understanding
Wittgenstein’s approach as an instance of the subjective-constitutive strat-
egy: According to the Tractatus (given the present interpretation), logical
necessity is a product of the form of linguistic representation. This form,
moreover, is not something which is imposed on our language from without,
but something which arises from language-internal considerations having to
do with the representational activities of the subject.
In the next section I argue that Wittgenstein’s ‘fundamental thought’
points to a further parallel between the Tractarian conception of logic and
the subjective-constitutive strategy – a parallel which, as we shall see in the
next chapter, becomes particularly important to the logical positivists and
the linguistic approach.
The Fundamental Thought
In the discussion of Kant, we considered the worry that even if we concede
that anything encountered in intuition (as it is presently structured) must
have certain features, there might still be counterexamples to what we take
to be necessary. Kant’s response here was his transcendental idealism: The
subjective principles are constitutive of the objects in question (e.g. spatial
objects), and so it does not make sense to worry, say, that although triangles
presented to us must have angles adding up to 180 degrees, there might
really be triangles which don’t have this property.
Is there a parallel move in the Tractatus? There has been quite a lot
of discussion as to whether the Tractatus is a work of transcendental ideal-
ism.15 I shall, however, focus on a rather different issue than these discus-
sions do, namely Wittgenstein’s ‘fundamental thought’, namely that ‘the
15See Williams (1973); A. W. Moore (1985; 2003); Sullivan (1996; 2003); and Tang
(2011).
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“logical constants” do not represent.’ (4.0312)16
There is an important (and under-appreciated) parallel between this
idea and Kant’s idealism – in particular, Kant’s insistence that we must
deny that, e.g., the triangle is something “in itself” in order to explain the
status of geometry. We can see the parallel as follows: Logic, according
to Wittgenstein, is a priori.17 But this requires that there are no ‘objects
of comparison’ in logic, since ‘a priori knowledge that a thought was true
would be possible only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself
(without anything to compare it with).’ (3.05)18 And, indeed, ‘it is the char-
acteristic mark of logical propositions that one can perceive in the symbol
alone that they are true’ (6.113; cf. also 6.126).
Putting these pieces together, the line of thought is as follows: Because
the logical constants do not represent (there are no logical objects), there is
no object of comparison in logic. This, in turn, allows logical propositions
to be a priori, in the sense that we can determine their truth-values from
the symbols alone, without determining whether the world is like this or
that (cf. 6.1233). If, on the other hand, the logical constants did represent,
then we should have to ask, paraphrasing Kant: How do you know that
what belongs to your symbolic rules for constructing propositions must
also pertain to the logical objects themselves?
Understood like this, the fundamental thought parallels Kant’s idealist
move: The peculiar status of logic can only be explained once we get rid of
the idea that logical truths are subject to an external standard of correctness
– the idea, that is, that these truths are in the business of depicting some
language-independent domain of logical objects. It is because there are
no such objects, that the question of agreement (comparison) between the
16Interestingly, the earliest philosophical remark we have from Wittgenstein records
precisely this idea (2012: 22.6.1912; cf. also 1979a: 37).
17Cf. 5.133; 5.4731; 5.551–5.552; 6.3211
18I have used the Pears-McGuinness translation here since, frankly, the Ogden trans-
lation makes no sense: ‘Only if we could know a priori that a thought is true if its truth
was to be recognized from the thought itself (without an object of comparison).’ The
German reads: ‘Nur so könnten wir a priori wissen, dass ein Gedanke wahr ist, wenn
aus dem Gedanken selbst (ohne Vergleichsobjekt) seine Wahrheit zu erkennen wäre.’
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logical propositions and reality does not arise, and this is why these can be
a priori without giving rise to a problem of inexplicable agreement.
We can see this in more detail by considering a variation on the worry
we discussed in connection with Kant. For Wittgenstein, logic concerns
the general structure of linguistic representation. This ensures that any-
thing represented in language will “behave logically”. But, it may be asked,
couldn’t there still – in some ineffable sense – be counterexamples to logic,
even if this means that they cannot be represented as such in language?
Couldn’t there really be contradictory states of affairs even if any attempt
to represent these in language will inevitably represent them as false?
The point is that against the background of the fundamental thought
this worry makes no sense. If logical constants – and conjunction and
negation in particular – do not represent, then there cannot “really be”
contradictions out there in the world. For how are we to make sense of these
being contradictions? This would require, essentially, that one bit of reality
should be the negation of another bit of reality, and this could only happen
if negation had some objective correlate.19 The fundamental thought, then,
can do for Wittgenstein what Kant’s idealism did for Kant.20 The ideality of
space allows Kant to deny that there could really be non-Euclidean triangles
even if we cannot experience them as such; the fundamental thought allows
Wittgenstein to deny that there could really be true contradictions even if
we cannot represent them as such in language.
Language and the Subjective-Constitutive Strategy
According to the interpretation just outlined, Wittgenstein’s explanation of
logical truth is an instance of the subjective-constitutive strategy, although
19It is, I think, an interesting question whether the non-representational character of
negation can be made consistent with everything Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus, but
there is no denying that this is the official position (cf. e.g. 4.0621 and 5.44).
20Wittgenstein does have an additional trick up his sleeve: We cannot worry that
there might be something that could not be represented in language since this would
require us to think non-sense. This response, though, becomes less satisfying once we
realise that the Tractatus itself consists of non-sense.
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transposed from intuition and thought to linguistic representation.
Logical truths are special because they are guaranteed to be true by
the subjective (or at least language-internal) principles that anything rep-
resented in language must conform to. Moreover, these principles are also
constitutive of the logical constants. Consequently, these belong only to
the symbolism, and for this reason there is no ‘object of comparison’ in
logic and so the question of agreement between the propositions of logic
and reality cannot arise. Here Kant’s transcendental idealism is replaced
by Wittgenstein’s fundamental thought: Where Kant denies the subject-
independent existence of, e.g., geometrical objects, Wittgenstein denies
the subject-independent (more precisely language-independent) existence
of logical objects.
By relocating the strategy from intuition to linguistic representation, it
should be noted, Wittgenstein avoids the radical nature of Kant’s transcen-
dental idealism. The only things that Wittgenstein is forced to be “idealist”
about are the logical constants, but as he himself put it: ‘That “or” and
“not” etc. are not relations in the same sense as “right” and “left” etc., is
obvious to the plain man.’ (1979a: 101)
As we saw above, a similar advantage can be claimed for Poincaré’s ge-
ometric conventionalism. However, we also saw that Poincaré’s argument
relied on a specific conception of the nature of space. His particular in-
stance of the subjective-constitutive strategy does not, therefore, generalise
easily.21 Wittgenstein’s account, on the other hand, is meant to apply, via
the linguistic turn, to anything capable of being represented in language.
It is therefore, on the face of it, quite general.
That being said, Wittgenstein is notoriously restrictive, in the Tractatus,
when it comes to admissible explanations of modal phenomena. All neces-
sity is meant to be logical necessity (6.37), which, in turn, is to be accounted
for by truth-functional combinations that result in tautologies. All impos-
sibility, correspondingly, is meant to be logical impossibility (6.375) – that
21Of course, he did not intend it to generalise either.
56
2.3. Wittgenstein’s Linguistic Turn
is, truth-functional combinations that result in contradiction. Cases like
colour exclusion are famously recalcitrant to this kind of treatment, lead-
ing Wittgenstein to conclude, later, that truth-functional considerations are
not general enough to account for all necessity and impossibility.
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3
The Linguistic Approach and Logical
Positivism
So far I have introduced Kant’s subjective-constitutive strategy and argued
that two key influences on the logical positivists – Poincaré’s conventional-
ism and the linguistic turn inherent in Wittgenstein’s account of logic – can
be seen as instances of this strategy. I have also argued that the focus on
convention, and the shift from intuition to language allows us to avoid some
of the difficulties with the specifics of Kant’s account. I now turn to how the
linguistic approach emerges as a synthesis of these ideas in the work of the
logical positivists. Here it is particularly helpful to look at the development
of Schlick’s views on the a priori, and this is the focus of section 3.1.
Next (3.2), I look at what the linguistic approach was meant to do for
the logical positivists – in particular, how it was meant to ‘make a consistent
empiricism possible’. I argue that much of what the positivists themselves
said about this is inadequate, but that a better answer can be extracted from
the writings of Hans Hahn. On this conception, the defence of empiricism
is closely tied precisely to the use of the subjective-constitutive strategy.
I then (3.3) consider various stages of Carnap’s career, and argue that,
although he spelt out the details differently at different times, he was com-
mitted to the linguistic approach throughout. This allows us to bring the
linguistic approach into sharper focus by pinpointing what it is that remains
constant throughout Carnap’s career.
3. The Linguistic Approach and Logical Positivism
Finally (3.4), I summarise the main findings of this chapter and the
previous one. In particular, I elaborate on what we can say about the
commitments of the linguistic approach once we conceive of it as a linguistic
version, with a strong emphasis on convention, of the subjective-constitutive
strategy. In doing so I also contrast this approach with some superficially
similar ideas that are not consistent with these commitments.
3.1 Schlick on the A Priori
Schlick’s Early Work
Schlick’s earliest work on the nature of the a priori was decidedly Kantian
(cf. Schlick 1910: 84), with no particular emphasis on either language or
convention. When he turns his attention to Einstein’s work on relativity,
however, he comes to appreciate Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism, and
he explicitly notes that he sees the root of this view in Kantian ideas:
Henri Poincaré has shown with convincing clarity (although Gauss
and Helmholtz still thought otherwise), that no experience can com-
pel us to lay down a particular geometrical system, such as Euclid’s,
as a basis for depicting the physical regularities of the world. Entirely
different systems can actually be chosen for this purpose, though in
each case we also have at the same time to adopt other laws of na-
ture. [. . . ] The reason why this choice is possible lies in the fact
(already emphasised by Kant) that it is never space itself, but al-
ways the mere spatial behaviour of bodies, that can become an object
of experience, perception and measurement. (1915: 168–9)1
However, his work on Einstein’s theories also convinced Schlick that Kant’s
epistemological system had to be rejected, and his General Theory of
1Note that Schlick appears to appreciate that Poincaré’s position relies on a specific
view concerning space (cf. also Schlick 1925: 71). It is not entirely clear, therefore, that
Michael Friedman is right to think (1995: 300–1) that Schlick read Poincaré as simply
making a general Duhemian point about underdetermination (even though the above
quote does continue in a way that might suggest this).
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Knowledge can be read as an attempt to provide an epistemology that
is fit for the new situation in the sciences.2 At this stage, however, it is
not Poincaré, but Hilbert and his method of implicit definition which is
the strongest influence on Schlick, and the result is a thoroughly formalist
conception of the a priori: ‘The construction of a strict deductive science
has only the significance of a game with symbols.’ (1918: 35)
This, though, signals a departure from both Poincaré and the subjective-
constitutive strategy we have been tracing so far. Kant’s project was to
explain how we could justifiably come to think that the objects we encounter
will conform to how we conceive of them a priori. Under the influence of
Hilbert, Schlick now refuses to engage with this problem (cf. Goldfarb 1996:
215). The deductive sciences are a priori because they are radically divorced
from the question of what we can encounter in experience:
In general, we concern ourselves with the abstract only to apply it
to the intuitive. But – and it is to this point that our considerations
return again and again – the moment we carry over a conceptual
relation to intuitive examples, we are no longer assured of complete
rigour. [. . . ] in implicit definition we have found an instrument that
enables us to determine concepts completely and thus to attain strict
precision in thinking. To achieve this end, however, we have had to
effect a radical separation between concept and intuition, thought
and reality. (1918: 35–6)
In the second edition, Schlick appears to have become uneasy with this
strict separation, and includes a new chapter, ‘Definitions, Conventions and
Empirical Judgments’, where he introduces a distinct notion of convention
which he explicitly attributes to Poincaré.3 These conventions are quite
different from the implicit definitions encountered earlier. They do not
remain divorced from experience, but serve to coordinate concepts with
reality (1925: 71) – e.g. they might be used to determine the physical
significance of ‘equal periods of time’ (1925: 72).
2Cf. e.g. Friedman (1991) and (2008: 95–6).
3For more on the differences between the two editions, see Uebel (2010: 288–9).
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However, these additions are not easily reconciled with the rest of the
book. It would appear that the a priori no longer pertains exclusively to
conceptual structures divorced from application to the intuitive, since we
are now told that the newly introduced conventions (which are concerned
precisely with such application) too can give rise to a priori knowledge.
Indeed, ‘the axioms of the science of space’ are cited as an example here
(1925: 74). On the other hand, we still find the claim, from the first
edition, that a priori knowledge is only possible as long as we are dealing
with conceptual structures cut off from application – including the claim
that geometry is a priori only insofar as it is a ‘pure conceptual science’
which does not concern ‘the spatial relationships of reality’. (1925: 355)
Adding to the confusion, conventions are in one place casually equated
with implicit definitions – as when Schlick writes that ‘geometry [. . . ] does
not proceed from synthetic a priori propositions. Instead, it proceeds from
conventions (see Part I, §11), that is, from implicit definitions.’ (1925: 355)
In the end, it is difficult to avoid the impression that there is a serious
tension in second edition of General Theory of Knowledge: The position
inherited from the first edition is that knowledge can be a priori only insofar
as it is a formal ‘game of symbols’ cut off from application to intuitive
examples. But the a priori knowledge gained via the conventions introduced
in the second edition, and, indeed some of the examples Schlick adds for
this edition (1925: 75), simply do not fit this mould.
Wittgenstein’s Influence
This tension is only resolved when Schlick adopts a new conception of for-
mality under the influence of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In 1928, an infat-
uated Schlick proclaims that Wittgenstein has reconciled empiricism with
the existence of logic and mathematics, since now the ‘nature of the logical
is completely elucidated and established for all time to come.’ (1928: 136)
The key to this, moreover, was that ‘an entirely clear and rigorous concept
of “form” is provided, which banishes at a stroke those difficult problems
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of logic which have lately given so much trouble to serious investigators.’
(1928: 136)
The new conception of the formal is directly opposed to that we find
in General Theory of Knowledge. Logic is formal, not because it is cut off
from what we talk about in empirical claims, but because it concerns the
framework for making such claims:
That the logical is in some sense formal is an old and oft-stated view;
but the nature of pure forms had not really been clearly understood.
The road to clarity on this subjects starts from the fact that every
item of knowledge is an expression or presentation. It expresses the
state-of-affairs known in it, and this can be done in any number of
ways, in any language, and by means of any arbitrary systems of
signs; all these possible modes of presentation, so long as they really
express the same piece of knowledge, must for that very reason have
something in common, and this common factor is their logical form.
(Schlick 1930b: 156)
Note, however, that the new conception of form initially comes with a price:
the rejection of conventionality. Poincaré has disappeared, and Schlick is
now claiming that logic concerns precisely the non-conventional aspects
of linguistic representation – i.e. what all possible modes of presentation
must have in common.4 Elsewhere, Schlick locates the formal in the rules
that hold for the use of words (Schlick 1930a: 169),5 but stops short of
maintaining that these rules are adopted as a matter of convention. Indeed,
in a conversation early in 1930 he pressed Wittgenstein precisely on the issue
of the status of these rules: ‘But how do I know that precisely these rules
are valid and no others? Can I not be wrong?’ (McGuinness 1979: 77)
4Schlick is reported as saying, in a 1931 discussion: ‘There is an order which is
independent of the phenomena and independent of our conventions. Syntax concerns
that about language which is common to all languages.’ (Stadler 2001: 252)
5This paper, though published in 1932, was initially delivered as a lecture in 1930.
63
3. The Linguistic Approach and Logical Positivism
The Return of Convention
During the 30’s, however, Schlick gradually adopts the view that the a
priori concerns the conventionally selected principles according to which
we represent the world in language:
Our 20th century empiricism was founded and chiefly promoted by
researchers who had made it their business to undertake a thorough
philosophical examination of logic and mathematics. Their efforts
have shown with ever increasing clarity that in logical and mathe-
matical propositions it is broadly speaking a question of the rules
whereby we form and transform linguistic symbols (propositions,
numbers, propositional connectives) according to the conventions we
have ourselves adopted for applying those symbols to the description
of reality. They are therefore analytic (they say no more than is con-
tained in the conventions defining them). (Schlick 1935b: 405–6)6
This renewed emphasis on convention might have been influenced by de-
velopments of Wittgenstein’s thought at the time, but it was presumably
also influenced by Carnap’s syntax project. Moreover, Poincaré now makes
a comeback:
As is well-known, Henri Poincaré has developed the procedure of
convention with reference to the propositions of geometry [. . . ] by
essentially calling attention to the fact that those propositions in
their application to the spatial properties of bodies are to be regarded
as definitions. [. . . ] In our manner of speaking we might express
most briefly the insight into the conventional character of geometrical
propositions by saying: geometry is the grammar of the language in
which we describe the spatial relationships of physics. (Schlick 1935a:
437)7
6Cf. also Schlick (1987: 107).
7In 1931, by contrast, when the role of convention was less clear for Schlick, he
suggests that Poincaré’s conventions are better understood as tautologies (1931: 194).
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This conception of geometry should be compared to that of General Theory
of Knowledge: While geometry is still said to be a conventional/definitional
subject, this is not meant to suggest that it is an unapplied purely con-
ceptual structure. Rather, geometrical propositions in their application to
the spatial properties of bodies are regarded as definitions. This is indeed
closer to Poincaré’s conception, but under the influence of the linguistic
turn, Schlick now sees this as part of a more general strategy based on the
general notion of a conventionally adopted linguistic rule.
Note that the new idea is not simply that necessary (or a priori) truths
are “analytic”. That claim was present in General Theory of Knowledge
as well. The real development concerns the specific understanding of ana-
lyticity, namely as arising from the conventionally adopted framework we
employ in order to linguistically represent the world – as opposed to arising
from a game with symbols cut off from application.
A Version of the Subjective-Constitutive Strategy
What we have here is a version of the subjective-constitutive strategy which
unifies some aspects of Poincaré’s conventionalism and the linguistic turn we
find in the Tractatus. The special status of necessary truths is understood in
terms of formal features of linguistic representation that we are responsible
for and which are not accountable to any external standard of correctness,
and so do not give rise to a problem of inexplicable agreement. This is
particularly clear insofar as these features are said to be conventions.
There are, of course, several respects in which we have departed radi-
cally from Kant’s initial position. Most obviously: whereas Kant took the
relevant subjective-constitutive principles to govern forms of intuition and
categories of reason, the linguistic approach takes them to be conventionally
adopted rules governing how we employ expressions in order to represent
the world in language. Still, as I shall argue in more detail in the next
section, the point of the subjective-constitutive strategy is largely retained.
Moreover, these developments arguably improve on Kant’s original pro-
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posal. We have already seen that appealing to convention provides us with
a clearer grasp on how to argue that this strategy is appropriate, and the
same can be said of the linguistic turn. Briefly put: we have a better grasp
on the notion of a linguistic convention, than we have on the notion of a
form of intuition.
We also avoid Kant’s radical idealism. What we end up being “idealists”
about here is essentially the principles of individuation reflected in the rules
that govern our use of linguistic expressions. We must deny, that is, that
these rules are dictated by something subject-independent like “the joints of
reality” or antecedent concepts understood along Platonist lines, since this
would raise the question of how we know that the rules we have adopted
reflect how things really are. Instead, the rules we adopt must be regarded
as constitutive of our concepts and the principles of individuation that they
bring with them. Although there are those who would want to contest
that our language is autonomous in this sense, it is surely less radical than
denying the objective reality of space and time.
A third problem noted in connection with Kant stemmed from Russell’s
objection from alteration: Can we guard against the possibility that the
subjective-constitutive principles might change so that we get counterex-
amples to what was previously regarded as necessary? This worry, however,
has considerably less force in the context of the linguistic approach since
the subjective-constitutive principles are now construed as definitions. A
change here will therefore involve a change in meaning, and so, although
changes to the relevant principles are certainly possible, there is little reason
to think that this would result in there being counterexamples to what was
previously held to be necessary, as opposed to effecting a change in subject.
Finally, we saw that Kant needs something like an epistemology of tran-
scendental psychology to explain how we can have insight into the principles
that govern intuition and thought. In the context of the linguistic approach,
on the other hand, all we need is a comparatively unmysterious capacity for
reflecting upon the rules governing our use of linguistic expressions. How-
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ever, although this is an advantage, we should not be carried away here,
since one standard objection against the linguistic approach is that knowing
what the linguistic rules are involves empirical knowledge of contingent mat-
ters, and cannot, therefore, provide the basis of modal knowledge, which
is traditionally construed as a priori – or at least not straightforwardly
empirical. We shall consider this objection in due course.
I should also draw attention to an advantage which this view has over
the Tractarian position: The idea here is that our linguistic rules quite
generally are exempt from an external standard of correctness. It is not
a view about the logical constants specifically. Moreover, since such rules
quite generally are supposed to explain necessity (and the a priori), there
is no suggestion here (like there is in the Tractatus) that all necessity must
be accounted for in terms of a highly restricted conception of logic.
3.2 Hans Hahn and Consistent Empiricism
Having seen how the linguistic approach emerges as a synthesis of a broadly
speaking Kantian strategy, Poincaré’s conventionalism and Wittgenstein’s
linguistic turn, I now turn to the question of what role this approach was
meant to play in the broader context of logical positivism.
According to the positivists, the chief importance of the new conception
of logical truth, together with the logicist project in the foundations of
mathematics, was that it made a ‘consistent empiricism’ possible. The
standard story told by the positivist in this context is, however, a rather
shallow one, and does not stand up to scrutiny. However, a closer look at
the writings of Hans Hahn reveals a more interesting picture, in which the
defence of empiricism is intimately connected with precisely the use of the
subject-constitutive strategy we have been tracing. In this section I first
present and criticise the standard story, and then consider Hahn’s views in
more detail.
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The Standard Defence of Empiricism
According to the standard story,8 the problem that faced empiricism was
simple: Empiricism requires that all knowledge must be justified by obser-
vation, but observation does not provide adequate justification for necessary
truths, in particular those of mathematics and logic. Recent developments
were said to have solved this problem by: i) reducing mathematics to logic
(barring some loose ends in Principia Mathematica), and ii) showing that
logic itself is tautological and therefore, in some sense, “devoid of factual
content”. This lack of factual content was supposed to exempt logic (and
thus also mathematics) from the demands of empiricism:
Since empiricism had always asserted that all knowledge is based on
experience, this assertion had to include knowledge in mathematics.
[. . . ] Our solution, based on Wittgenstein’s conception, consisted in
asserting the thesis of empiricism only for factual truth. By contrast,
the truths in logic and mathematics are not in need of confirmation
by observations, because they do not state anything about the world
of facts, they hold for any possible combination of facts. (Carnap
1963a: 64)
The last sentence here leaves it somewhat unclear how the notion of factual
content ties in with the notion of holding for any possible combination of
facts, but elsewhere Carnap is more explicit about this: ‘All valid state-
ments of mathematics are analytic in the specific sense that they hold in
all possible cases and therefore do not have any factual content.’ (1963a:
47; cf. also 1930: 143) This, however, amounts to simply equating ‘lack
of factual content’ with being necessary, and if this is what is meant by
‘factual content’, then restricting the empiricist thesis to factual matters,
is just to restrict it to contingent matters. This by itself could hardly be a
vindication of empiricism in any significance sense. For even if a truth lacks
factual content in this sense, this gives us no reason at all to think that it
is somehow epistemically unproblematic.
8Cf. e.g. Carnap (1930: 141–3; 1963a: 46–7), and Ayer (1936a: ch. 4).
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Moreover, if this is what lack of content amounts to, then Carnap is
much too quick in passages such as this:
Since all the sentences of logic are tautological and devoid of content,
we cannot draw inferences from them about what is necessary or
impossible in reality. Thus the attempt to base metaphysics on pure
logic which is chiefly characteristic of such a system as Hegel’s, is
shown to be unwarranted. (1930: 143)
The examples used by the positivists are similarly unhelpful. Ayer, for
instance, tells us that ‘ “Either some ants are parasitic or none are’ provides
no information whatsoever about the behaviour of ants’ (1936a: 103–4),
and Carnap insists that ‘we learn nothing about reality from the tautology
“Its is raining (here and now) or it is not raining.”’ (1930: 143). But
even if we grant that there is a reasonable sense in which this provides
no information about the behaviour of ants or the weather, we might still
say that the realisation that this holds in every possible case teaches us
something profound about the modal structure reality or logic. Gödel makes
something like this objection when he writes that ‘one may very well say
that the proposition mentioned above, although it says nothing about rain,
does express a property of “not” and “or”.’ (1995a: 362)
In the end, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the standard story
of how new developments in logic and the foundations of mathematics made
a consistent empiricism possible, relies on misleading blend of definitions
and rhetorical devices. On a straightforward understanding of what it is
to ‘lack factual content’, it could plausibly be said that if logic and math-
ematics lack factual content, then there is no real knowledge here, and
consequently no threat to the empiricist thesis that knowledge must be
backed up by observation. But if all it means is that logic and mathematics
hold in all possible cases, then this warrants no such conclusion.
After all, the question all along was presumably: How do we know that
something holds in every possible case assuming that this is not something
we learn by observation? It is all well and good to back this up with truth-
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tables, but this only pushes the question back to the truth-tables themselves
and how we know that they indeed take all the possibilities into account. To
say that some truths lack factual content because they hold in all possible
cases is clearly of no help here.
Hans Hahn on Logic and Language
We should not, however, conclude that the positivists’ conception of logi-
cal truth had no bearing on the defence of empiricism they were interested
in. A more interesting picture emerges if we look at the writings of Hans
Hahn, who, according to Carnap, was the one who especially emphasised
the connection between the new conception of logic and empiricism, both in
publication and discussion (Carnap 1963a: 47).9 I shall argue that Hahn’s
account of logical necessity and how it makes a consistent empiricism pos-
sible relies essentially on employing Kant’s subjective-constitutive strategy.
There is no denying that the Vienna Circle was more concerned with
stressing discontinuities with Kant than points of contact, and Hahn is no
exception.10 It is quite clear, in particular, that he rejected the synthetic a
priori, and the notion of pure intuition. Still, we find no wholesale rejection
of Kant, and at a more fundamental level there is agreement. In particular,
Hahn is quite explicit that knowledge presupposes that the subject takes
on an active role, and that this provides the key to the special status of
logic. Thus he writes that ‘in the acquisition of our knowledge we do not
just receive the given but in addition process it’, and maintains that ‘this
provides us with an opportunity to sketch a view of the place of logic’ (Hahn
1930a: 22).
The view he goes on to sketch has a distinctly Kantian flavour, although
it is transposed, under the influence of Wittgenstein’s linguistic turn, from
thought and intuition to language:
9Hahn’s views are rarely discussed today, but see Ablondi (2002) and Uebel (2005).
10Cf. e.g. Hahn (1930b: 10; 1933a: 74).
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According to this view, logic is not something to be found in the given
– or let us say: in the world. Logic is not, as used to be believed, a
theory of the most general properties of objects, a theory of objects
as such; rather, logic first arises when the given is processed, when
the knowing subject confronts the given, tries to picture it to himself,
and introduces a symbolism: logic is tied up with something’s being
said about the world. (1930a: 22)11
Notice that Hahn is not just making the positive claim that how we talk
about the world gives rise to logic, but also the negative claim that there
is nothing analogous ‘in the world’ (or ‘the given’). There is, therefore, no
sense in which the logic that arises from how we represent “the given” in
language could fall short of an external standard of correctness. Indeed,
Hahn explicitly draws on Wittgenstein’s fundamental thought here: ‘There
[is] nothing in the world corresponding to the so-called logical constants
(like “and”, “or”, etc.)’ (1930a: 24).
We have, then, the following two parallel strategies: Kant argued that
the reason why geometry is necessary and knowable a priori is that it con-
cerns the principles according to which the subject experiences objects, and
he supplemented this with a denial that the objects of geometry correspond
to anything outside of our form of outer intuition. Hahn argues that the
reason why logic is necessary and knowable a priori is that it concerns the
principles according to which the subject represents the world in language,
and he supplements this with a denial that the logical constants correspond
to anything outside of our language.
Further similarities emerge when we consider the problems Kant and
Hahn took themselves to be addressing. Kant, recall, introduced his strat-
egy in response to the problem of explaining the agreement that a priori
representations are supposed to have with the objects even without any
experiential input – the problem of inexplicable agreement. Hahn sees the
linguistic approach as fulfilling an exactly analogous purpose:
11Cf. also Hahn (1929: 40; 1931: 33; and 1933b: 29).
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Once we take this view of logic, a much-discussed problem dissolves
of its own accord – the problem of the seemingly mysterious par-
allelism between the course of our thought and that of the world,
the seemingly pre-established harmony between thought and world,
which would enable us to discover something about the world by
thought. (1930a: 24)12
Now, the idea that we could discover something about the world “by
thought” is exactly what the logical positivists wanted to oppose by their
empiricism. It is, therefore, by dissolving (as opposed to solving) this prob-
lem of “mysterious parallelism” that empiricism is supposed to be vindi-
cated. This is why Hahn prefaces all of this by saying that ‘only the eluci-
dation of the place of logic and mathematics to be discussed below (which is
of very recent origin) made a consistent empiricism possible.’ (1930a: 21)13
As in Kant’s case, the problem is dissolved by employing the subjective-
constitutive strategy – by conceiving of that which can be discovered ‘by
thought’ (logic and mathematics) as concerning subjective principles which
are not accountable to any further standard of correctness, so that no ques-
tion of “parallelism” arises. Indeed, in a 1931 conversation, Hahn character-
istically opposes Schlick’s claim that ‘the form of the facts is mirrored in the
language’, by saying that ‘there is no connection here unless it is artificially
construed. For the rules of syntax a logical justification cannot be given
because it is only here that logic begins’ (Stadler 2001: 253). The rules of
syntax, that is, are constitutive of the notion of a logical justification, and
so there can be no question of getting these right.
Note that this defence of empiricism goes deeper than the standard story.
The point is not just that logical truths are true in every possible case, but
that the reason why this is so is that they arise from how we represent
the world in language, independently of what it is actually like. Thus,
while Hahn does adopt Wittgenstein’s ‘tautology’ terminology – with the
implication that tautologies are in some sense devoid of content – what he
12Cf. also Hahn (1933b: 28).
13Cf. also Hahn (1929: 41; 1931: 33; and 1933b: 38).
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stresses is not that they are true no matter what, but that they arise merely
from how we speak: ‘We must distinguish two kinds of propositions: those
that say something factual and those that merely express a dependence in
the assignment of designations to objects; let us call propositions of the
latter kind tautological’ (1933b: 32).
This provides the more principled reason for the positivists’ insistence
that logical truths, and necessary truths more generally, are without factual
content. The thought is precisely that questions of logic can be settled, as
Wittgenstein puts it, ‘without an object of comparison’. This is the sense
in which the ‘universal validity’, ‘certainty’, and ‘irrefutability’ of the laws
of logic ‘flows precisely from this from this circumstance, that they say
nothing at all about objects’ (Hahn 1933b: 30). They say nothing about
the objects because they are built into the framework we use to represent
the world, and this framework is itself independent of what the objects are
like.
The positivists’ use of the linguistic approach to defend their empiricism,
then, relies crucially on the subjective constitutive strategy: The existence
of necessary (and a priori) truths is meant to be consistent with empiri-
cism because such truths concern merely the principles according to which
the subject represents the world in language. These principles, moreover,
are not subject to any external standard of correctness, but rather them-
selves constitutive of our concepts. There is therefore no problem of inex-
plicable agreement – no ‘mysterious parallelism between the course of our
thought and that of the world’. Logical knowledge is meant to be a kind of
self-knowledge, available by reflecting on the rules that govern our use of
linguistic expressions.
3.3 Carnap and the Linguistic Approach
Carnap was the one, among the logical positivists, who treated questions
about the foundations of mathematics and logic with the most rigour, and
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he was also the one who most explicitly endorsed a thoroughgoing con-
ventionalism with respect to logic. This tends to be associated primarily
with Carnap’s syntax project which culminated in Logical Syntax of Lan-
guage. However, Carnap was committed to something like the linguistic
approach (and the subjective-constitutive strategy) long before the syntax
project, and he retained this commitment after he abandoned it in favour
of a semantic approach. Moreover, while the move to semantics did put a
restriction on the appeal to convention, this should still not be thought of
as a radical break when it comes to how Carnap thought about the nature
of logical truth. In this section I trace these developments with a focus on
the linguistic approach as something which remains constants throughout.
Carnap Before Syntax
As mentioned, Carnap holds, in the Aufbau, that logic consists solely of con-
ventions concerning the use of symbols and tautologies based on these. We
are also told that ‘the symbols of logic (and mathematics) do not designate
objects, but merely serve as symbolic fixations of these conventions.’ (1928a:
178) Both the use of ‘tautology’ and the insistence that logical constants do
not refer show the influence of Wittgenstein. The appeal to convention, on
the other hand, is foreign to the Tractatus. We know, however, that Carnap
was influenced by Poincaré’s conventionalism from early on,14 and it is not
surprising, therefore, that he would put – perhaps without realising it – a
conventionalist spin on the Tractarian position.
Carnap does not have much more to say about logic in the Aufbau.
However, a paper from around the same time elaborate on these ideas:
In order to provide derivations of real concepts from other real con-
cepts, we need, in addition to words for these concepts, interme-
diary signs which do not themselves refer to real concepts (using
14We find references to Poincaré in his 1921 doctoral dissertation (published as Carnap
1922), and, as Carnap mentions in his autobiography (1963a: 15), he was strongly
influenced by Poincaré’s conventionalism in his (1923).
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a word language, for example words like: ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘all’, ‘not’,
‘if. . . then. . . ’, ‘equals’). They do help to say something about real-
ity, but nothing in reality corresponds to them – they are only part
of the statement. (1927: 358; my translation)15
Again we find Carnap making the Tractarian point that the logical con-
stants belong solely to our way of representing the world and not to what
is represented. This idea is later connected with the special status of logi-
cal/mathematical knowledge:
The formal concepts (logical and arithmetic concepts) serve only as
a tool for representing knowledge of real concepts; so-called knowl-
edge of formal concepts (e.g. mathematical knowledge) consists of
tautologies. (Carnap 1927: 373; my translation)16
It is worth noting that although Carnap uses the notion of a tautology
here, he nowhere provides a definition of this term along the lines of the
Tractatus. There is no mention, for instance, of truth-tables. All we are
given is an equation of the tautological and the a priori, and a contrast
between tautologies and ‘propositions about reality’ (1927: 362). In addi-
tion, the reader could be expected to rely on the ordinary understanding of
‘tautology’ from grammar – that is, a sentence in which there is a linguistic
redundancy of some kind.
In this context, then, calling formal knowledge ‘tautological’ is plausi-
bly Carnap’s way of making precisely the point that it is an artefact of how
the subjects represents genuine knowledge in language: Formal concepts
are ‘only part of the statement’, and as a consequence, formal truths are
15Wenn die Ableitung eines Realbegriffes aus anderen oder eine Aussage über Re-
albegriffe gegeben werden soll, so brauchen wir außer den Worten für diese Begriffe
noch Zwischenzeichen, die selbst keine Realbegriffe bezeichnen (bei Verwendung von
Wortsprache z. B. die Worte: ‘und’, ‘oder’, ‘alle’, ‘nicht’, ‘wenn. . . so. . . ’, ‘derselbe’ und
dergleichen). Sie verhelfen zwar dazu, etwas über die Wirklichkeit auszusagen; ihnen
selbst entspricht jedoch nichts in der Wirklichkeit, sie formen nur die Aussage.
16Die Formalbegriffe (logische und arithmetische Begriffe) dienen nur als Hilfsmittel
zur Darstellung der Erkenntnis von Realbegriffen; die sogenannten Erkenntnisse von
Formalbegriffen (z. B. mathematische Erkenntnisse) sind Tautologien.
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tautologies, as opposed to ‘propositions about reality’. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, then Carnap was, by the late 1920’s, already committed to
a linguistic approach to logical necessity, understood as a linguistic turn
(inspired by Wittgenstein) on Kant’s subjective-constitutive strategy, with
strongly conventionalist elements inherited from Poincaré.
The Syntax Project
It is a mistake, then, to restrict Carnap’s commitment to the linguistic ap-
proach or ‘conventionalism’ to his syntax project. Rather, the work culmi-
nating in Logical Syntax of Language17 should be seen as a specific attempt
to spell out and defend the view he already had in the late 20’s. Two devel-
opments probably convinced Carnap that this idea was in need of a more
thorough treatment: i) the realisation that the Tractarian notion of a tau-
tology is too weak to sustain a strong enough version of the logicist project;
ii) Gödel’s demonstration that mathematical truth cannot be equated with
provability.18
What is new in LSL is Carnap’s adoption of what he later (1963b: 928)
calls ‘the formalist method’:
I intended to show that the concepts of the theory of formal deduc-
tive logic, e.g., provability, derivability from given premises, logical
independence, etc., are purely syntactical concepts, and that there-
fore their definitions can be formulated in logical syntax, since these
concepts depend merely on the forms of the sentences, not on their
meanings. (1963a: 54)
Importantly, Carnap did not regard this as a fully-fledged commitment
to formalism: While he accepted the method, he ‘did not accept the the-
sis of formalism and instead maintained that of logicism’ (Carnap 1963b:
17The original was published in 1934, and the expanded English translation in 1937.
18For more on this, see e.g. Awodey and Carus (2007), Awodey (2007: §1), and Uebel
(2007: §5.1.1).
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928). In accordance with the method, he aims to conduct his investiga-
tions from a purely formal (syntactical) point of view, but he denies that
logic/mathematics should be regarded as anything like a game with sym-
bols cut off from application: ‘Since Schlick and I came to philosophy from
physics, we looked at mathematics always from the point of view of its ap-
plication in empirical science.’ (1963a: 48) LSL is meant to establish, not
that logic/mathematics is cut off from application, but that notions like
logical truth and provability can be fully explained without taking such
matters into account.
Though the adoption of the method of formalism is a new development,
the reason (or at least one reason) for adopting it is not. The point is pre-
cisely that if we can show that all formal/logical concepts can be adequately
defined from a purely syntactic point of view – i.e. using definitions that
refer ‘solely to the kinds and order of the symbols from which the expres-
sions are constructed’ (Carnap 1937: 1) – then we shall have both defended
and explicated the idea that formal concepts are special because they are,
as he had put it earlier, ‘only part of the statement’.
It is not surprising, therefore, that we find Carnap making essentially
the same point he had made in 1927 in a paper from the syntax period:
In adjoining the formal sciences to the factual sciences no new area
of subject matter is introduced, despite the contrary opinion of some
philosophers who believe that the “real” objects of the factual sci-
ences must be contrasted with the “formal”, “geistig” or “ideal” ob-
jects of the formal sciences. The formal sciences do not have any
objects at all; they are systems of auxiliary statements without ob-
jects and without content. (1935: 128)
The adoption of the formalist method, then, provides Carnap with a new
way of spelling out an old idea.
Another development is that the conventionalist strand, although
present before the syntax project, becomes much more pronounced. It is
lifted to the foreground in the form of the Principle of Tolerance:
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It is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conven-
tions. [. . . ] In logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to
build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes.
All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he
must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules in stead of
philosophical arguments. (1937: 51–2)
It is clear that Carnap did see the adoption of the formalist method as
liberating debates in logic and the foundations of mathematics from the
notion of correctness. Still, this is potentially puzzling since he held that
logic was based on conventions as early as 1928. Moreover, he stresses in his
Autobiography that the Principle of Tolerance – although first formulated
in LSL – expresses an attitude that ‘remained the same throughout [his]
life.’ (1963a: 18) What the formalist method brings to the table, then, is
neither the idea that logic is in some sense tied to conventions, nor the
idea that ‘everyone is free to use the language most suited to his purpose.’
(Carnap 1963a: 18)19 The point, rather, is that by adopting the formalist
method, the choice of logic – understood as a proof system – becomes prior
to anything else. It is therefore not subject to any prior constraints, and
the notion of correctness gets no grip at all:
Let any postulates and any rules of inference be chosen arbitrarily;
then this choice, whatever it may be, will determine what meaning is
to be assigned to the fundamental logical symbols. By this method,
also, the conflict between the divergent points of view on the problem
of the foundations of mathematics disappears. For language, in its
mathematical form, can be constructed according to the preferences
of any one of the points of view represented; so that no question
of justification arises at all, but only the question of the syntactical
consequences to which one or the other of the choices leads, including
the question of non-contradiction. (Carnap 1937: xv)
19Nor, indeed, is the aim of reconciling formalism, intuitionism and logicism new (cf.
Hahn, O. Neurath, and Carnap 1929: 311).
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As I understand the development of Carnap’s ideas, he was, even before the
syntax project, sympathetic to the the idea that there could be different
but equally correct logics built into different but equally correct languages.
But this is not yet the position of LSL, for it may still be debated, for a
given logic (say intuitionistic logic), whether there is a coherent language
for which this logic would be the correct one – whether we can, that is,
find a suitable interpreted language which would give us, say, intuitionistic
logic. These are the kinds of questions that are meant to be dissolved in
LSL by the adoption of the formalist method.
The Move to Semantics
So far I have argued that Carnap’s commitment to the linguistic approach
– understood as a linguistic version of the subjective-constitutive strategy
with a focus on convention – antecedes the syntax project, and that the
syntax project itself should be seen as a specific attempt to develop this
view. I shall now argue that the linguistic approach survives when Carnap
abandons the syntax project in favour of a focus on semantics.
In general, I agree with those (Creath 1990b; Ricketts 1996), that have
argued that Carnap’s move to semantics should not be thought of as a sharp
break with his syntax project. It is also quite clear that this was Carnap’s
own view (Carnap 1942: 246). However, the more interesting questions
are more local and concern how the move to semantics alters Carnap’s
conception of particular issues. Two such questions are particularly relevant
for our purposes:
1. Does the move to semantics involve a break with the linguistic ap-
proach?
2. Does the move to semantics involve a significant restriction of the
conventionalism inherent in the Principle of Tolerance?
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Semantics and Logical Truth
The explanation of logical truth is one of the most significant differences be-
tween LSL and the later works. The syntactical definitions of what Carnap
calls ‘L-concepts’ are now abandoned, and semantic definitions are sought.
Carnap no longer holds, that is, that it is appropriate to characterise these
notions without taking question of meaning into account. Our first question
is whether this development signals a rejection of the idea that logical truth
is to be explained in terms of linguistic rules that are not accountable to
any subject-independent standard.
There is one reason to think that it might. The idea would be that
once this move is made, what is doing the explanatory work is not the
linguistic rules we conventionally adopt, but relations between meanings
which hold independently of such rules. On this picture, our linguistic rules
would appear to be accountable to the meaning relations that in fact obtain,
resulting in the abandonment of the subjective-constitutive strategy, and
giving rise to a problem of inexplicable agreement: What reason do we have
to think that the semantic relations are as we take them to be?
Some later passages from Carnap do indeed hint at a picture along such
lines:
Once the meanings of the individual words in a sentence of this
form are given (which may be regarded as a matter of convention),
then it is no longer a matter of convention or of arbitrary choice
whether or not to regard the sentence as true; the truth of such a
sentence is determined by the logical relations holding between the
given meanings. (1963c: 916)
It may even be suggested that Carnap here sounds rather like Gödel when
he, in one of his more Platonist moments, maintains that ‘with mathemati-
cal reason we perceive the most general (namely the “formal”) concepts and
their relations, which are separated from space-time reality’ (1995a: 354).
However, the similarities here are superficial and it would be a serious
mistake to conflate Carnap’s and Gödel’s positions. They diverge on pre-
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cisely the issue that is crucial for our purposes: whether the meanings are
understood as a subject-independent standard of correctness that would
introduce the kind of epistemological puzzles that the subjective-strategy
is supposed to get rid of.
For Carnap, there is nothing in the appeal to meaning beyond an appeal
to the semantic rules which we have adopted: ‘Within semantics, I stress the
distinction between factual truth, dependent upon the contingency of facts,
and logical truth, independent of facts and dependent merely on meaning
as determined by semantical rules.’ (Carnap 1942: xi; my emphasis) These
rules, moreover, are still adopted by convention. As he puts it in his earliest
treatment of the subject after adopting the semantic point of view:
Even here, conventions are of fundamental importance; for the basis
on which logic is constructed, namely, the interpretation of the logi-
cal signs (e.g. by a determination of truth conditions) can be freely
chosen. (Carnap 1939: 28)
Gödel, on the other hand, was eager to stress that when we are dealing with
relations between meanings/concepts, we are not dealing with something
which has its basis in our linguistic rules: ‘I wish to repeat that “analytic”
here does not mean “true owing to our definitions”, but rather “true owing
to the nature of the concepts occurring therein” ’ (1995b: 321).
On inspection, then, the move to a semantic explanation of logical truth
is less of a break with the earlier conception that it might seem. The idea is
not that we need to appeal to “the meanings”, as opposed to the linguistic
rules we have chosen to adopt. We are still to appeal to such rules, but we
are dealing with rules of a different kind than those in LSL. Carnap’s seman-
tic explanation of logical truth is therefore, in fundamental respects, quite
continuous with the account in LSL. Both the syntactic and the semantic
account are attempts to spell out an underlying idea that Carnap was com-
mitted to as early as 1927: namely that logical truth (which, for Carnap,
includes everything traditionally referred to as ‘necessary’) arises from the
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rules that govern how we represent the world in language – rules, moreover,
that are not accountable to any further, subject-independent standard.
Semantics and Convention
Our second question is whether the move to semantics involves a significant
restriction on the Principle of Tolerance – that is, whether Carnap’s conven-
tionalism is diluted. There are different views about this in the literature.
Michael Potter, for instance, maintains that ‘the introduction of a theory of
semantics is to be seen as a constraint on the Principle of Tolerance’ (2000:
272), whereas Thomas Ricketts holds that the ‘adoption of semantics does
not seriously affect Carnap’s attitude of tolerance’ (Ricketts 1996: 246–7).
After the move to semantics, Carnap certainly does make it clear, as we
have already seen, that there are limits to what is conventional. In partic-
ular, we cannot first settle on an interpretation of our language and then
decide on a logic by convention (Carnap 1939: 27–8).20 Nor, presumably,
can we settle on a logic, and then freely decide on an interpretation. In
this sense, the move to semantics does introduce new constraints; there are
some morals in logic, namely soundness, and (perhaps) completeness.
However, some care is needed when comparing this to the syntax period.
For there is a sense in which Carnap always accepted that there are such
constraints linking the semantic and the syntactic. In LSL, after all, it is
suggested that we should postulate a logic and let this choice determine
the interpretation (Carnap 1937: xv). Moreover, Carnap’s objection to
the strategy of first deciding on an interpretation and then determine the
correct logic relative to this was not that the interpretation leaves the choice
of logic completely undetermined; it was that matters of meaning are too
vague for this to be a productive method. Indeed, during the syntax period,
Carnap could still write:
It is often stated that the relation of entailment depends on the
meanings of the propositions. In a certain sense we can agree with
20Cf. also (1942: 247).
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that; for when the meaning of two propositions is known, it is thereby
determined whether one is the entailment of the other or not. (1934b:
10–1)
Even in the syntax period, then, Carnap recognised the (plain) fact that
the choice of logic isn’t independent of the interpretation of the logical
expressions. It is just that because talk of meaning was viewed as insuffi-
ciently rigorous and therefore banned (somewhat ironically, in the spirit of
tolerance) from discussions of logic, these constraints didn’t appear on the
radar. Against the background of the method of formalism, the question of
soundness is not allowed to arise.
Once semantics is accepted as rigorous enough, however, so too are the
questions of soundness and completeness. But this is, at bottom, just a
broadening of what is available for scientific treatment. It does not repre-
sent a fundamental change in Carnap’s tolerant attitude. In particular, it
remains the case that we can speak whatever language we choose, and it
remains the case that such different languages may give rise to different but
equally “correct” logics. My contention, then, is that although the move to
semantics does put some constraints on the radar because it allows for a rig-
orous treatment of the relationship between syntax (i.e. proof theory) and
semantics, it does not alter the substance of Carnap’s conventionalism.21
It is worth reiterating here a point made above: The transition from
talking about syntactic rules to talking about semantic rules, does not in-
volve rejecting the idea that logic is based on rules that are conventionally
adopted (cf. Carnap 1939: 28). While the emphasis on convention is now
less pronounced, and the the recognition of the limits of convention more
explicit, the role of convention when it comes to the explanation of logical
truth remains largely the same. As Richard Creath puts it ‘the move to
21An interesting question is whether the general semantic framework that Carnap
constrains our choice of logic in some way. Even if this is so, however, it would not
automatically be a break with the syntax period since an analogous question arises there
with regard to the ‘general syntax’ laid out in Part IV of LSL.
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semantics does not change the content of Carnap’s conventionalism, but it
does change the form.’ (1990b: 413)
The Unity of Carnap’s Views on Logical Necessity
I maintain, then, that the linguistic approach was a constant theme in
Carnap’s thinking about the nature of logical necessity. He never gave up
his early conviction that logic does not “correspond” to anything in reality,
but arises solely from how we represent the world in language and the rules
we have adopted for this purpose. Instead, he worked to spell out this idea
in more detail, first, during the restrictive syntax period, by attempting
to explicate the notions of logical truth and provability in terms of purely
syntactic notions, and then, once he was satisfied that semantics had been
put on a firm scientific basis, via a more liberal project that allowed appeals
to semantic notions as well.
Still, he always endorsed a linguistic version of the subjective-
constitutive strategy, with a strong emphasis on convention and tolerance.
The idea was throughout that logical necessity should be explained in terms
of the rules that govern linguistic representation, and that these rules are
not responsible to any external reality or standard of correctness. Rather,
the rules constitute the standard of correctness, since it is, as Hahn puts it,
‘only here that logic begins’ (Stadler 2001: 253).22 For this reason there is
meant to be no problem of inexplicable agreement, which, in turn, is meant
to make empiricism consistent with the existence of necessary truths (with
the Humean background assumption being that empirical evidence does not
provide adequate justification for thinking that something is necessary).23
22Analogously, we might say that, for Kant, it is only in the form of outer intuition
that “geometry begins” since space is a mere form of intuition, and so there can be no
question of justifying our form of intuition relative to the true geometry of space.
23This assumption is not, it is worth noting, automatically undermined by the “nec-
essary a posteriori”. For even if we learn that water is H2O via empirical investigation,
this is not to say that such an investigation suffices to tell us that this is necessary (after
all, thinking about what is the case on Twin Earth is hardly an empirical investigation).
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3.4 More on the Commitments of the
Linguistic Approach
In chapter 1 we said that the linguistic approach is best understood as a
commitment to carrying out an explanatory project of a certain kind, where
necessities are to be explained in terms of, broadly speaking, linguistic mat-
ters having to do with the rules that govern the use of linguistic expressions.
We also noted that although this notion of a “linguistic matter” gives us
some grasp on what adherents of the linguistic approach can appeal to in
their explanations, it is in need of further explication.
The above investigation into the historical roots of the linguistic ap-
proach, and the role it was meant to play within the context of logical
positivism, allows us to provide such a further explication. Our main
guide here is the idea that the linguistic approach – given its roots, how
it was developed, and what it was meant to accomplish – is a version of
the subjective-constitutive strategy. An adherent of this approach cannot,
therefore, appeal to anything which would compromise this.
Notably, this means that they are restricted to appealing to principles
which can plausibly be regarded as: i) subjective, in the sense that they
concern how the subject represents the world in language, as opposed to
how the world is “in itself”; and ii) not accountable to an external standard
of correctness – a standard of correctness, that is, which would introduce
a problem of inexplicable agreement regarding how we get to be confident
that the principles that govern how we speak are adequate relative to some
language-independent domain.
Now, it may be suggested that explanations in accordance with the
commitments of the linguistic approach must appeal solely to conventional
features of linguistic representation, and so that whatever is appealed to in
such explanations must admit of alternatives. And as we have seen, there
are indeed great merits in appealing to convention in this context, since
the presence of equally valid alternatives provide us with a reasonably clear
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indication that there is no external standard of correctness (e.g. the fact
that a measurement in feet would be as correct as one in meters tells us
that the units we use here are not in the business of correctly capturing
something like the real units of nature).
However, this would be unduly restrictive. For given how we are un-
derstanding the linguistic approach, the appeal to convention, while highly
significant, is, essentially, a means to an end. The point of highlighting
that something is a matter of convention is to establish that there is no
external standard of correctness, and therefore no room for a worry about
whether we are “getting things right or not” in this regard. This means,
however, that as long as an adherent of the linguistic approach can ar-
gue that they are not appealing to anything which would introduce such a
worry, it need not undermine their aims if they appeal to something which
cannot be straightforwardly be said to admit of alternatives, and so be a
matter of convention. Even if there are aspects of how we represent the
world in language which we cannot envisage alternatives to, this does not
necessarily mean that these aspects are in the business of reflecting some
language-independent reality; they might just be built into our very practice
of linguistic representation as such.
Moreover, there is not much basis, in the writings of the logical posi-
tivists, for the notion that conventionality is the be all and end all of the
linguistic approach. Even in LSL, where Carnap is at his most “convention-
alist” and declares that ‘in logic there are no morals’ (1937: 52), it is not
said that, when it comes to syntax, it is all a matter of convention. Carnap
plainly cannot say this since the purpose of the entire Division B of Part
IV of LSL is to ‘construct a syntax for languages in general, that is to say,
a system of definitions of syntactical terms which are so comprehensive as
to be applicable to any language whatsoever’ (1937: 167). In other words:
not everything which is a matter of syntax admits of alternatives.
What we do frequently find is the idea that logical necessities are to
be explained in terms of conventionally adopted rules for using linguistic
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expressions. But to say that the rules are conventionally adopted is not to
say that they are wholly conventional constructs with no non-conventional
features. It may be, after all – indeed, it is quite plausible – that there are
limits to what could count as a linguistic rule at all. Thus, a rule could be
conventionally adopted (since we might blamelessly have adopted different
rules) even if it has certain features which no linguistic rule could lack.
Moreover, appealing to such features in explanations of necessities could
still be consistent with a linguistic version of the subjective-constitutive
strategy provided that they are not understood as imposed on our language
by an independent standard of correctness which would introduce a problem
of inexplicable agreement regarding how we know that our language meets
this standard.
The preceding chapters also allows us to say something about what
would be a too liberal conception of the commitments of the linguistic ap-
proach. In particular, the aim is not to explain necessities in terms of some
bland notion of analyticity. Indeed, we have already seen that at least two
traditions which can be thought of in terms of analyticity are not consistent
with the central tenets of the linguistic approach since they are in tension
with the subjective-constitutive strategy.
First, formalism is not a version of the linguistic approach. The idea is
not that necessary truths are special because they concern formal or pure
conceptual structures that are cut off from application. As we saw, this
conception of formality was abandoned by Schlick under the influence of
Wittgenstein, and both Carnap and Hahn stress that the problem concerns
how to account for the applicability of logic and mathematics to the em-
pirical (Carnap 1963a: 48; Hahn 1931: 32). The linguistic approach, like
the subjective-constitutive strategy in general, is meant to explain how we
can know that the world we encounter must conform to certain principles,
and it does this by locating these principles in the framework we use to
represent the world in language.
Second, the linguistic approach should not be equated with what we may
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call ‘conceptual Platonism’ – the view that necessities are to be understood
in terms of something like brute facts about meanings/concepts (cf. the
Gödel quote above) which are independent of our linguistic practices. This
would involve introducing a subject-independent standard which introduces
the kind of agreement problem that both Kant and the logical positivists
were determined to dissolve via the use of the subjective-constitutive strat-
egy, and which, for the latter, was meant to make a consistent empiricism
possible.
It is worth noting that the problem here isn’t talk about abstract mean-
ings or concepts as such, but rather the idea that brute facts about some
such domain can do any explanatory work here. The point is that if we
maintain, say, that triangles necessarily have three sides because the con-
cept triangle stands in a certain relation to the concept three-sided, but deny
that this can be understood simply in terms of how we have decided to use
the expressions ‘triangle’ and ‘three-sided’ (or ‘having three sides’), then
this raises the question of how we know that this conceptual relationship
obtains.
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Transition to Part B
The general aim of the linguistic approach, then, is to explain necessary
truths – that is: how they get to be necessary and how we get to appreciate
this (cf. Dummett’s question) – in terms of subjective and normatively
autonomous principles that govern how we represent the world in language.
These principles, moreover, are reasonably described as conventions if there
are alternative principles that could have been chosen instead.
Illustrating the model with a simple (but by no means unproblematic)
example, the idea might be that the necessity of ‘all triangles have three
vertices’ is to be explained (at least in part) by there being a linguistic rule
(adopted, presumably, by convention) to the effect that ‘triangle’ correctly
applies to an object only if it is a polygon with three vertices. This is meant
to explain the necessity of the claim because the rule is meant to be what
sets limits to our conception of what a triangle could be.
As to the epistemological side of the problem, these considerations are
meant to be available to us by reflecting on how we use linguistic expres-
sions, and there is supposed to be no room for the worry that the verdicts
we reach in this manner are mistaken relative to what triangles are “really
like”. This is because our rule for applying the word ‘triangle’ is meant to
be constitutive of the very notion of a triangle. Hence, there is no room
for the worry that that real triangles might fail to conform to our linguistic
conception of them – and therefore no “mysterious parallelism”, no problem
of inexplicable agreement.
Transition to Part B
It is worth noting, moreover, that this would allow us to know “in ad-
vance” that any triangle we encounter will conform to this pattern (cf.
e.g. Schlick 1925: 75), and that it also explains why it appears misguided
to carry out anything like an empirical investigation where we count the
vertices of a representative sample of triangles. I mention this because it
captures some of the traditional idea that such knowledge is a priori.24
In this part, I shall be concerned with the following question: Is the
explanatory model that I have just illustrated even a coherent one? A
prevalent attitude today is that it is not, and over the course of the next
three chapters I shall consider the main arguments that underlie this atti-
tude.
24More generally, however, the notion of the a priori is notoriously difficult to pin
down (for some of the complexities involved, see Kitcher 1980, Casullo 1988, Giaquinto
1996: §4 and Jenkins 2008: §1). There is, for instance, the question of whether intro-
spectively reflecting on the linguistic rules should count as a kind of “experience”. As I
see it, questions like these are not essential to our main concerns, which is part of the
reason why I am chiefly approaching these issues via the comparatively clearer notion of
necessity.
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Language, Truth and Necessity
The linguistic approach tends to be associated – or even downright identified
– with the following line of thought:
(Truth-contrast.) Necessary claims are not true in the way
that contingent claims are true. In particular, they are not
made true by “the facts” or “the world”. Instead, they are made
true by meanings or linguistic conventions, or perhaps not really
made true by anything at all, since they are prescriptions rather
than assertions. This, in turn, explains why such claims are
assertible independently of what the facts are, which is what
their necessity consists in.
This association provides the basis, especially in much recent literature, for
the rejection of the linguistic approach, since (Truth-contrast) is said
to fall victim to a number of conclusive objections.1
The main aim of this chapter is to show that this move is unwarranted,
since, although (Truth-contrast) should indeed be rejected, the linguis-
tic approach was never committed to this idea in the first place. A secondary
aim, however, is to show that some of the standard objections that tend to
be levelled against (Truth-contrast) are in fact much less convincing
1Boghossian (1996), Hale (2013: §§5.2–5.3), Sider (2011: §6.5), and Williamson
(2007: ch. 3) all target essentially (Truth-contrast).
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that they are often taken to be. This is important, for our purposes, since
these objections, if sound, would also tell against the linguistic approach.
I begin by introducing various versions of (Truth-contrast), before
considering some standard objections that do not, I argue, hit the mark.
I then provide what I take to be the right reason for rejecting this idea,
explain why there was no reason for saddling the linguistic approach with
(Truth-contrast) in the first place, and argue that, moreover, there is
little reason to think that the logical positivists endorsed this idea.
4.1 Versions of the Truth-Contrast Thesis
We can helpfully distinguish at least four versions of (Truth-contrast):
(i) Truth in virtue of meaning.2 Here the thought is that, unlike contin-
gent sentences, which, if true, owe their truth partly to their having
the meaning they do and partly to the way the world is, a necessary
truth ‘owes its truth value completely to its meaning, and not at all
to “the facts” ’ (Boghossian 1996: 363).
Such sentences would be, in Boghossian’s terminology, ‘metaphys-
ically analytic’, where the analyticity is metaphysical (rather than
epistemological) because it concerns, not how we might discover or
justify the truth of the sentence, but what is responsible for making
the sentence true. If we assume, now, that what a sentence means
is determined by linguistic conventions, then we can presumably say
that these are responsible, in the end, for making such sentences true.
(ii) Truth by convention. The slogans ‘truth by convention’ and ‘truth
in virtue of meaning’ are not always kept apart, but when they are,
‘truth by convention’ tends to suggest the more specific idea that
necessary truths are true because they have been stipulated (perhaps
2Obviously, this notion has been spelled out in a number of different ways. The
following characterisation is not intended to do justice to all of these.
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implicitly) to be so. That is, there is a convention in force to the
effect that these sentences are to be treated as true come what may.
Understood like this, rejecting the notion of ‘truth by convention’,
need not involve rejecting the notion of ‘truth in virtue of meaning’.
It can be consistently maintained that ‘there is no truth by conven-
tion; there is only meaning by convention, and then truth in virtue of
meaning’ (Coffa 1991: 321). Typically, the idea is that the sentences
which are stipulated to be true contain some previously undefined
term which thereby acquires meaning. In this case, necessary truths
could be regarded as true by ‘implicit definition’ in Hilbert’s sense.
(iii) Resolute normativism. A more radical idea is that necessary “truths”
are not descriptive and therefore, in fact, not true at all, but rather
rules which prescribe how linguistic expressions are to be used. Here
is Ayer proposing this idea:
They make no statement whose truth can be accepted or denied.
They merely lay down a rule which can be followed or disobeyed.
Their necessity then, we must say, consists in the fact that it
does not make sense to deny them. If we reject them we are
merely adopting another usage from that which they prescribe.
It is in this sense only that they cannot conceivably be false.
(Ayer 1936b: 20)3
(iv) Modified normativism. Resolute normativism immediately leads to
difficulties of the Frege-Geach kind (Geach 1965), and, as Ayer later
admitted (1946: 17), it is pretty undeniable that, by ordinary stan-
dards, necessary truths are indeed true. Resolute normativism is only,
therefore, an option for someone not deterred by massive revisionism.
In response to this, it has been suggested that the spirit of norma-
tivism is quite consistent with attributing truth to necessary claims
3This seems to signal a change from Ayer (1936a), published earlier that year.
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in some minimal – typically deflationary – sense.4 We may even allow
that there are modal facts as long as this notion of a ‘fact’ is given a
similarly deflationary reading (Thomasson 2009: 17). Still, the idea
remains that, in the case of necessary claims, assertibility is a matter
of a rule being in force, rather than the world being thus-and-so.
These four positions are all versions of (Truth-contrast) insofar as they
deny that necessary sentences are ‘made true by the facts’. This claim, of
course, goes beyond the claim that necessary truths have a special relation-
ship with the truth – they are, after all, necessarily true. Rather, the idea
is that being a necessary truth is not just a matter of being a truth which
is, in addition, necessary; being true (or, more generally, assertible) is itself
supposed to be a very different matter here.
It is not always clear just how deep the contrast is supposed to be –
for instance, whether we are supposed to regard ‘true’ as ambiguous. This
would, perhaps, be a somewhat peculiar view,5 so it is worth noting that
(Truth-contrast) does not entail such ambiguity. As Williamson puts
it:
Analytic truths and synthetic truths are true in exactly the same
central sense of ‘true.’ That is compatible with their being true in
very different ways, just as being a mother and being a father are
two very different ways of being a parent; ‘parent’ is not ambiguous
between mothers and fathers. (2007: 58)6
4Karl Britton is an early advocate of this idea (1947). More recent advocates include
Hans-Johann Glock (1996; 2008) and Amie Thomasson (2007a; 2009; and 2013). For a
number of criticisms, see Kalhat (2008a and 2008b).
5Although it is explicitly endorsed by Felix Kaufmann (1944: 66).
6However, Williamson immediately goes on to deny that there is such a distinction
between two different ways of being true.
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4.2 Standard Objections
Sentences and Propositions
The contemporary literature contains plenty of arguments against (Truth-
contrast), many of which target the more specific idea that linguistic
conventions alone can make sentences true – barring, perhaps, in cases
where the sentence is a metalinguistic one.
One common such objection makes heavy weather of the distinction
between sentences and propositions:
Given standard English usage, the sentence ‘bachelors are unmarried’
is true; if English had involved different conventions about what
words mean, the sentence might have meant something different,
and so it might have been false. However, the proposition expressed
by the English sentence – that bachelors are unmarried – does not
depend for its truth on how English works. (Sober 2000: 247)7
The point, of course, is not just that in addition to sentences, there are
other truth-bearers – propositions – which do not owe their truth to lin-
guistic conventions. This, after all, would leave room for the idea that
(Truth-contrast) is quite correct as a thesis about sentences. The fur-
ther point is that if we concede that the truth of the proposition is explained
by something non-conventional, then we are forced to concede this in the
sentential case as well. This is indeed very plausible; it would be odd if the
explanation of why a proposition is true were irrelevant to the explanation
of why a sentence which expresses this proposition is true.
However, we have yet to be given any reason to accept that linguistic
conventions cannot explain the truth of propositions, and this can hardly
be taken for granted in the present context.
7Variations on this point have been made by e.g. Ewing (1940: 219–20), C. I. Lewis
(1946: 96–7), Pap (1958: 169–70), Lewy (1976: 58), Yablo (1992: 878), Boghossian
(1996: 365), and Hale (2013: 120).
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In providing such a reason, moreover, there is a danger of relying on
a question-begging conception of propositions.8 Notably, we cannot just
insist that proposition are abstract, language-independent entities, since
‘the advocate of the linguistic theory is likely to scoff at the suggestion that
necessity is an intrinsic property of extralinguistic propositions’ (Pap 1958:
166). One such advocate, Jared Warren, describes the question-begging
picture of propositions in a bit more detail:
This picture seems to assume that there are the propositions, some-
where out there all arrayed. They toil not, they spin not; they are
timeless and forever. We corporeal beings work not with propositions
but with sentences. Our conventions generate meaningful sentences
simply by attaching them to particular propositions – like price tags
at the grocery store. (2015b: 90)
If we assume some such picture, then it will indeed be natural to deny
that our linguistic conventions could ever explain why a proposition is true.
The propositions are all there – with their truth-values – quite indepen-
dently of what the linguistic conventions are. However, no argument which
presupposes this picture will be persuasive to an advocate of (Truth-
contrast).9
Merely drawing the sentence-proposition distinction does not, then, suf-
fice to undermine (Truth-contrast). If there is a cogent objection here,
it must concern, not the distinction as such, but our reasons for thinking
that linguistic conventions cannot be responsible for the truth-values of
propositions.
8In a footnote, Sober cites a passage by Boghossian which is meant to suggest that
the argument works regardless of what propositions are like. This, however, is misleading
since the relevant passage is aimed at establishing a different point, namely that recog-
nising implicit definition as a route to a priori knowledge does not force us to accept that
the resulting sentence is made true by the implicit definition (Boghossian 1996: 380).
9Thus, Giannoni defends his conventionalism by denying that complex propositions
exist independently of being expressed by sentences (1971: 104). Whereas Garćıa-
Carpintero and Pérez Otero, argue that the linguistic approach can meet the present
objection by replacing what they call ‘P-propositions’ with ‘T-propositions’ (2009).
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English Chauvinism
In fact, Sober does provide such a reason:
There are bachelors in France who would very much resent the En-
glish chauvinism involved in saying that the way English works af-
fects whether (French) bachelors are unmarried. ‘Quelle imperti-
nence!’ one can hear them exclaim. The fact that bachelors are
unmarried is no more dependent on English than it is on French.
(2000: 247)10
Now, the rhetoric here is somewhat misleading. Of course, no bachelor,
French or otherwise, should think that the linguistic conventions explain
why he is unmarried. There might be all sorts of reason for that. What
the linguistic conventions are supposed to explain is, rather, why he would
cease being a bachelor if he did marry. Looking past this, we are left with
something like the following argument (where E is some English sentence,
and F a synonymous French one):
(1) E and F express the same proposition.
(2) The conventions of English are not the reason why the proposition
expressed by F is true.
(∴) The conventions of English are not the reason why the proposition
expressed by E is true.
Though there are some complications that could be discussed in more detail,
I am prepared to grant that this argument is valid. Premise (1), moreover,
is conceded by assumption, so the question is whether we should accept (2).
Insofar as Sober provides an argument for (2), it hinges on the idea that
failing to accept it would be an expression of English chauvinism. Certainly,
it would be chauvinistic to say that French is governed by the conventions
of English, but rejecting (2) does not require us to put matters in this way.
It is enough to say that English and French might share some linguistic
10Essentially the same point is made by Ewing (1940: 217–9; 1951: 41), Lazerowitz
(1972: 235), Moore (1954: 311–2), and Lewy (1976: 2; 58).
99
4. Language, Truth and Necessity
conventions, or that the conventions of English and those of French might
share those features that are (supposedly) responsible for the truth of the
proposition in question. After all, if we are really dealing with synonymous
sentences, we should expect a great deal of overlap between the relevant
conventions of English and those of French (since that is the natural expla-
nation of how the sentences got to be synonymous in the first place).
We would, of course, expect the expressions treated by the conventions
of English to differ from those treated by the conventions of French. But
unless what is supposed to account for the truth of the proposition con-
cerns these particular expressions, there are not really any grounds for the
accusation of English chauvinism here. And we should now note that advo-
cates of the linguistic approach often insisted that the particular expressions
are precisely not what is important. Here is Carnap – who appears to be
Sober’s main target – in LSL:
From the syntactical point of view it is irrelevant whether one of two
symbolical languages makes use, let us say, of the sign ‘&’ where the
other uses ‘•’ (in word-languages: whether the one uses ‘and’ and
the other ‘und’) so long as the rules of formation and transformation
are analogous. (Carnap 1937: 6)
Indeed, Carnap stresses that whether a sentence is analytic, or an inference
valid, is fundamentally a matter of the formal structure of the language,
which is what notational variants have in common (1937: 5–6).
Against this background, it is not too difficult to imagine what Carnap
would have said if someone objected, say, that the rules of English cannot
explain the validity of conjunction elimination since this rule is valid in
French as well.
Strawson makes a similar but more natural-language-oriented point. In
the course of defending the view that logical properties are explicable in
terms of linguistic rules, Strawson considers the objection (very much like
Sober’s) that this cannot be right since the same logical statement can be
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expressed in different languages governed by what seem to be different rules
(1952: 10–1). He replies, however, that:
We might say that these were really different versions of the same
rule; that in laying down inconsistency-rules in one language, we
are implicitly laying down inconsistency-rules for the corresponding
expressions in all languages; and that thus a linguistic expression
of the kind quoted transcends the language of the words which it
mentions. (1952: 11; emphasis in original)
It might seem like an extraordinary feat to implicitly lay down a rule for all
languages, but the point is that this falls out of the criteria for translation:
When you draw the boundaries of the applicability of words in one
language and then connect the words of that language with those of
another by means of translation-rules, there is no need to draw the
boundaries again for the second language. (Strawson 1952: 12)
Perhaps it will be said that it surely remains chauvinistic to say that the
truth of a French sentence could be explained by English rules via rules of
translation, but this is to get Strawson backwards. The point is, firstly, that
the explanation offered in terms of the rules of English might be available in
other languages since the rules of other languages might be ‘really different
versions of the same rule’, and, secondly, that there is no mystery concerning
how an explanation arrived at by reflecting on the rules of English could
be universally applicable. If a statement is found to be inconsistent via the
rules of English, any sentence (of any language) expressing that statement
will be inconsistent. For it expresses the same statement because it is
governed by relevantly similar rules.
I conclude, then, that we have not been given sufficient reason to ac-
cept (2) in Sober’s argument, and that it is therefore inconclusive against
(Truth-contrast).
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Pre-Linguistic Times
Before moving on to what I take to be the right reasons for abandoning
(Truth-contrast), I want to consider a passage from Paul Boghossian
which has informed much of the recent discussion. In ‘Analyticity Recon-
sidered’, he objects to the notion of metaphysical analyticity as follows:
What is far more mysterious is the claim that the truth of what the
sentence expresses depends on the fact that it is expressed by that
sentence, so that we can say that what is expressed wouldn’t have
been true at all had it not been for the fact that it is expressed by
that sentence. Are we really to suppose that, prior to our stipulating
a meaning for the sentence
Either snow is white or it isn’t
it wasn’t the case that either snow was white or it wasn’t? Isn’t
it overwhelmingly obvious that this claim was true before such an
act of meaning, and that it would have been true even if no one
had thought about it, or chosen it to be expressed by one of our
sentences? (1996: 365)11
There are, as I see it, a number of things going on in this passage, and
though I do think it contains the seed of a telling objection against meta-
physical analyticity, it also suggests some much less telling ones.
First of all, the talk about ‘the truth of what the sentence expresses’ and
the assertion that ‘the claim’ was true before we decided to use a sentence
to express it, both suggest that Boghossian is here making the point that
the truth-values of propositions are independent of linguistic conventions.
We have already seen that this objection is not at all decisive. Indeed, if by
‘claim’, Boghossian means ‘proposition’, then he appears to be assuming the
question-begging picture of propositions sketched above. If, on the other
hand, it means ‘sentence’, then, plainly, the claim was not true before we
11Cf. also Stroud (1981: 242–3), Williamson (2007: 71–2) and Sider (2011: 102).
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established a use for it., This matter, then, is not as overwhelmingly obvious
as Boghossian suggests.
What is obvious – and I do think that this is the point that Boghossian
wants to make – is simply that snow was white or not white before there
were any languages around.12 We need to tread carefully here, however,
since we are in the vicinity of a famously dubious objection:
This short way with the issue reminds one of Lenin’s (disastrously in-
competent) polemical book against Machian positivism. Lenin sim-
ply claimed that positivists, since they took human sensations as the
class of truth-makers for all propositions (I am using the present-day
terminology, not Lenin’s, of course), could not accept the statement
that the solar system existed before there were human beings.13 This
argument simply assumes – what the positivists of course deny –
that the positivists cannot interpret ‘the solar system existed before
there were human beings’ in their rationally reconstructed “language
of science”. (Putnam 2007: 158)
Putnam is here complaining about Michael Devitt’s approach to the
realism/anti-realism debate, but, on the face of it at least, a similar com-
plaint can be levelled against Boghossian’s ‘short way’ with metaphysical
analyticity. He appears to suggest, after all, that adherents of (Truth-
contrast) cannot accept – what we all think is obvious – that snow was
white or not white before there were any languages around. But nothing
has been said to rule out the idea that the sentence ‘snow was white or not
white before there were any languages around’ is made true by our current
linguistic conventions, which is presumably what adherents of metaphysical
analyticity would want to say anyway.
Certainly, this response is itself not unproblematic. In fact, we are
touching upon a topic which will take centre stage in the next chapter. For
12Note that if this is Boghossian’s point, then Eric Loomis’s response (2004) misses
the mark.
13I suspect that this is somewhat apocryphal. We do not find this exact claim in
Lenin’s book, although we do find similar ones (1909: 78–9).
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the time being, however, my point is simply that if Boghossian is claiming
that the adherents of (Truth-contrast) are committed to denying obvi-
ous truths about the past or counterfactual scenarios, then his objection is
much too quick.
4.3 In Favour of Ordinary Truth
We have seen, then, that neither a bare appeal to propositions, inter-
linguistic considerations, or platitudes about pre-linguistic times suffice to
undermine (Truth-contrast). However, in this section I argue that it
should nevertheless be rejected.
It is often objected against (Truth-contrast) that the special kind of
truth – i.e. ‘ truth in virtue of meaning’ or ‘by convention’ – that necessary
truths are said to possess is obscure: ‘This line is itself fraught with diffi-
culty. For how can we make sense of the idea that something is made true
by our meaning something by a sentence?’ (Boghossian 1996: 365) ‘Here I
immediately come up against a stumbling block: what can be meant by say-
ing that a statement follows from the very meaning of its terms? I should
have thought that one statement can follow from another ; but from the
meaning – !’ (Waismann 1949: 27)
Such objections are certainly fair, but they are necessarily somewhat
inconclusive. An advocate of (Truth-contrast) will be quick to respond
that even if they haven’t quite succeeded in spelling out this peculiar kind
of truth so far, this is no reason to stop trying (although at some point a
pessimistic induction presumably becomes warranted).
The more conclusive objection comes from the other direction: Instead
of arguing that we lack an adequate account of the special kind of truth
which necessary truths are said to possess, I shall argue that we lack an
account of ordinary truth which justifies restricting this notion to contingent
truths. I shall argue, that is, that insofar as we want to say that contingent
truths are made true by “the facts” or “the world”, we have no reason to
104
4.3. In Favour of Ordinary Truth
refrain from doing so in the case of – at least some – necessary truths. This
line, if successful, would undermine (Truth-contrast) quite generally,
including the normativist lines.
This is where I think the passage from Boghossian provides at least the
starting point for a cogent objection. For rather than making the point that
adherents of (Truth-contrast) cannot say that snow was white or not
white before languages were invented, this passage can be read as a reminder
of the (trivial) point that the colour of snow is in no way influenced by
linguistic matters. This can then form the basis of the following argument:
(1) The colour of snow is a language-independent feature of the world.
(2) ‘Snow is white or snow is not white’ is made true (at least in part) by
the colour of snow.
(∴) So, ‘Snow is white or snow is not white’ is made true (at least in part)
by a language-independent feature of the world.
Now, as it stands, (2) is blatantly question-begging, since this is presumably
something an adherent of (Truth-contrast) would deny. The problem,
though, is that it is quite difficult to find a principled reason for denying
this (assuming that we are happy to talk about truthmaking at all).
Consider the disjunction ‘snow is white or snow is purple’. Presumably
we may say that this sentence is true because one of its disjuncts is true,
and if asked why this disjunct is true, we may say that this is because
snow is indeed white. In the absence of a more specific account of what
truthmaking is supposed to be, I take it that this is what is meant by saying
that the above sentence is made true by the colour of snow (or the fact that
snow is white).
However, we can of course say exactly the same thing about ‘snow is
white or snow is not white’ (hereafter I call this sentence ‘S ’, and the sen-
tence ‘snow is white’ ‘D’), which suggests the following argument for (2):
(1*) S is true because it has a true disjunct D.
(2*) D is made true by the colour of snow.
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(∴) So, S is made true by the colour of snow.
Though I don’t expect advocates of (Truth-contrast) to be immedi-
ately convinced by this brief argument, it adds further pressure since it
pinpoints exactly what they are committed to denying. (2*), after all, is
uncontroversial in this context, so (1*) must be the culprit.14
It is undeniable that D suffices for the truth of S, but that is not to
say that this is what explains why S is true. Analogously, the fact that
I’m vaccinated against a particular disease might suffice to ensure that I
won’t get ill, but it need not be the reason why I don’t (I might never get
in contact with the pathogen). A natural suggestion is that the vaccine
is not the reason here because we don’t get the appropriate counterfactual
sensitivity: I would have been healthy even if I hadn’t been vaccinated. And
this line of thought would seem to give us reason to deny (1*). For it is
clear that S would have have been true even if D had been false, suggesting
that D being true is not the reason why S is true after all.
Something like this appears to be Amie Thomasson’s line of thought.
Thomasson advocates a version of what I am calling ‘modified normativism’
(variously under the labels ‘modal normativism’ and ‘non-descriptivism
about modality’), according to which both modal claims and analytic claims
are prescriptive rather than descriptive. Although she is prepared to ac-
cept that analytic claims are true ‘in a straightforwardly truth-conditional
sense’ (2007a: 147), she insists that this does not show that they require –
or indeed have – truthmakers, which is, she maintains, the crucial issue in
this context (2007a: 136–7).
Assessing this claim is somewhat difficult since Thomasson never pro-
vides any account of just what it takes for something to be a truthmaker
for a sentence. It is, therefore, not entirely clear what the difference be-
14I am assuming that the argument is accepted as valid. This may be contested
because it assumes that truthmaking is transitive, and there are reasons for denying this
(Tahko 2013). However, the reasons for denying transitivity would also be reasons to
denying (1*), and I don’t think anyone who accepts (1*) would want to deny that the
reason why the disjunct is true is the reason why the disjunction is true. Thus, adherents
of (Truth-contrast) remain committed to denying (1*).
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tween having a truthmaker and ‘being true in a straightforwardly condi-
tional sense’ is supposed to be.
My best attempt to make sense of this, however, is to utilise the above
distinction between being sufficient for truth and explaining truth. Since,
as we have seen, the colour of snow suffices to make S true, S is true in
a straightforwardly conditional sense, but this is not yet to say that the
colour of snow acts as a truthmaker here since this might be redundant in
the proper explanation of why it is true (as the counterfactual insensitivity
suggests). This is, I think, what Thomasson has in mind when she, after
conceding that ‘all bachelors are male’ is straightforwardly true,15 goes on
to write:
But actual bachelors and their features are not truthmakers for the
claim, for the analytic claim is guaranteed to be true regardless of
any features of the world: it is vacuously true even if there are no
bachelors whatsoever. (Thomasson 2007a: 148)
Now, I am not convinced that there is anything here which gives us reason
to say that ‘all bachelors are male’ lacks a truthmaker whereas, say, ‘all
humans are mortal’ has one. Certainly, universal claims are somewhat
awkward for the truthmaker terminology in general, but Thomasson needs
a contrast.
The point about the analytic claim being true even if there are no bach-
elors does, of course, not give us such a contrast. But the only suggestion,
apart from this, is that there is no truthmaker since the sentence is ‘true
regardless of any features of the world’. This, however, is presumably just
to say that it is necessary, and it is clear that this cannot be the criterion,
in the present context, for whether there is a truthmaker since that would
make the question that Thomasson is interested in trivial.
A more promising route is to invoke the notion of counterfactual insen-
sitivity to justify the inference from ‘this sentence would have been true
15I suspect that this might well be false, but let us set this aside.
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regardless of the features of the world’ to ‘the features of the world do not
explain why it is true’.
Let us now probe this idea a bit further. Because of the awkwardness of
universal claims, let us switch back to our sentence S.16 The claim, then, is
that the colour of snow is not what makes S true since it would have been
true regardless of what the colour of snow is like. Just like the vaccination is
not what makes me disease-free if I would have been disease-free regardless
since I never encountered the pathogen.
However, we need to distinguish two cases: Do we get counterfactual in-
sensitivity because there is an independent explanation even in the actual
scenario (as in the vaccination case), or because a new explanation is avail-
able in the counterfactual scenario? The sentence ‘Germany or Argentina
won the 2014 World Cup’ is true, and what makes it true is presumably
that Germany won it. This is so even though the sentence would still have
been true had they not won it (since they played Argentina in the final).
Here counterfactual insensitivity gives us no reason to reject our original
explanation, and it is quite clear why: In the counterfactual scenario a
different explanation is available.
The question, then, is which category our instance of excluded middle
falls into, and it is quite clear, I think, that there is no reason, on the face
of it at least, not to put it in the second category. The reason why we have
counterfactual insensitivity here is that a different explanation is available
in the counterfactual scenario: If the colour of snow had been different, then
this alternative colour would have made the second disjunct of S true.17
What this shows is that merely pointing to counterfactual insensitivity
does not give us reason to abandon (1*). If, therefore, the adherent of
(Truth-contrast) wants to reject it (as they have to), their reason must
be the more specific idea that there is an independent reason why S is true
16It should be noted, though, that Thomasson sets logical and mathematical truth
aside (2007a: 135), so it’s not clear what she would say about instances of excluded
middle. Still, the main lessons below do carry over to the cases of analyticity which she
does discuss.
17I am setting aside complications having to do with vagueness.
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which has nothing to do with the colour of snow, indeed, nothing to do with
either disjunct being true – e.g. that it has been stipulated to be true, or
that there is a norm which says that it shouldn’t be denied.
This is the point at which (Truth-contrast) unravels. First, we are
heading for a rather glaring violation of Occam’s Razor: Not only have
we introduced two distinct routes to truth for disjunctions – by having
(at least) one true disjunct or by being made true by something like our
linguistic conventions (which, it may be noted, certainly do not suffice to
make either disjunct true),18 it also turns out that the first route alone is
perfectly adequate to account for the truths that need accounting for.19
Second, and more importantly, no additional route can solve the problem
which (Truth-contrast) was meant to solve. The strategy, recall, was to
explain necessity in terms of the special kind of truth (or normative status)
which is conferred on the sentence independently of what the facts are –
and so explains its necessity. But now we are saying that the sentence is
also made true by the facts (in an appropriately bland sense). And as soon
as we make this concession, we realise that not only is it made true by the
facts, it is necessarily made true by the facts, and this is something the
additional kind of truth is quite unable to explain.
We can summarise the situation as follows: We ordinarily think that
when a disjunction is true, then there are three (or two – depending on how
we count) potential reasons for this:
(i) . . . because the first disjunct is true.
(ii) . . . because the second disjunct is true.
(iii) . . . because both disjuncts are true.
An adherent of (Truth-contrast) cannot think that this list is exhaus-
18Sider also presents an objection along these lines (2011: 104). Azzouni claims that
the objection begs the question (2014: 47), but provides little detail.
19With the possible exception of instances of excluded middle with vague vocabulary
and borderline cases, but if we are inclined to say that neither disjunct is true here, then
we might be inclined to say that the disjunction isn’t true either (unless we are attracted
to supervaluationism).
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tive since whichever of these scenarios obtain, it is going to be because the
world is the way it is. They must therefore add something like:
(iv) . . . because it is stipulated to be true (or accepted as a rule).
The problem, however, is that a sentence like S appears to be necessarily
true even if we explicitly restrict ourselves to (i)–(iii) which removes our
incentive for introducing (iv) in the first place. In other words, it is neces-
sarily true that one of (i)–(iii) will hold in the case of S (given its meaning),
and (iv) is powerless to explain this fact. Consequently, adding (iv) as an
additional route to truth/assertibility has not provided us with the sought
after explanation of necessity – and now Occam’s Razor really kicks in.
The upshot is that the motivation behind (Truth-contrast) was mis-
guided from he beginning. The idea was that some sentences are necessary
because they are true/assertible for reasons that have nothing to do with
what the facts are. We have seen, first, that we are forced to concede that
such sentences are, in any case, also true/assertible for ordinary, factual rea-
sons,20 and, second, that they remain true even if we restrict ourselves to
such reasons, making the hypothesis that there is some additional, special
reason why they are true/assertible redundant.
4.4 From Truth to Necessity
(Truth-contrast), then, should be rejected, and this might well be
thought to be bad news for the linguistic approach, since the two are often
assumed to be closely related.
However, there is no reason – at least on the face of it – why an adherent
of the linguistic approach should be committed to this line of thought. The
aim, recall, is to explain necessity, and the idea is to do so by appealing
20More accurately, we have seen that this must be conceded in some cases. Nothing
I have said shows that we must do so in the case of e.g. mathematical truths.
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to the rules that govern linguistic expressions. This, however, is not to say
that these rules must also provide the reason why these sentences are true.21
The idea that adherents of the linguistic approach are committed to
(Truth-contrast) is thus in need of argument. There aren’t many such
arguments in the literature, but Boghossian appears to present one. Having
rejected the notion of metaphysical analyticity, he writes:
Why, if this idea is as problematic as I have claimed it to be, did it
figure so prominently in positivist thinking about analyticity?
Much of the answer derives from the fact that the positivists
didn’t merely want to provide a theory of a priori knowledge; they
also wanted to provide a reductive theory of necessity. The mo-
tivation was not purely epistemological, but metaphysical as well.
Guided by the fear that objective, language-independent necessary
connections would be both metaphysically and epistemologically
odd, they attempted to show that all necessities could be understood
to consist in linguistic necessities, in the shadows cast by conven-
tional decisions concerning the meanings of words. Conventional lin-
guistic meaning, by itself, was supposed to generate necessary truth;
a fortiori, conventional linguistic meaning, by itself, was supposed
to generate truth. Hence the play with the metaphysical concept of
analyticity. (1996: 365)
As I read him, Boghossian is here saying that if your aim is to provide a
reductive theory of necessity (as arguably was the aim of the logical posi-
tivists), then you have a reason to hold that some truths are metaphysically
analytic. Furthermore, if your specific theory is that necessary truth is ‘gen-
erated’ by linguistic meaning (as is maintained by adherents of the linguistic
21Sidelle too makes this point (1998). In fact, the term ‘neo-conventionalism’ has
recently been used to denote positions that reject ‘truth by convention’ in favour of
‘necessity by convention’ (see e.g. Livingstone-Banks 2017). The next section will make
it clear why I find this terminology misleading. I should also say that some versions of
this “neo-conventionalism” (see Cameron 2009 and 2010, as well as Sider 2003: §4.2)
do not really qualify as versions of the linguistic approach since there is no attempt to
explain necessities in terms of linguistic rules in the relevant sense.
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approach – at least if we squint a bit), then you must hold this, since, a
fortiori, linguistic meaning would then have to generate truth.
This, however, is a bad argument. First, the a fortiori inference is
dubious in general: A soda maker could be said to generate carbonated
water, but it doesn’t a fortiori generate water. Second, Boghossian’s specific
use of the inference appears to equivocate on ‘generate’. There are two
senses in which an adherent of the linguistic approach could be expected
to accept that the linguistic conventions ‘generate’ the necessary truth of
some claim T. It could mean a) that the conventions provide the explanation
for why T is necessarily true, or b) that they suffice to ensure that T is
necessarily true. If ‘generate’ is understood along the lines of (a), then the
inference is invalid since there is no reason to think that the explanation of
why T is necessarily true must ‘a fortiori’ explain why T is true. But if we
go with (b), then the conclusion poses no problem, since we can accept that
the conventions suffice to ensure that T is true without having to say that
they provide anything like the truthmaker for T. Boghossian’s argument,
therefore, is unconvincing.
Bob Hale also suggests that we can move from a thesis that adher-
ents of the linguistic approach can be expected to accept to something like
(Truth-contrast). In his discussion of ‘conventionalism’, he defines this
view, at the outset, as ‘the thesis that necessary truths are simply truths
guaranteed by conventions governing the use of words’ (2013: 117). And we
might well think that an adherent of the linguistic approach is committed
to something along these lines. However, Hale then goes on to object, var-
iously, that conventions cannot create truth (122), that necessities cannot
be explained as truths grounded in meaning (117), and that conventions
cannot make statements (118) or propositions (120; 122–3) true.
We are left wondering, though, how all of this is supposed to bear on
the thesis that was originally formulated. This thesis certainly does not
seem to entail any of the ideas that are later attacked. After all, the special
theory of relativity guarantees, I suppose, that I’m not moving at a speed
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exceeding c, but if I say that this is what makes it true that I’m not moving
at such a speed, then I’m giving my legs too much credit. Nor would I say
that my pace is grounded in Einstein’s work or that his 1905 paper created
the truth in question.
Neither Hale nor Boghossian, then, provide adequate reason for thinking
that an adherent of the linguistic approach must be committed to (Truth-
contrast).
The idea that necessary truths are true in a quite ordinary sense does,
however, leads to a natural worry against the background of the subjective-
constitutive strategy. According to this strategy, after all, knowledge of
necessities consists in reflective knowledge of principles – in this case lin-
guistic rules – which are supposed to be exempt from any external standard
of correctness. But, it may be asked, how could this be if necessity implies
truth and a sentence is true just in case the world is such that the sentence’s
truth-conditions are satisfied? How could the rules be exempt from any ex-
ternal standard of correctness and yet be capable of guaranteeing truth –
ordinary truth?
We shall return to this issue in Chapter 9. For now, I just want to briefly
outline the general idea in order to slightly alleviate the worry: What the
adherent of the linguistic approach insists is that when we establish that a
sentence is necessarily true, we don’t start from knowing something about
what the world is or must be like and conclude that the truth-conditions of
this sentence must be satisfied. Rather, we establish – purely on the basis
of the linguistic rules which determine what the truth-conditions are – that
these cannot but be fulfilled. Roughly speaking, the idea is that due to how
we have set up the truth-conditions, we can know, in certain special cases,
that the world will be such as to fulfil them quite independently of what it
is actually like.22
22For responses to Boghossian that draw on similar considerations, see G. Russell
(2008) and Hofmann and Horvath (2008). These responses are, however, problematic for
our purposes since they are content with taking the notion of possibility for granted.
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4.5 In Defence of the Logical Positivists
The question remains, though, whether Boghossian is right that (Truth-
contrast) figured prominently in the work of the logical positivists, via a
commitment to metaphysical analyticity. Unfortunately, he does not pro-
vide any textual evidence in this connection. Instead his discussion appears
to be informed by Quine’s paper ‘Carnap on Logical Truth’, which, it should
be remembered, in one version (Schilpp 1963) opens with the disclaimer:
‘My dissent from Carnap’s philosophy of logical truth is hard to state and
argue in Carnap’s terms. This circumstance perhaps counts in favor of
Carnap’s position.’
Somewhat ironically, however, it would have been easy for Boghossian to
find textual support for the idea that Carnap was committed to the notion
of metaphysical analyticity. Consider, for instance, the opening passage
of ‘Meaning Postulates’: ‘Philosophers have often distinguished two kinds
of truth: the truth of some statements is logical, necessary, based upon
meaning, while that of other statements is empirical, contingent, dependent
upon the facts of the world.’ (1952: 65)
I am not denying, therefore, that the logical positivists did on the face of
it, appeal to something like metaphysical analyticity. There are, however,
two reasons why I think appearances are misleading here. First, while
passages like this are relatively common when Carnap is engaging in “big-
picture” talk, a quite different picture emerges when we look at his more
detailed treatments of necessary truth.
At the time when he wrote ‘Meaning Postulates’, Carnap’s preferred
approach to semantics was via state-descriptions, and this approach is most
fully presented in Meaning and Necessity. Here we read:
The connection between these concepts and that of truth is as fol-
lows: There is one and only one state-description which describes
the actual state of the universe; it is that which contains all true
atomic sentences and the negations of those which are false. Hence
it contains only true sentences; therefore, we call it the true state-
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description. A sentence of any form is true if and only if it holds in
the true state-description. (1947: 10)
As to ‘the familiar but vague concept of logical or necessary or analytic
truth’, Carnap first tells us that ‘this explicandum has sometimes been
characterised as truth based on purely logical reasons, on meaning alone,
independent of the contingency of facts.’ He then observes that the meaning
of a sentence is determined by the semantical rules of the language, and so
offers the following condition (described as a convention) which any defini-
tion of L-truth (as an explication of the familiar but vague notion) needs
to satisfy:
A sentence Si is L-true in a semantical system S if and only if Si is
true in S in such a way that its truth can be established on the basis
of the semantical rules of the system S alone, without any reference
to (extra-linguistic) facts. (1947: 10)
The explication he goes on to offer is simply that a sentence is L-true (in
S) if and only if it holds in every state-description (in S), but what is more
significant for our purposes is what Carnap says in order to show that this
definition is indeed in accordance with his condition:
If Si holds in every state-description, then the semantical rules of
ranges suffice for establishing this result. Therefore, the semantical
rules establish also the truth of Si because, if Si holds in every state-
description, then it holds also in the true state-description and hence
is itself true. (1947: 11)
This makes it quite clear that Carnap takes the appropriate understanding
of ‘truth based on meanings’ to be truth (ordinary truth) that can be es-
tablished via the semantic rules, and that L-truth, like all truth, is a matter
of the sentence holding in the actual state-description. There is no basis,
here, for a distinction between L-truths and other truths when it comes to
what “makes them true”. Indeed, there is a very straightforward way of
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introducing truthmakers into this framework should we want to. We could
simply say that the truthmakers for a sentence R is the minimal subset M
of the actual state-description such that R could be derived from M via
the semantic rules of the relevant language.23 Thus, returning to Boghos-
sian’s example, ‘snow is white or not white’ would receive exactly the same
truthmaker as ‘snow is white or purple’.
The second reason why we should be sceptical of the idea that the
logical positivists were committed to Boghossian’s notion of metaphysical
analyticity is that it is far from clear that there is even room for such a
notion in their overall outlook.
I am not here thinking of their notorious “rejection of metaphysics”,
but of their verificationist approach to meaning. It is not clear, after all,
that a verificationist can even make the distinction which Boghossian makes
between what would justify a belief in a sentence and what would make the
sentence true – at least not if we are talking about canonical justifications.
Against a verificationist background, talk about what the truth of a sentence
is based on (cf. the opening of ‘Meaning Postulates’) just amounts to talk
about what would constitute evidence for it. Thus, it makes perfect sense
for Carnap to spell out the notion of ‘truth based on meaning’ (or ‘logical
reasons’) as ‘truth that can be established on the basis of semantical rules’
in Meaning and Necessity.
Upon scrutiny, then, I think there is little or no evidence that the logical
positivists ever bought into the idea of metaphysical analyticity, and I think
few of them ever accepted (Truth-contrast).24
23a) We need a convention to settle cases where there is no unique such set. One
option would be to take their union in such cases. b) There is also the issue of how to
deal with universally quantified sentences (which is appropriate since this is indeed an
issue for truthmaker theory).
24There are exceptions here. Most explicitly, we did see that Ayer subscribed to
resolute normativism, at least briefly. Moreover, the axioms that partly constitute the
languages in Carnap’s LSL can arguably be described as ‘true by convention’. However,
since LSL explicitly shuns the notion of truth (1937: §60b), the suggestion that Carnap
here subscribes to a version of (Truth-contrast) is problematic. For a thorough
discussion of whether Carnap was committed to ‘truth by convention’, see Ebbs (2011).
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The Contingency Problem
In the previous chapter we saw that one of the standard objections against
the linguistic approach – that it is a mistake to think that the linguistic
conventions explain why necessary sentences are true – is essentially correct,
but irrelevant since it is enough that their necessity is so explained.
This, however, brings another standard objection into focus. For to
say that necessity could be explained by something conventional is, so the
charge goes, at best mystifying and potentially a straightforward contradic-
tion:
If words are to be taken in their ordinary sense, it seems obvious
that necessary truths cannot be true by convention. In common
speech the word ‘necessary’ means much the same as ‘indispensible’,
‘inevitable’, ‘without any possible alternative’. [. . . ] But in common
usage the phrase ‘by convention’ always implies the possibility of an
alternative. [. . . ] It seems clear, therefore, that anyone who speaks of
necessary truths as true by convention is guilty of self-contradiction,
unless one or more of the terms he uses has a special sense in this con-
text. Taken according to ordinary usage, his statement means that
truths without alternatives nevertheless have alternatives. (Kneale
1947: 118–9)1
1This objection can be found in a number of places; e.g. Black (1936: 28–9), Wild
and Coblitz (1948: 665), Lazerowitz (1972: 234–5), and Horwich (1998).
5. The Contingency Problem
I have already suggested that there might be room for a version of the lin-
guistic approach which admits that there are limits to what can appropri-
ately be described as conventional in this context. I should say immediately
that I do not think that this provides us with a solution to the present objec-
tion. Fundamentally, the problem concerns the attempt to explain necessity
in terms of something contingent, and while the appeal to conventions cer-
tainly makes this problem particularly sharp (since, as Kneale points out,
conventions are contingent by definition), even non-conventional aspects of
language-use would seem to be contingent insofar as the very existence of
languages is a contingent matter.
Contemporary discussions tend to approach this ‘contingency problem’
via a more general argument which has come to be known as ‘Blackburn’s
Dilemma’, and I shall do the same. I begin, therefore, by articulating Black-
burn’s dilemma, its ‘contingency horn’ in particular, and how it applies to
the linguistic approach.
5.1 Blackburn’s Dilemma
In ‘Morals and Modals’ (1986), Simon Blackburn presents a much discussed
dilemma for what he calls the ‘truth-conditional approach’ to the problem
of necessity. Suppose we want to explain why some necessary truth A is
necessary, and we offer an explanation of the form ‘A because F ’. Now,
Blackburn writes:
either F will claim that something is so, or it will claim that some-
thing must be so. If the latter, there is no problem about the form
of explanation, for one necessity can well explain another. But, as
we have seen, there will be the same bad residual ‘must’ [. . . ] Sup-
pose instead that F just cites that something is so. If whatever it
is does not have to be so, then there is strong pressure to feel that
the original necessity has not been explained or identified, so much
as undermined. (1986: 120–1)
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In other words: if the explanans is necessarily true, we have only pushed
the problem back, whereas if it is contingently true, it is unsuitable as an
explanation of something genuinely necessary. In the former case we fail to
explain necessity; in the latter we fail to explain necessity.2
As an example of an account that falls victim to the contingency horn,
Blackburn considers precisely the idea that necessities are to be explained
in terms of linguistic conventions:
Suppose a theorist claims that twice two must be four because of
a linguistic convention, [and] suppose it is denied that there is any
residual necessity, that we must make just those conventions. [Then]
there is a principled difficulty about seeing how the kind of fact cited
could institute or be responsible for the necessity. This is because
the explanation, if good, would undermine the original modal status:
if that’s all there is to it, then twice two does not have to be four
(1986: 121).
While Blackburn’s reasoning is intuitively plausible, one crucial notion –
that of necessity being “undermined” – is not spelled out in any detail.
However, more recent discussions of the dilemma – going back to Hale
(2002b)3 – explicate the reasoning along the following lines:
1. ¬F  ¬A (Premise: consequence of ‘A because F ’)
2. ♦¬F (Premise: contingent explanans)
3. ♦¬A (From 1 and 2 using counterfactual logic)
4. ¬A (From 3 in the modal logic S4)
We thus reach the conclusion that A isn’t necessary after all. I will refer to
this as ‘Hale’s formalisation of the contingency horn’.
There are two standard objections to this argument (Hale 2002b: 302–
3), neither of which is wholly satisfactory. First, it is pointed out that
(1) is not a straightforward consequence of ‘A because F’ since there are
2For a somewhat different interpretation of the dilemma, see Shalkowski (2008).
3Cf. e.g. Lange (2008), Hanks (2008), Cameron (2010), and Morato (2014).
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counterexamples such as causal pre-emption cases (cf. D. Lewis 2000: 184).
I shall set this response aside without much comment, but I do think it
is poorly motivated unless we can offer some positive reason for thinking
that such considerations are relevant here – which seems, on the face of it,
doubtful.4
Next, it is said that assuming the S4 axiom (ϕ→ ϕ) – needed in or-
der to go from (3) to (4) – ‘pretty directly begs the question’ in this context
(Hale 2002b: 302). There are some reasons to be sceptical of this however.
First, a self-ascribed ‘conventionalist’ such as Alan Sidelle explicitly con-
siders the rejection of S4 to be misguided (2009: 226), and it is difficult to
find textual support for the idea that historically prominent advocates of
the linguistic approach found this principle problematic.
Second, as Sidelle points out (2009: 227), the supposed rationale for
rejecting the S4 axiom is somewhat unstable. The idea, presumably, is
that whereas it is necessary that, e.g., triangles have three sides, this need
not be necessary relative to a world where the linguistic conventions are
different (say, where ‘triangle’ is governed by the rules which in fact govern
‘rectangle’), and so it is not necessarily necessary. The problem, however,
is that if this gives us reason to say that it’s not necessary that triangles
have three-sides relative to this world, why does it not also give us reason
to say that this is false relative to this world? Why is it only modal claims
that are evaluated relative to their linguistic conventions?
Thirdly, I do not think that the S4 axiom is needed to deliver the conclu-
sion that Blackburn was aiming for – namely that a contingent explanans
undermines the necessity we set out to explain. Even without the S4 axiom,
the formalised contingency horn delivers the conclusion: ♦♦¬A. The nega-
tion of A, that is, is found to be possibly possible, and that is already to take
away some of the force which we ordinarily ascribe to (logical/metaphysical)
necessity. For we think that what is necessary holds no matter what, and
not just in “accessible worlds” (whatever that means in this context). Put
4For a more thorough discussion of this, see Hanks (2008: 306).
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differently: logical necessity as ordinarily understood is S5 necessity. If we
cannot have this, then necessity as ordinarily understood is indeed, in some
sense, undermined.
That, of course, is not to say that someone cannot bite the bullet here
and accept the necessity-undermining contingency horn while rejecting S4.
Still, I shall assume that this option is not available to anyone who wants to
explain genuine necessity. And I shall say that the necessity of a putatively
necessary truth p has been undermined if and only if there is any sense at
all in which p could have been false or possibly false. Given this explication,
the status of the S4 axiom is irrelevant to the discussion.
5.2 The Wright-Sidelle Strategy and Its
Limits
Another possible response to the contingency horn is to maintain that (1)
should be rejected, but not because of anything like causal pre-emption.
In the previous chapter we noted that Boghossian’s complaint that the
adherent of metaphysical analyticity must deny, e.g., that snow was white or
not white before there were languages around is too quick since they might
insist that this claim is true because of our current linguistic conventions.
Both Crispin Wright (1985: 189–92) and Alan Sidelle (2009: 229–32)
have offered an analogous response to the contingency problem: Even coun-
terfactual scenarios (other possible worlds), they say, are described us-
ing our actual linguistic conventions.5 Thus, a counterfactual like ‘p 
¬(Triangles have three sides)’, will have a false consequent no matter
what we substitute for ‘p’. It does not matter what the linguistic conven-
tions are like at other worlds; triangles with more or less than three sides
are ruled out – across logical space – by our actual linguistic conventions.
This is both true and important, but not quite satisfactory. For if the
linguistic approach does not entail the kind of counterfactual covariance
5Wright regards this as a higher-order convention (1985: 190).
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we expect from explanations, then it becomes quite unclear what kind of
explanation is really on offer. Indeed, Sidelle is well aware of this worry and
puts it well:
If our conventions really do explain the modal facts, then changes in
our conventions would have to effect what is modally the case, and
so, contrapositively, [. . . ] if they don’t have such an effect, then they
cannot really provide our explanations here. (2009: 232–3)
This problem is particularly pressing given that I have proposed to under-
stand the linguistic approach in terms of a commitment to carrying out
a particular explanatory project. The reason is that if it turns out that
we must appeal to some non-standard explanatory relation here – which
cannot be assessed by our ordinary criteria – then it is far from clear that
this provides us with a practically workable grasp on this commitment after
all.6
We can put the situation we are in as follows: The Wright-Sidelle strat-
egy shows us that an adherent of the linguistic approach can allow for a
perfectly good sense in which the modal facts remain fixed in counterfactual
scenarios – even counterfactual scenarios where the linguistic conventions
are different. That, however, still leaves us with the following question:
Is there, if the adherent of the linguistic approach is correct, still some
sense in which the modal facts would have been different had our linguistic
conventions been different? If the answer to this question is ‘no’, then we
start to lose our grip on what kind of explanation the linguistic approach is
meant to offer. But if the answer is ‘yes’, then this threatens to undermine
necessity after all.
My strategy will be to put these worries to rest by articulating a sense
in which we do get covariance, but without undermining necessity. I shall
begin by showing that even if we accept that there is a commitment to
6For this reason I don’t think Sidelle’s own attempt to address this worry (2009:
233–6) can help us here.
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covariance, we have reason to think that this cannot be adequately captured
in the manner of (1) in Hale’s formalisation of the contingency horn.
5.3 Doubts about Hale’s Formalisation
For our present purposes, we may say that according to the linguistic ap-
proach, all modal facts7 are due to the linguistic conventions. Taking covari-
ance for granted, this presumably means that had there been no linguistic
conventions, there would have been no modal facts, and in particular, no
such fact as, e.g., that necessarily all triangles have three sides. Now, let
‘L’ be the claim that there are linguistic conventions and ‘p’ the claim that
all triangles have three sides.
Hale’s formalisation assumes that the commitment to covariance can be
put in the form ‘¬L ¬p’. This, however, is equivalent to ‘¬L ♦¬p’,
which reads: ‘If there had been no linguistic conventions, it would have
been possible for triangles to not have three sides’. Clearly something has
gone wrong. The residual “possibility fact” is obviously contrary to the idea
that all modal facts are due to linguistic conventions.
We can, of course, do the same trick the other way around. Let ‘q’ be the
claim that some human is ten feet tall. According to the linguistic approach,
the fact that this is possible is due to certain linguistic conventions. If,
however, we take this to yield a covariance commitment like ‘¬L ¬♦q’,
then we get ‘¬L ¬q’, i.e. ‘If there had been no linguistic conventions,
it would have been necessary that no human is ten feet tall’. This residual
“necessity fact” is, again, obviously contrary to the central tenet of the
linguistic approach.
These formalisations, then, certainly yield undesired consequences, but
they are so immediately contrary to the ideas they were meant to capture
that we should suspect the problem to lie with the formalisations rather
than with what was to be formalised. That is to say: even if we are prepared
7That is: all facts about the widest kind of necessity and possibility.
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to accept that the linguistic approach does yield a commitment to some kind
of covariance, it is far from clear that Hale’s formalisation hits the mark.
(1) does not seem to capture a kind of covariance that could plausibly be
attributed to the adherent of the linguistic approach.
It is worth noting that the problems are not plausibly attributed to
the use of the would-counterfactual. Rather, what is problematic is the
assumption that the counterfactual scenario can be described by negating
an ordinary modal claim expressed using a standard modal operator. It is
not difficult to see why this is a problematic assumption in this context: The
modal operators are irreducibly modal, in the sense that putting a negation
sign in front of one just yields another modal claim. Consequently, using
these threatens to beg the question: We are supposed to consider the idea
that there might have been no such thing as modality, but the notation we
use to express this commits us to modal facts no matter what.
Now, it should be pointed out here that one person’s question-begging
might be another’s reductio. If what “begs the question” is the interde-
finability of the modal operators, then perhaps so much the worse for the
linguistic approach. We do, after all, think that these are interdefinable.
However, nothing said so far suggests that someone advocating the linguis-
tic approach must reject the modal operators as standardly used. What we
have seen is that if we express the covariance commitments of this approach
straightforwardly using these operators, then their interdefinability begs the
question. But the correct response to this, I will argue, is to deny the an-
tecedent: It is a mistake to think that we can understand the commitment
to covariance in this way.
In the next section, therefore, I shall aim to do two things: i) artic-
ulate the sense in which we do get covariance according to the linguistic
approach; ii) show why it would be a mistake to formalise this in the way
that Hale does. My main line of thought can be summarised as follows:
We need to make a distinction between two kinds of covariance, which may
be labelled ‘internal’ and ‘external’ covariance. (1) in Hale’s formalisation
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expresses internal covariance, but the adherent of the linguistic approach is
only committed to the external variant. In section 5.5, I shall then go on
to argue that external covariance does not undermine necessity.
5.4 Making Sense of Covariance
I shall proceed by introducing the distinction between internal and external
covariance (as well as some related terminology) via an example taken from
aesthetics, before applying this framework to the modal case.
An Analogy from Aesthetics
Consider someone, Emmy, who holds that there are aesthetic facts, but
thinks that these are explained, in the end, by facts about human prefer-
ences. In keeping with standard assumptions about explanation and covari-
ance, she therefore accepts:
(A) Had there been no humans, there would have been no aesthetic facts.
Now suppose that she comes across a lake filled with rubbish in an otherwise
beautiful landscape and proclaims:
(B) Had there been no humans (and hence no rubbish), this lake would
have been beautiful.
Is Emmy guilty of contradiction? I would say no, or at least not necessarily.
The reason is that these counterfactuals are ambiguous. In each case
we could either evaluate the entire counterfactual in accordance with the
aesthetic facts that the actual human preferences (supposedly) give rise to,
or we could first assume that the antecedent is true, ask how that would
affect the human preferences and what aesthetic facts they would give rise
to, and see whether this would make the consequent true. Thus, focusing on
(B), we could either imagine how the lake would look in a human-free world,
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and ask whether it would be beautiful according to the actual, preference-
dependent, aesthetic facts, or we could consider what the human preferences
would be like if there were no humans and ask whether they would sustain
the fact that the lake is beautiful (presumably not).
I shall call counterfactuals read along the former lines internal counter-
factuals, and counterfactuals read along the latter lines external counter-
factuals (the rationale behind the terminology will become clear shortly).
A reasonable interpretation of Emmy would be that (A) should be under-
stood as an external counterfactual, and (B) as an internal one. It is (A),
moreover, which expresses her covariance commitment, and so we may say
that her meta-aesthetic views commit her to external covariance.
Before applying these ideas to the modal case, we should note a crucial
point about negation. Because Emmy accepts the covariance commitments
that come with her meta-aesthetic beliefs, she is happy to assert:
(C) Had there been no humans, the lake would not have been beautiful.
In accordance with what we have just said, this counterfactual should be
read externally. However, this isn’t quite enough to ensure that it gets
interpreted correctly. The reason is that the denial in the consequent is
also ambiguous. It is natural, after all, to read ‘the lake is not beautiful’ as
expressing an aesthetic judgement. This, however, would be to misrepresent
Emmy. She is not saying that if there had been no humans, the correct
aesthetic verdict on the lake would be ‘not beautiful’, she is saying that the
lake wouldn’t be beautiful since there would have been no correct aesthetic
verdict at all. In keeping with the above terminology, we may say that
Emmy intends the negation to be read externally.
Borrowing a standard trick from the analysis of fictional discourse, we
can make all the distinctions we need here using a single operator and
scope distinctions. By introducing an operator ‘Æ’ (read along the lines
of ‘according to the aesthetic facts’) we can distinguish the following three
readings of (C):
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(C1) Æ(No humans  ¬beautiful lake)
(C2) No humans  Æ(¬beautiful lake)
(C3) No humans  ¬Æ(beautiful lake)
Here, (C1) is an internal counterfactual, whereas (C2) and (C3) are both
external ones. The difference between the latter two, moreover, is that (C2)
contains an internal negation, whereas (C3) contains an external one.8 The
appropriate interpretation of (C) is (C3), which can be read along the lines
of: Had there been no humans, then it would not have been the case that,
according to the aesthetic facts, the lake is beautiful. Note, in particular,
the difference between the consequents in (C2) and (C3): The former says
that it is an aesthetic fact that the lake is not beautiful; the latter says that
it is not an aesthetic fact that the lake is beautiful.
The Modal Case
I maintain that, in the context of the linguistic approach, analogous ideas
apply to the modal case.9 Consider a counterfactual like:
(D) Had there been no linguistic conventions, it wouldn’t have been nec-
essary that all triangles have three sides.
Read internally, we are to evaluate the entire counterfactual in accordance
with the modal facts which our actual linguistic conventions give rise to;
read externally we are to first consider what the modal facts would have
been like had the antecedent been true, and then ask whether this would
render the consequent true. Moreover, we can distinguish between an in-
ternal and an external reading of the negation in the consequent: It could
be read as attributing the modal status not necessary to the proposition in
question, or it could be read as withholding the modal status necessary.
8Hence the terminology: the counterfactual in (C1) is internal since it is within the
scope of the operator – similarly with the negation in (C2).
9Although there is one glaring disanalogy: Counterfactuals are themselves modal. I
shall return to this issue in section 5.6 below.
127
5. The Contingency Problem
Again, we can make all the needed distinctions by introducing an oper-
ator, ‘M’, read along the lines of ‘according to the modal facts’:
(D1) M(No conventions  ¬triangles have three sides)
(D2) No conventions M(¬triangles have three sides)
(D3) No conventions  ¬M(triangles have three sides)
(D1) says that the entire counterfactual holds relative to the modal facts
which our actual linguistic conventions give rise to. (D2) says that the
nearest world with no linguistic conventions would be such as to give rise to
the modal fact that triangles do not necessarily have three sides, and (D3)
says that this world would be such as to not give rise to the modal fact that
triangles necessarily have three sides.
Now, it should be reasonably clear, once these distinctions are drawn,
that the adherent of the linguistic approach is committed, not to internal,
but to external covariance, and specifically to covariance claims which share
the form of (D3).
This issue can helpfully be approached via the framework of possible
worlds (reading ‘M’ as ‘according to the framework of possible worlds’).
Note, to begin with, that an adherent of the linguistic approach cannot be
expected to take the notion of a possible world as an explanatory primitive.
That would make the linguistic approach redundant. Instead, they must be
understood as attempting to explain what a possible world is – attempting
to explain, that is, what makes the possible worlds possible.10 The answer
they give is, roughly, that a possible world is a scenario that can be described
without infringing on our linguistic conventions.
This allows us to see both why (D1) does not capture an appropriate
covariance commitment, and why an adherent of the linguistic approach
is perfectly within their rights to say that (D1) is false. Starting with the
latter point, (D1) tells us to evaluate the entire counterfactual in accordance
10This, I take it, is Crispin Wright’s point when he says that ‘what the conventionalist
ought to be advancing is a thesis about the meanings of the modal operators in the first
instance’ (1985: 173).
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with the framework of possible worlds that our actual linguistic conventions
give rise to, and it says that if we do, then we will see that if we go to the
nearest world in which there are no linguistic conventions, we shall find that
there is a world in which it is false that triangles have three sides.
However, if the criterion for being a possible world is that it can be
described without infringing on our actual linguistic conventions, then there
won’t be any worlds containing such triangles anywhere in logical space
(assuming that our linguistic conventions indeed rule out such things.) This
is really just an application of the Wright-Sidelle strategy, albeit in a more
radical form: The point isn’t just that we describe other possible worlds
using our actual linguistic conventions, but that our actual conventions
determine what possible worlds there are in the first place.
As to the first point, since the linguistic approach is an attempt to ex-
plain why the framework of possible worlds looks the way it does, the appro-
priate covariance commitments are not captured by claims about how the
worlds are related within the framework which our actual conventions have
given us. This is also what an adherent of the linguistic approach should
say about Hale’s formalisation: (1) is just a standard modal-counterfactual
claim – a mere description of how things are within the domain of possible
worlds generated by our actual linguistic conventions. Consequently, (1),
like (D1), fails to capture an appropriate covariance commitment.
(D3), on the other hand, is exactly the kind of claim we are looking for.
We are trying to explain why it is thatM(triangles have three sides), and
this means that, given an explanans E, the covariance commitment will be
of the form ‘¬E ¬M(triangles have three sides)’ – which says that had
E not been the case, then it would not have been the case that according
to the framework of possible worlds, triangles necessarily have three sides,
or, alternatively: Had E not been the case, it would not have been a modal
fact that, necessarily, triangles have three sides.
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5.5 External Covariance and Genuine
Necessity
Avoiding the Contingency Horn
So far, I have argued that although the linguistic approach does yield co-
variance commitments, these should not be expressed, as in Hale’s formal-
isation, using internal counterfactuals, but using external ones. Crucially,
this allows us to make sense of the linguistic approach as an attempt at
explanation in a quite ordinary sense, with the usual commitments which
come with that. It remains, however, to show that this provides us with a
response to Blackburn’s dilemma. We do this by showing that a commit-
ment to external covariance does not yield the conclusion that necessity is
undermined.
When (1) in Hale’s formalisation is replaced by the appropriate external
counterfactual, the reasoning of the contingency horn goes as follows:
1. ¬F  ¬M(A) (Premise: consequence of ‘M(A) because F ’)
2. ♦¬F (Premise: contingent explanans)
3. ♦¬M(A) (From 1 and 2 using counterfactual logic)
Now, we said above that the necessity of a putatively necessary truth is
undermined if and only if there is some sense in which its negation is or
could have been possible. Crucially, (3) commits us to no such thing. (3)
concedes that it could have failed to be the case that: According to the
framework of possible worlds, necessarily A. It is conceded, that is, that
the modal fact A might not have obtained. However, we cannot infer from
this that the contrary modal fact ¬A/♦¬A could have obtained. There is
no inference, that is, from ‘♦¬M(A)’ to something like ‘♦M(¬A)’.11
11This marks a difference between the present proposal and that of Iris Einheuser
(2006: 476–8). Einheuser distinguishes two notions of possibility: ♦cϕ (which is true at
w iff it is true at some world which differs from w only in virtue of its ‘carving’), and
♦sϕ (which is true at w iff it is true at some world which differs from w only in virtue
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We have already seen one reason why this inference must be rejected:
‘♦¬M(A)’ might be true because the counterfactual scenario sustains no
domain of possible worlds, in which case there would be no potential for
contrary modal facts either. If the linguistic approach is correct, this is
presumably the case in possible worlds where there are no linguistic con-
ventions. Furthermore, ‘♦¬M(A)’ might be true because, even though
the counterfactual scenario does sustain an alternative domain of possible
worlds, these worlds are silent on whether ‘A’ is true or not, and so deliver
no verdict regarding the modal status of ‘A’. This is plausibly the case if
the relevant linguistic conventions don’t suffice to express the proposition
expressed by ‘A’.
The reasoning of the contingency horn, then, does not yield the con-
clusion that necessity has been undermined when applied to an external
counterfactual. We reach the conclusion that the modal fact in question
might have been lacking, but since we cannot “push the negation through”,
we cannot infer that there might have been a contrary modal fact.
It might be objected that this is based on too narrow an understanding
of what it is for necessity to be undermined. For why shouldn’t we say that
the necessity of a putatively necessary truth is already undermined by the
concession that there are possible circumstances in which there would have
been no such modal fact? Of course, this is not really about that particular
word ‘undermined’; rather, it has to do with why we find the conclusion of
Blackburn’s contingency horn problematic. The reason, I would say, is that
we want ascriptions of necessity to retain their force. We want to hold on
to the idea that if something is genuinely necessary, then there is absolutely
no sense in which it could have been false, or even possibly false, and that
this holds unconditionally. No matter how strange we imagine things to be,
it remains the case that what is necessary is still true.
of its ‘substratum’), and argues that the ‘conventionalist’ is only committed to claims
like: ‘♦c¬s(Bachelors are unmarried)’. However, if the modal operators remain interde-
finable (and we are not told otherwise), this gives us: ‘♦c♦s¬(Bachelors are unmarried)’.
Although I am sympathetic to much of what Einheuser says, it is not clear that this
avoids the charge that the necessity in question has, in some sense, been undermined.
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My reason, then, for holding that necessity is not undermined by the
above concession is simply that this idea can be retained. While it is con-
ceded that there is a sense in which it is correct that had the linguistic
conventions been different or lacking, it wouldn’t have been necessary, say,
that all bachelors are unmarried, this in no way suggests that there could
have been married bachelors or that such people might have been possible.
What is conceded is that the framework which delivers this modal verdict,
might not have been able to deliver one, or, indeed, not existed at all.
Ruling Out Contrary Modal Facts
The modified contingency horn, then, does not entail that contrary modal
facts are possible, and so does not entail that necessity is undermined. This,
however, is not all that reassuring. After all, this does not guarantee that
no alternative set of linguistic conventions would give rise to contrary modal
facts. Why shouldn’t it be the case, if the linguistic approach is correct,
that had or linguistic conventions been different enough, they would have
given rise to, say, the modal fact that four-sided triangles are possible?
The question here is whether, for some putatively necessary truth
‘A’, we might find ourselves committed to a counterfactual of the form
‘F M(♦¬A)’, where ‘F ’ is possible. This would deliver the conclusion
‘♦M(♦¬A)’, which would count as undermining the necessity of ‘A’.
However, we already have the resources needed to address this worry.
Strawson, recall, argued that if we can explain why a sentence is necessary
in terms of the conventions of English, then there is no mystery regard-
ing how we know that any sentence (in any language) expressing the same
proposition is also necessary. The reason, essentially, is that the linguistic
considerations we appeal to in order to explain the necessity of the English
sentence also provide the criteria for whether a sentence in a different lan-
guage expresses the same proposition. So, if we find some sentence which is
not susceptible to a similar explanation, that shows that we are not dealing
with a sentence which expresses the same proposition.
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The same reasoning can be applied to other possible languages, and this
largely removes the present worry. Even though it is certainly possible that
some sentence which we take to be necessary could have been governed by
linguistic conventions which would render it both contingent and false, we
would also have to be able to say that it still expresses the same proposition.
It is quite unclear, however, why we would ever say this if the relevant
linguistic conventions are different, and even differ so as to alter the modal
status and truth-value of the sentence. As Richard Creath put its when
discussing Carnap:
Nor is one free to affirm in one system what one denies in another.
After all, the meanings are not fixed until after the linguistic con-
ventions are established. If different rules are laid down, then there
is not common claim with a single meaning that is variously asserted
and denied. (1990a: 10–1)12
Thus, not only can we block the inference (via the contingency horn) to
the possibility of contrary modal facts, there is also a strategy available for
ruling out such things.
5.6 A Glaring Disanalogy
We should now consider the glaring disanalogy between the modal case and
the aesthetic case which I used to motivate the internal-external distinction,
namely that counterfactuals are themselves modal, and so are themselves
typically understood in terms of a framework of possible worlds.13 Conse-
quently, it may seem that while there can be genuinely external counterfac-
tuals with regard to aesthetics, the notion of a modally external counterfac-
tual is problematic. For if we try to “step outside” the modal framework,
12Sidelle also makes this point (2009: 230).
13There are some dissenters from this view. Anscombe, for instance, suggests that
‘subjunctive counterfactuals’ are truth-functional in her (1975), although she does have
some doubts about this proposal (1981b: 196–7). Note that although Goodman’s some-
what influential proposal (1947) does not invoke possible worlds, it is still modal since it
invokes the notion of entailment.
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then we shall be left without a good way of making sense of the counter-
factuals.
Put differently, the point is that a modally external counterfactual, when
properly spelt out, is not of the form ‘pM(q)’, but, rather:
(E) M(pM(q))
However, while this does constitute a disanalogy with the aesthetic case, it
is not clear that it is a problem. Certainly there is no general problem with
operators being nested in this way, and, more importantly for our purposes,
the nesting in (E) does not create any problems when it comes to evaluating
this sentence. Indeed, looking back on the discussion in 5.4, we may say
that we were working with tacit M-operators up front all along.
With a bit of artificial rigour, we can be slightly more specific about how
to evaluate (E). The linguistic approach provides us with a theory T, about
how the linguistic conventions give rise to modal facts, which we can view as
a function from sets of linguistic conventions to domains of possible worlds.
(E) is then evaluated by first going to the nearest world in which p is true,
asking what conventions are present there and what domain of possible
worlds these would give us in accordance with T. We then ask whether this
domain is such that necessarily q. The process here does indeed involve
considering two domains of possible worlds, as is reflected in the double use
of the M-operator, but this causes no obvious problems.
It might be said that there are bound to be complications since, given
that counterfactuals are modal, the linguistic conventions would have to set-
tle, not just what is possible and necessary, but also which counterfactuals
are true. This, however, is a mistaken demand. The linguistic conventions
should not be expected to explain every fact which contains a modal compo-
nent. For instance, they should not be expected to settle whether something
is physically possible or not. Similarly, they should not be expected to settle
the “modal distances” that are crucial to the evaluation of counterfactual
claims. Consequently, an adherent of the linguistic approach can (and, I
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think, should) reject the idea that the linguistic conventions must explain
the truth-values of counterfactual claims in general.
Still, if our linguistic conventions determine facts about necessity and
possibility, then this will presumably affect claims which have modal aspects
– such as claims about physical possibility and counterfactuals. This, I
think, must be conceded, albeit with a qualification: There is no reason
to suspect that this will affect anything other than external claims about
counterfactuals and physical possibility. And since such claims are really
only of concern to philosophers, there is not much potential for any serious
revisionism here.
Let us consider this in a bit more detail. If, as I have suggested, the
adherent of the linguistic approach should grant that, in the external sense,
there would have been no modal facts if there were no languages, then
this would presumably include facts about physical modality and counter-
factuals. The reason is that these notions, at least as they are typically
understood, involve a background appeal to the broader kind of modality
that the linguistic conventions are said to explain.
A standard suggestion, for instance, is that an event is physically pos-
sible iff its occurring is consistent with the laws of physics. But the notion
of consistency is one that the linguistic approach is obligated to explain,
and this might well lead us to conclude that there is a sense in which there
would not be facts about consistency in the absence of language, and that
might commit us to saying that there are no facts about physical possibility
in the absence of language either.
Now, it certainly sounds odd to say, e.g., that if there had been no
linguistic conventions, then it wouldn’t have been physically possible for
birds to fly. However, this at least becomes less odd if we remind ourselves
of the proper external interpretation of this claim. We are not, of course,
saying that it would be physically impossible for birds to fly in this case; we
are saying that the framework we use to make sense of physical possibility
and impossibility alike would be lacking. And this, I think, is a bullet the
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adherent of the linguistic approach might be able to bite.
Reverting to the disanalogy that prompted this discussion, I don’t claim
to have shown that this disanalogy definitely causes no problems, but I do
hope to have shifted the burden of proof: If there is a problem here, it needs
to be argued for. More generally, the interaction between logical modality
and other modal phenomena is, I think, an area in which further research
is both needed and likely to shed light on the tenability or otherwise of the
linguistic approach.
136
6
The Character of Linguistic Rules
In the previous two chapters we have responded to two influential objec-
tions against the linguistic approach. In doing so, we have also clarified
two aspects of the explanations that adherents of the linguistic approach
are committed to providing. With regard to what is to be explained (the
“explanandum” in somewhat antiquated terminology), we have seen that
this is the necessity of necessary truths, not their truth; and with regard to
the explanatory relation itself, we have seen that this can be understood in
the standard way, with the commitments to covariance which that entails.
In this chapter, I shall consider two objections that target that which
is offered as an explanation (the “explanans”) – namely the conventionally
adopted linguistic rules.1 These objections are, first, that our linguistic
practices are simply too messy to provide us with anything like the definite
rules we would need for the purposes of such explanations, and, second, that
what these rules are is plainly an empirical matter and that this clashes
with the central tenet of the subjective-constitutive strategy. I shall begin
by expanding on why an adherent of the linguistic approach is committed
to approaching matters via actual linguistic practices in the first place.
1Leaving aside, for now, the idea that an appeal to more general features of linguistic
representation might also be needed.
6. The Character of Linguistic Rules
6.1 Rejecting the Myth of a Museum
In his Dewey Lectures, Quine provided a now famous characterisation of
a certain simplistic view of meaning: ‘Uncritical semantics is the myth of
a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the words are labels.
To switch languages is to change the labels.’ (1968: 186) On this kind of
picture, we invest a word with meaning by simply correlating it with a
meaning, and the correct rules for using the word are then dictated by the
properties of that meaning. This same idea was criticised by Wittgenstein
under the heading of ‘meaning bodies’:
We are tempted to think we can deduce the rules for the use of a
word from its meaning, which we supposedly grasp as a whole when
we pronounce the word. This is the error I would eradicate. [. . . ] To
say that the use of a word, e.g., ‘cube’, follows from its meaning is
to treat the word as if it were the visible face of a hidden body, its
meaning, whose rules of combination with other hidden bodies are
given by the laws of geometry. (1979b: 50–1)
It is sometimes suggested that Wittgenstein’s target in passages like this
is the linguistic approach as understood by members of the Vienna Circle
(Baker and Hacker 2009: 367). But although it is possible to find occasional
passages in the positivists’ writings which suggest some such picture, the
idea that they subscribed to the ‘museum myth’ of ‘meaning bodies’ does
not stand up to scrutiny (Glock 2003a: 156). To take but one example,
Carnap opposes precisely this idea in the preface to LSL (1937: xv).
Moreover, this picture is antithetical to the linguistic approach as it
was presented in Part A. I there argued that the central goal is to dissolve
‘the problem of the seemingly mysterious parallelism between the course of
our thought and that of the world, the pre-established harmony between
thought and world, which would enable us to discover something about the
world by thought’ (Hahn 1930a: 24), and that the strategy is to do so,
in Kantian fashion, by abolishing the idea of an external standard of cor-
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rectness when it comes to necessary (logical) truths. The logical positivists
therefore maintained that ‘there [is] nothing in the world corresponding to
the so-called logical constants (like “and”, “or”, etc.)’ (Hahn 1930a: 25),
and more generally that ‘logic [. . . ] does not deal with any objects at all;
it only deals with the way we talk about objects’ (Hahn 1933a: 29).
The Museum Myth – being essentially a version of the “conceptual Pla-
tonism” we discussed in section 3.4 – is in clear tension with this project. For
here the meanings would indeed constitute an external standard of correct-
ness and we should have to ask how we get to be justified in thinking that
the rules which we believe follow from these meanings actually do so. More
generally, when it is said that necessity is to be explained in terms of the
linguistic rules, we cannot go on to say that the “proper” rules are dictated
by something behind our linguistic practices – some subject-independent
standard which these practices may fall short of. That would land us right
back with the problems the linguistic approach was meant to dissolve.
The worry, however, is that it is not clear, on reflection, that abandoning
the museum myth in favour of focusing on our actual linguistic practices
squares any better with the aspirations of the linguistic approach. First,
it may be said that the linguistic approach presupposes the neatness of
the Museum Myth since our linguistic practices do not provide us with
appropriately determinate facts about what the linguistic rules are, and
so leaves us without a proper basis for the explanations that we want to
provide. Second, it might be said that it is an empirical question what
the linguistic rules are, and so that we have hardly succeeded in avoiding
external standards of correctness here. In section 6.2 I consider the former
of these worries (via an objection due to Marcus Giaquinto);2 in sections
6.3–6.5 I consider the latter.
2Substantial parts of this discussion have appeared as Nyseth (2017).
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6.2 The Threat of Indeterminacy
In ‘The Linguistic View of a Priori Knowledge’ (2008), Giaquinto argues
that a priori knowledge cannot be explained in terms of knowledge of
synonymy because, although meanings are not as indeterminate as Quine
thought (see Quine 1960b: ch. 2), ‘there is enough indeterminacy of lexical
meaning for ordinary statements of synonymy to fall short of fact-hood’
(2008: 91).
I shall not contest Giaquinto’s thesis of ‘moderate indeterminacy of
meaning’, but I shall contest the conclusion he draws regarding the ‘lin-
guistic view of a priori knowledge’. As I see it, the moderate indeterminacy
thesis does not pose a problem for this view. Indeed, once the dialectical
situation is made explicit, we can see that, if anything, Giaquinto’s consid-
erations speak in favour of it.
The details of Giaquinto’s argument are in two respects slightly tangen-
tial to our concerns. Firstly, this argument targets the appeal to synonymy
specifically, whereas we are interested in linguistic rules more generally.
Secondly, the position he is attacking is understood as a view about the a
priori, whereas we are understanding the linguistic approach primarily in
terms of the problem of necessity.3 However, the general lesson I’m going
to draw is independent of these two points.
Synonymy and a Priori Knowledge
According to the linguistic view, one route to a priori knowledge is to
deduce it from synonymies and logical truths that are independently known
a priori. Here is one example Giaquinto considers (I will refer to this general
scheme as ‘the synonymy model’):4
(1) All cows are cows (logical knowledge)
3For this reason, I shall refer to the view Giaquinto is attacking as ‘the linguistic
view’ rather than ’the linguistic approach’.
4Giaquinto’s model is a simplification of one due to Boghossian (cf. his 2003b). For
an objection to Boghossian’s line of thought, see Nyseth (Forthcoming).
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(2) ‘Cow’ means the same as ‘female bovine’ (semantic knowledge)
(∴) So, all cows are female bovines (new a priori knowledge)
As Giaquinto is quick to point out (2008: 90), there are a number of poten-
tial issues with this idea: First, he says, we may doubt whether the logical
truth is available a priori.5 Second, we may doubt whether the relevant
semantic knowledge is available a priori. And third, we might worry that
claims of the form ‘X means the same as Y’ are typically not strictly true
because there is no fact of the matter.6
Giaquinto discusses the first of these worries in the second part of his
paper, and is willing to disregard the second for the sake of argument. His
objection in the first part of the paper concerns the third worry.7
Giaquinto’s Objection
In order for synonymy-based explanations of a priori knowledge to work,
there must be semantic facts underlying claims such as (2). Giaquinto
claims, however, that if we reflect upon certain questions about how to
individuate meanings, we shall have to conclude that this requirement is
typically not met, and that it is simply indeterminate whether two words
are synonymous.
To substantiate this, Giaquinto considers the question: ‘Does “cow” (in
English) mean the same as “vache” (in French)?’ Well, we first observe
that ‘cow’ is used in certain ways that differ from how ‘vache’ is used. For
instance, ‘cow’ is applied to female elephants and whales, whereas ‘vache’ is
not (2008: 92). This by itself does not establish that the synonymy doesn’t
hold, for we might well say that ‘cow’ is used in several (somewhat similar)
5Indeed, if the linguistic view is to be an explanation of the a priori in general, it
must be shown, not just that this is a priori, but that the a priori status of logic can be
explained in a way that is consistent with the central tenets of this view.
6A fourth worry concerns the inference itself: Is it valid? Can this be known a priori?
And if so, can this knowledge be explained by the linguistic view?
7We shall consider essentially the second worry in sections 6.3–6.5 below, and we
shall return to considerations related to the first in chapter 9.
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senses in English, but that one of these is synonymous with the French word
‘vache’. What this response makes clear, however, is that:
The question whether the noun ‘cow’ has a meaning with respect to
which it is synonymous with the noun ‘vache’ depends on a further
question: Does the noun ‘cow’ have one meaning covering several
kinds (female bovines, female elephants, female whales etc.), or two
or more related meanings with disjoint extensions, one of which cov-
ers just female bovines? (2008: 92)
Giaquinto considers several ways of tackling this question, but argues that
neither lexicography (2008: 92–3) nor cognitive semantics (2008: 93–6)
provides any reason to think that there is a determinate answer here.
Though the problem is initially presented in terms of synonymy across
languages, this is not essential. In particular, the same worries arise if
we replace the French ‘vache’ with the English ‘female bovine’, and if so,
premise (2) above is in trouble. Of course, if this phenomenon were peculiar
to the word ‘cow’ and perhaps a few others, then it wouldn’t be all that
significant, but Giaquinto argues that the issue will affect most other – but
perhaps not all – cases of (purported) synonymy, including that favourite
example: ‘bachelor’/‘unmarried man’ (2008: 97–8).
Is Moderate Indeterminacy a Problem?
I shall not contest Giaquinto’s reasons for thinking that moderate inde-
terminacy of meaning is a widespread phenomenon. My point concerns,
rather, what we should conclude if Giaquinto’s claims about this are cor-
rect. He thinks it shows that there is something wrong with the linguistic
view of a priori knowledge:
The general point is this. For the linguistic story to work at all, words
must have determinate meanings and speakers must know just what
those meanings are. In many examples this double requirement is
not satisfied. (2008: 96)
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But at this point we should ask: ‘Examples of what, exactly?’ Surely, if this
is to be an effective objection against the linguistic view – which is, after
all, a claim about how to explain the a priori – we must be dealing with
examples of a priori knowledge. The problem is that insofar as Giaquinto
is right about the cases he considers, these aren’t examples of a priori
knowledge after all.
Take the claim that all cows are female bovines. That might indeed seem
like a candidate for a priori knowledge. But if Giaquinto is right, and it is
indeterminate whether ‘cow’, can be correctly applied to female elephants,
then it is equally indeterminate whether all cows are female bovines. So,
since we can only know what is true, this cannot be an instance of a priori
knowledge after all. Similarly for the other cases Giaquinto considers: If the
meanings are indeterminate in the way he suggests, the appropriate lesson
appears to be, not that these are counterexamples to the linguistic view,
but that these aren’t candidates for a priori knowledge in the first place.8
Indeed, we can tweak the example so as to make it clear that it is specif-
ically a priori knowledge, and not knowledge in general, that is undermined
by moderate indeterminacy. Suppose, for example, that all species except
humans and bovines become extinct, then it would be true and knowable
that all cows are female bovines – even if the meaning of ‘cow’ is inde-
terminate in the way Giaquinto suggests. However, this would still not be
knowable a priori since, presumably, we would have to ascertain empirically
that there are no female whales, elephants etc. What the lack of a semantic
fact precludes is not knowledge, but a priori knowledge specifically.
We thus reach a conclusion quite opposed to that drawn by Giaquinto,
namely that we can know a priori that all cows are female bovines if and
only if there is a relevant semantic fact of the matter. Although this offers
only (very limited) inductive evidence for a correlation between semantic
facts and the possibility of a priori knowledge, and although a mere cor-
relation does not suffice to establish the explanatory relation claimed by
8It should be noted that Giaquinto is not arguing against the very possibility of a
priori knowledge (2008: 111).
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advocates of the linguistic view, I maintain that, nevertheless, evidence in
favour of a correlation here is surely a point in favour of the linguistic view,
rather than a point against it.
It is noteworthy, therefore, that other things Giaquinto says further
suggest a correlation here. Since he is advocating a moderate form of inde-
terminacy, he is conceding that there are some semantic facts. For instance,
he tells us that it is a semantic fact that ‘cow’ cannot be correctly applied
to female spiders. Now, if this is correct (and making the concessions that
Giaquinto makes about other problematic aspects concerning the linguistic
view), then it would seem that we can know a priori that no cow is a female
spider.
Moreover, Giaquinto does in fact concede that there are some synonymy
facts - notably cases where a term is introduced as abbreviating another ex-
pression and perhaps a few others (2008: 100–1). In theses cases, then, the
synonymy model is presumably not threatened by moderate indeterminacy
of meaning.
The lesson Giaquinto draws from this is that ‘a priori knowledge via
knowledge of synonymies is at best very restricted’ (2008: 101). However,
this assessment is misleading. It makes it sound as if the synonymy model
is at fault for being less explanatory than it ought to be. But, as we have
seen, establishing this would require a case of a priori knowledge which
the synonymy model ought to account for but doesn’t, and no such case
is provided. Thus, while Giaquinto might indeed have established that ‘a
priori knowledge via knowledge of synonymies is at best very restricted’,
he has not given us reason to think that it isn’t exactly as restricted as it
ought to be.
Conclusion Regarding Indeterminacy
This discussion was motivated by the objection that an adherent of the
linguistic approach cannot think of the linguistic rules that are supposed
to explain necessity in terms of our actual practices, since these practices
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are too messy to provide us with rules that are determinate enough for the
needs of the linguistic approach. This is, I suspect, one of the reasons why
it is sometimes taken for granted that an adherent of the linguistic approach
must buy into some version of the Museum Myth.
Generalising from the above, we can now say that an adherent of the
linguistic approach can very well accept that our practices are messy and
indeterminate, as long as they are not messy and indeterminate relative to
the necessary truths. That is to say: there is no problem here unless we
find some indisputably necessary truth where the relevant linguistic rules
are too messy to sustain any plausible explanation.
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that reasonably clear cases of neces-
sity tend to be found precisely in areas where linguistic rigour is emphasised
– areas, that is, where we are required to be as explicit as possible about our
definitions. This, moreover, would hardly be news to someone like Carnap,
who emphasised that the notion of analyticity is typically not straightfor-
wardly applicable to “pre-scientific” parts of natural languages (1966: 260;
cf. also 1955: 40–1 and Richardson 1997: 152).9 In cases where we do have
linguistic rigour, on the other hand, even Quine grants that maybe the lin-
guistic approach does have something going for it (1951: 26; 1960a: 358;
361), although he still has some misgivings (1960a: 361–2).
The frequently messy and indeterminate character of our linguistic prac-
tices, then, does not automatically threaten the linguistic approach. Still,
it might be asked how this approach fares if indeterminacy is a completely
general phenomenon. Even this, however, would not be a straightforward
refutation. Someone advocating general indeterminacy could, in principle,
maintain that a necessary truth would be a truth guaranteed by the lin-
guistic rules, although, as a matter of fact, there are no such truths.10 Of
course, there would be little reason to care about the linguistic approach
9Carnap in fact articulates a potential counterexample to ‘no bachelor has a wife’
(1966: 261) which is quite reminiscent of counterexamples articulated by post-Quineans
in the business of attacking the notion of analyticity (cf. e.g. Harman 1967: 139; 1994:
45; 1996: 398; and Giaquinto 2008: 97–8).
10A case can be made, I think, that this is Quine’s attitude.
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if there are, in fact, no necessary truths. However, for the purposes of this
thesis, I am assuming the existence of the phenomenon and asking whether
the linguistic approach might provide an adequate explanation of it.
Note, finally, that these considerations are relevant in somewhat different
contexts as well. First, Putnam has argued (1962a; 1962b; 1975; 1976) that
although Quine was wrong to deny the existence of analytic truths, he was
quite right to deny the significance of this phenomenon. Strict analyticity,
as he sees it, is only possible when we have ‘one criterion words’, and these
are rare and insignificant (1962b: 659). Even if this is so, however, the
appropriate lesson need not be that the linguistic approach is misguided; it
might just be that necessities are equally rare.11
Second, it might be suggested that the linguistic approach presupposes
an implausibly internalist account of meaning. Putnam (1975), Kripke
(1972) and Burge (1979; 1986) have all famously argued that matters of
meaning frequently depend on features of the external environment (e.g.
facts about chemistry, histories of usage and expert judgements), and if
so, then there might well be facts about our linguistic rules which are not
available to us in anything like the way adherents of the linguistic approach
suggest.
Here too, however, the important question is not whether externalist
considerations are important, but whether they are important in contexts
where modal knowledge is possible. Although there are influential argu-
ments – based on alleged cases of a posteriori necessity – which suggest
that this is indeed the case, it is not universally accepted. This is not an
issue that will be discussed here, but – as already mentioned – one strategy
would be to argue that although we need empirical investigation to deter-
mine that a claim like ‘water is H2O’ is true, the principles that allow us to
infer from this that it is necessary can be explained in accordance with the
linguistic approach – drawing on aspects of our linguistic practices that do
not rely on externalist considerations.12
11Indeed, this appears to be how Putnam sees it (1962b: 660).
12In addition to Sidelle’s proposal (1989), two-dimensional semantics provides us with
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Thus, while both lexical indeterminacy and semantic externalism cer-
tainly put pressure on the linguistic approach, the very existence of these
phenomena does not suffice to undermine it.
6.3 The Retreat to Idiolects
I now turn to the second problem with conceiving of linguistic rules in terms
of our actual linguistic practices – namely that it is plainly an empirical
question what these practices are:
If an analytic proposition “calls attention to linguistic usages,” it
states an alleged matter of fact about the majority of writers and
speakers of the language which the speaker is using. It can be tested
by reading the works of a representative selection of persons who use
language, and seeing whether they do use words and phrases in the
manner alleged. The analytic proposition is therefore quite plainly
synthetic and empirical. (Broad 1936: 107)13
It was this objection which led Ayer to abandon his position in Language,
Truth and Logic in favour of the normativism in (Ayer 1936b). After he
became dissatisfied with this position too, he tried to defuse the worry by
pointing out that thinking of necessary truths as truths guaranteed by lin-
guistic rules need not amount to thinking of these as being about linguistic
rules (1946: 16–7). This is presumably quite correct, but it is difficult to see
that it gets to the heart of the matter. For if knowing what the linguistic
rules are requires an empirical investigation of the linguistic community, and
modal knowledge is based on such linguistic knowledge, then it remains the
case, it seems, that modal knowledge too requires some such investigation.
More importantly, this would seem to turn empirical facts concerning
the public language into the kind of external standard of correctness which
some resources here (cf. e.g. Chalmers 2006) – as does some of Albert Casullo’s work on
the relationship between necessity and apriority (1977; 2010).
13Cf. also Ewing (1940: 213–4), Pap (1958: 165–6) and Burgess (1997: 30–1).
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it is essential for the positivists to avoid. As Baker puts it: ‘If the concept of
analytic truth is to remove an epistemological problem about the possibility
of a priori knowledge,14 it seems that the conventions of symbolism must
be transparent or self-evident.’ (1988: 235) Plainly though, it is neither
transparent nor self-evident how linguistic expressions are used in public
languages.
A common suggestion for securing such transparency or self-evidence
is to maintain that we should not be focusing on public languages but on
idiolects.15 This appeal to idiolects is, however, problematic for several rea-
sons. To begin with, many are suspicious of the very notion of an idiolect –
especially insofar as an idiolect is understood to be anything like a language
in its own right:
But an idiolect is not a language; there is no describing any indi-
vidual’s employment of his words without account being taken of his
willingness to subordinate his use to that generally agreed as correct.
That is, one cannot so much as explain what an idiolect is without
invoking the notion of a language considered as a social phenomenon.
(Dummett 1974: 528)16
Furthermore, even if we disregard this worry, we might be troubled by the
suggestion that modal inquiry is really carried out with reference to such
languages. If the linguistic approach is forced to admit that we are really
interested in our own idiolects, then this gives the approach a ‘solipsistic
drift’ (Baker 1988: 235) which is at odds with the appearance that modal
inquiry is no less communal than other kinds of inquiry.
14Again, although we are primarily interested in knowledge of necessities (and not a
priori knowledge as such), we are assuming (with Hume) that such knowledge cannot
be based on empirical evidence alone.
15In particular, this is sometimes charitably suggested by critics of the linguistic
approach, at least for the sake of argument – see, e.g. Sober (2000: 52) and Giaquinto
(2008: 90)
16For more scepticism about idiolects see e.g. Dummett (1991: 105–6), Wiggins (1997)
and Marconi (2015: 49) – although Marconi stops short of endorsing this scepticism. For
a good discussion of some of these issues, see Heck (2006).
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Finally, it is, in fact, far from clear that idiolects are as epistemologically
unproblematic as they are sometimes made out to be. Broad, for instance,
did not think that retreating to idiolects suffices to avoid the charge that an-
alytic propositions would be empirical according to the linguistic approach:
If an analytic proposition states that the person who records it in-
tends to use certain words in certain ways, it evidently makes a
statement about the present experiences of the speaker and about
his future behaviour. The former can be tested only by the speaker
himself introspectively. The latter can be tested by seeing how the
speaker does use these words in the later parts of his discourse. The
analytic proposition is therefore quite plainly synthetic and empiri-
cal. (1936: 107)
It is certainly true that if a claim about my idiolect is a claim about how
I will go on to use linguistic expressions in the future, then we are dealing
with an empirical prediction. And even if this is a prediction that I am in
a particularly good position to make, the answer is neither “transparent”
nor “self-evident”. In response to this, it is tempting to maintain that what
we are really interested in is the language that a given person speaks at a
given time – their “instantaneous idiolect” so to speak.
Even this, however, does not guarantee transparency and self-evidence.
Suppose that someone, Mary, is asked what rule governs her own use of
‘bachelor’. Quite plausibly she might reply that she takes ‘bachelor’ to
be correctly applicable to a person x if and only if x is both male and
unmarried. The interlocutor then points out that, according to this rule,
‘bachelor’ is correctly applicable to male infants and toddlers. Now, Mary
might reply that this is indeed the case (perhaps with the disclaimer that
she considers this use to be pragmatically misleading). However, it is also
perfectly conceivable that she would just admit to having made a mistake
and say that, contrary to her initial judgement, the rule she goes by is not
that ‘bachelor’ can be applied to all and only unmarried males, but that it
can be applied to all and only unmarried adult males.
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This should emphatically not be described as a case where Mary is
correct about her idiolect when she gives her initial response, but changes
her language when it is pointed out that ‘bachelor’, so understood, would
be applicable to infants and toddlers. This would be to say, I take it,
that had Mary been asked at the slightly earlier time whether toddlers can
be bachelors she would have answered affirmatively, but we might perfectly
well assume that this is false. Moreover, going down this route would create
a number of problems. After all, why did Mary say that she had made a
mistake? And what motivated the hypothesised sudden change in language?
Instead, I maintain, this should be regarded as a perfectly mundane case
of Mary being mistaken about her own (instantaneous) idiolect. Moreover,
we do not have to resort to imagined cases in order to see that this is
possible. Before reading Putnam (cf. 1962b: 660; and 1975: 161) I would
probably have said, if asked, that my use of the word ‘cat’ was governed, in
part, by the rule ‘apply “cat” to x only if x is an animal’ and my use of the
word ‘pencil’, in part by: ‘Apply “pencil” to x only if x is an artefact’. But
when I did read Putnam, I discovered that I was wrong about this. I did
not discover that my use of those words diverged from the public language,
nor did I decide to change my usage, I discovered that I was mistaken about
how I, at that time, was inclined to use those expressions.17
The proposed retreat to idiolects, then, is not without its problems.
First, the notion of an idiolect as a distinct language is controversial; sec-
ond, focusing on idiolects threatens to make the linguistic approach unduly
solipsistic; and third, it is not clear that idiolects deliver the transparency
and self-evidence which they were meant to secure. In the remainder of this
chapter I shall argue that, in fact, we can do without both the appeal to
idiolects, and the aim of self-evidence. In the next section I outline why we
shouldn’t aim for self-evidence in this context, and, crucially, why this is
consistent with the subjective-constitutive strategy. Then, in section 6.5,
I argue that we can address the concern that public languages introduce
17For more on whether one can be mistaken about ones own idiolect, see George
(1990), Higginbotham (1991) and Barber (2001).
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external standards of correctness without bringing in idiolects – at least in
any controversial sense.
6.4 External and Internal Standards of
Correctness
Baker claims that ‘if the concept of analytic truth is to remove an epistemo-
logical problem about the possibility of a priori knowledge, it seems that
the conventions of symbolism must be transparent or self-evident.’ (1988:
235) And we have seen that it is doubtful that retreating to (instantaneous)
idiolects succeeds in making these conventions ‘transparent or self-evident’
– at least if that is supposed to preclude the possibility of making mistakes
about what the conventions are.
On reflection, however, we might wonder whether we should even want
to secure this kind of transparency in the first place. It is, after all, a plain
fact that we frequently do make mistakes in areas, like logic, which the
linguistic approach is meant to account for. If we hold that such knowledge
is based on a knowledge of linguistic conventions that we could not possibly
be mistaken about, then we now need to explain how it is that mistakes
nevertheless creep in. I am not saying that this is a problem that could
not possibly be addressed, but the fact that this emerges as a problem
should make us ask ourselves whether we should really want to rule out the
possibility of being mistaken about the linguistic rules.
Baker’s suggestion is that such transparency is needed in order to ‘re-
move an epistemological problem about the possibility of a priori knowl-
edge’. But it isn’t obvious why this should be so. The problem in question
is, I take it, what we have been referring to as ‘the problem of inexplicable
agreement’. The linguistic approach attempts to address this problem by
getting rid of the idea of an external standard of correctness, so that it
becomes clear why there is no need for ordinary empirical input in order to
establish agreement between our modal beliefs and the external world.
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This, however, does not immediately imply that there can be no room for
mistakes on this conception. To see this, we may return to the case of Mary
above. I maintain that we can make sense of her mistake without bringing
in an external standard of correctness which would, as Hahn puts it, make
the possibility of knowledge here a matter of ‘mysterious parallelism’.
The key point is just that Mary’s mistake was revealed to her by further
reflection: She corrected herself. Unlike in a case where, say, Mary makes
a mistaken prediction about how she or others will use ‘bachelor’ in the
future, this was not a case of Mary’s belief failing to match an external
standard of correctness. This is indicated by the fact that Mary did not
require any additional information in order to determine that she had made
a mistake. She was only asked a question which resulted in her reflecting on
how she would use the expression in a hypothetical case which she hadn’t
yet considered. The correction came, we may say, from the same source as
the initial judgement – namely from Mary’s reflecting on her use of linguistic
expressions.
Nor is there any great mystery as to how this could happen. Mary’s
initial verdict was a universal statement: ‘Bachelor’ can be applied to all
and only unmarried males. However, the full range of relevant cases need
not have occurred to her. She might just have tried to imagine some “arbi-
trary” unmarried male and concluded that she would apply ‘bachelor’ here,
without realising that she was in fact assuming this to be an adult. When
she is later asked to consider the case of a male child, this assumption comes
to light and she revises her judgement.
What this shows is that we can make sense of the possibility of making
a mistake without appealing to the kind of external standard of correctness
which would reinstate the inexplicable agreement problem. An adherent
of the linguistic approach need not, therefore, maintain that our linguistic
conventions must be self-evident in a way that would rule out this possibil-
ity.
Relatedly, an adherent of the linguistic approach is not, as it is some-
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times said, committed to the idea that knowledge of necessities must be
unrevisable knowledge. Putnam, for instance, writes that: ‘If S is true sim-
ply by virtue of what S means, and meanings are invariant under scientific
and common-sensical belief fixation, then the status of S must likewise be
so invariant. S must be an unrevisable truth’ (1986: 414).18
But this argument is problematic: If ‘the status’ in question refers to the
truth-value of the sentence, then it must indeed be invariant (this is the case
quite generally as long as the meaning is held fixed and the sentence doesn’t
contain indexicals). However, in order for this to relate to revisability, it
must refer, rather, to whether the sentence is believed to be true, and if
so the argument fails. The reason is that such a belief may be revised
as a result of revising a belief about what the meaning of the sentence is.
Someone can coherently maintain, that is, that the meaning of a sentence
suffices to guarantee that it is true, while conceding that they might be
mistaken about this, since it might turn out that they had an inadequate
conception of what the meaning of the sentence was. This, for instance,
was what happened in the case of Mary and the sentence ‘all unmarried
males are bachelors’.
There is, then, no need for the kind of unrevisability, self-evidence or
infallibility that idiolects are sometimes said to secure. This is to some ex-
tent good news for those advocating idiolects since, as we saw, it is doubtful
that they actually manage to secure this. However, it also removes much of
what motivated the appeal to idiolects in the first place. And since we have
seen that this appeal is problematic for other reasons, it would be good if it
could be avoided. This is the conclusion I shall argue for in the remainder
of this chapter.
18The final section of Quine (1951) is sometimes read as containing a similar argument:
No statement is immune to revision, so no statement is analytic. However, Quine has
also been read as suggesting that since no statement is immune to revision there is no
need for the notion of analyticity.
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6.5 Avoiding Idiolects
I shall proceed as follows: First, I shall recast some of these issues in terms of
a distinction between what we may call sentential and propositional doubts.
Next, I shall argue that we can explain – without bringing in idiolects
in any controversial sense – how someone could obtain knowledge at the
propositional level in the way suggested by the linguistic approach even
if they are relying on a mistaken conception of the linguistic rules in the
course of doing so.
Sentential and Propositional Doubts
It is a commonplace observation that it is possible to be right about some-
thing while being mistaken about how to express it in a given (or indeed
any) language. Schlick at one point suggests that this provides us with
something like a solution to our present worries, since it allows us to deny
that doubts concerning whether we have an accurate conception of the pub-
lic language translate into doubts concerning what we take to be necessary:
The set of symbols 3 + 1 = 4 designates an analytic proposition
whose validity cannot be doubted once it is understood, since we
then know that by definition the symbols 3 + 1 and 4 have the
same meaning. But now I can in principle doubt whether it really
was the symbol ‘4’ that was inserted as an abbreviation for ‘3 + 1’,
and whether it did not perhaps look like ‘5’ or even ‘!!’. Here I
could indeed be the victim of a deception of memory. But [. . . ]
such a doubt does not give rise here to that uncertainty which is
characteristic of a hypothesis, for it is not a doubt about the truth
of a given proposition, but rather about whether the way I have
chosen to present the proposition obeys the symbolic rules that are
otherwise customary. (1935b: 411–2)
However, while it is certainly true that we can doubt whether a given sen-
tence is true without doubting whether the proposition we think it expresses
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is true, this does not absolve the linguistic approach. For, we may ask, what
remains of this approach if it does not matter, in the end, whether we get
the linguistic rules right or not? Isn’t this just to concede that the appeal
to such rules is really redundant here?
We can put the problem as follows: The claim is that we obtain knowl-
edge of necessities by reflecting on the rules that govern our linguistic ex-
pressions. Now, either we need to get these rules right or we don’t. If we
do, then we are confronted with an external standard of correctness which
undermines the subjective-constitutive strategy; but if we don’t, then it
becomes quite unclear what the role of the linguistic rules is meant to be.
Indeed, it may be be said that this is where we should appeal to idiolects.
We could then say that although we do need to get the linguistic rules right,
these need not be the rules of a public language like English. Instead, they
could be the rules of our respective idiolects – languages which are allegedly
accessible (in some sense) to each of us on reflection. This, as I read her, is
Gillian Russell’s line of thought:
For suppose I have come to believe, by empirical means, that, in a
certain dialect of English, bachelor refers to all and only unmarried
men and so become justified, by the now familiar reasoning, in my
belief in the proposition that all bachelors are unmarried. I might
be wrong in my empirically justified belief about the English dialect.
Perhaps my data was misleading in some way. Yet this need not
undermine my justification for believing that all bachelors are men,
because I could justify my belief that all bachelors are men using
any language in which bachelor has the reference determiner which
I thought it had in the English dialect – including my own idiolect
(G. Russell 2008: 211).
Thus, our idiolects provide each of us with a language which allows us to
reason correctly for conclusions even if it turns out that we are incorrect
relative to the public language.
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My contention is that while there isn’t necessarily anything wrong with
putting matters like this, the appeal to idiolects is not really doing any work
here, and that we do not need to find a new language relative to which we
can think of ourselves as reasoning correctly when our reasoning turns out
to be incorrect relative to the public language. Instead, we can remain
content with acknowledging that we are reasoning incorrectly, but in ways
which are consistent with the idea that we thereby obtain knowledge at the
propositional level. Roughly the idea is that even if we are aware that we
might be reasoning incorrectly relative to the public language, this need
not undermine our confidence in the conclusion we arrive at, as long as it
is clear that the mistake will be irrelevant once we turn from sentences to
propositions.
Reasoning with Mistaken Linguistic Assumptions
Let us consider a case in which someone arrives at the conclusion that
something is a necessary truth via a mistaken conception of what the rules
of the public language are. Suppose that Lucy confuses ‘equilateral’ and
‘quadrilateral’, and therefore takes ‘every rectangle is equilateral’ to express
a necessary truth. She might have arrived at this conclusion as follows:
The rules for applying ‘rectangle’ dictate that ‘rectangle’ is ap-
plicable to an object only if this is a polygon with four edges, and
the rules for applying ‘equilateral’ tell us that if something is an
polygon with four edges, then this is sufficient for ‘equilateral’
to be correctly applicable. Thus, our linguistic rules establish
that whenever ‘rectangle’ is applicable, ‘equilateral’ too is appli-
cable, and this suffices to guarantee the truth of ‘all rectangles
are equilateral’.19
19Clearly this cannot be the whole story: We would need, for instance, to bring in
the rules governing the universal quantifier, and a complete explanation would have to
account for Lucy’s knowledge of logic as well. However, this suffices for our present
purposes.
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Note, to begin with, that although Lucy assents to ‘all rectangles are equi-
lateral’, she should not be portrayed as believing the proposition which we
would refer to as ‘the proposition that all rectangles are equilateral’. This
would not only be uncharitable, it would be to ignore the fact that she
has a misguided conception of how to use ‘equilateral’. Instead, we should
say that one aspect of this mistake is that she also believes, mistakenly,
that the sentence ‘all rectangles are equilateral’ says that all rectangles are
quadrilateral.20
Thus, although Lucy will presumably abandon her belief that ‘all rectan-
gles are equilateral’ expresses a necessary truth once her mistake is pointed
out to her, she may legitimately insist that she was right about what she
meant – namely that, necessarily, all rectangles are quadrilateral. That is
to say: her mistaken belief about English did not lead her to a mistaken
belief about geometry. And this tells us that although the public language
provides an external standard of correctness when it comes to the metalin-
guistic belief that a particular English sentence expresses a necessary truth,
it need not act as such a standard with regard to Lucy’s belief that the
geometrical proposition in question is necessary – even if she arrived at
this belief via reflecting on linguistic rules which she erroneously believed
to govern English.
Crucially, this is not to say that the appeal to linguistic rules was in
fact redundant in the story concerning how Lucy obtained the propositional
knowledge that, necessarily, all rectangles are quadrilateral. After all, her
route to this conclusion would be closed off without any such appeal. The
question is what role her misguided conception of the rules of English can
be allowed to play with regard to the propositional knowledge she reaches
and why her mistake turns out to be irrelevant in this context.
It is important here to keep in mind what conception of propositions an
20She will, of course, assent to the sentence ‘ “all rectangles are equilateral” means
that all rectangles are equilateral’, but as Dummett points out: ‘It is not sufficient, for
someone to know what the sentence “The Earth moves” means, for him to know the
M-sentence relating to it [i.e. ‘“The Earth moves” means that the Earth moves’] to be
true; he must know the proposition expressed by that M-sentence.’ (1975: 110)
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adherent of the linguistic approach can be expected to accept. As I have
already remarked, an adherent of this approach will presumably not be
happy to think of propositions as extralinguistic entities which are, in some
sense, explanatorily prior to the notion of a meaningful sentence. We should
not be starting with the notion of a proposition and trying to make sense
of the notion of a meaningful sentence by trying to explain how sentences
get to be correlated with propositions.
Instead, the adherent of the linguistic approach will say that we should
start with the notion of a meaningful sentence (a sentence which has been
given a use by our linguistic conventions) and think of a proposition as a
theoretical notion that is arrived at by abstracting from certain features of
sentences. In particular, we should abstract from anything which concerns
which expressions are used in the sentence and fixate solely on how the rules
dictate that the sentence is to be used (independently of “what it looks or
sounds like”).
We may then say that a sentence R expresses the same proposition as a
sentence S iff the expressions in R are governed by rules that are analogous
to the rules that govern the corresponding expressions in S – where to say
that two rules are analogous is to say that they are identical except for the
fact that they treat of different expressions.21
Against this background, coming to know that a given sentence is neces-
sary amounts to realising that the linguistic conventions that govern the use
of that sentence suffice to guarantee its truth. And realising that the propo-
sition is necessary is just a matter of realising that any sentence governed
by analogous rules will similarly be guaranteed to be true. Roughly speak-
ing, then, the idea is that coming to know that some particular proposition
is necessary is to come to know that if a sentence is governed by such-
and-such rules (regardless of which expressions are used), then it will be
necessary.22
21This demand could be relaxed somewhat to yield a less fine-grained conception of
propositions.
22As we have already seen, adherents of the linguistic approach frequently stress that
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We can now return to Lucy and the proposition that all rectangles are
quadrilateral. If we simplify somewhat,23 we can say that knowing that
the proposition that all rectangles are quadrilateral is necessary amounts
to knowing that any sentence of the form ‘All ζ are ξ’ is necessary provided
that ‘ζ’ is governed by the rule that it is applicable to an object iff it is a
polygon with exactly four edges and four right angles and ‘ξ’ is governed by
the rule that it is applicable to an object iff it is a polygon with four edges.
That is to say: it is like coming to know that the sentence is necessary
except that we disregard which expressions are used for the predicates.
Reaching this propositional knowledge, then, is a matter of coming to
know that any sentence governed by such rules will be necessary. Crucially,
though, obtaining this knowledge is consistent with mistakenly believing
that the English sentence ‘All rectangles are equilateral’ is governed by such
rules. Thus, I maintain that the fact that Lucy has a misguided conception
of the rules of English does not preclude her from relying on this conception
in order to obtain modal knowledge at the propositional level. What she
learns by reflecting on the linguistic rules she mistakenly believes to govern
English is that any sentence governed by analogous rules (rules that are
identical once we abstract from the particular expressions mentioned) is
guaranteed to be true, and this realisation is not threatened by the fact
that she mistakenly believes ‘All rectangles are equilateral’ to be one such
sentence.
Once matters are put like this, it becomes clear, moreover, that nothing
much is added by insisting that there is such a sentence in Lucy’s idiolect.
Lucy’s propositional knowledge does not presuppose that we can find some
sentence which is in fact governed by the relevant rules, and so looking for
some such sentence – and claiming to find one in the idiolect – is besides
the point.
it is rarely of much importance, for the purposes of the explanations they are interested
in, which linguistic expressions are used for which purposes (cf. in particular Carnap
1937: 6; and Sidelle 2009: 235).
23The simplification being that we restrict ourselves to the predicates involved.
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The mistake which Lucy makes is, of course, a particularly straightfor-
ward one – being a simple mix-up of two English words. It would certainly
be rash to generalise from this to conclude that other kinds of mistakes
could be treated in similar ways. However, my more limited aim has been
to show that thinking of the linguistic approach in terms of the public lan-
guage does not automatically introduce the kind of external standard that
we have been trying to avoid. It remains open to the adherent of the lin-
guistic approach to argue that mistakes relative to public language do not
undermine the possibility of knowledge at the propositional level. There is,
therefore, no in principle objection here, but rather a general worry that
should be kept in mind by someone who attempts to carry out the linguistic
approach in detail.
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Exploring the Limits of Convention

Transition to Part C
In part B, my focus was mainly on objections which purport to show that
the very idea of explaining necessary truths in the manner suggested by the
linguistic approach is fundamentally misguided. I argued that none of these
objections manage to establish this strong conclusion, although it should be
conceded that some of them do put extra pressure on the linguistic approach
in various ways.
Notably, we have seen: i) that although critics are correct that linguistic
conventions by themselves do not “make necessary truths true”, this can
pretty much be discarded as irrelevant; ii) that explaining the necessity
of a necessary truth in terms of something contingent does not automati-
cally undermine the necessity in question; and iii) that the adherent of the
linguistic approach need not make a problematic appeal to idiolects.
I shall now move on to objections which, instead of targeting the very
idea of explaining necessary truths in terms of the rules that govern lin-
guistic representation, purport to establish that such explanations will in-
evitably fall short of the aim of the linguistic approach – namely that of
addressing the philosophical problem of necessity.
More specifically, these objections all suggest, in one way or another,
that there are limits to what can be explained in terms of linguistic conven-
tion, and that this undermines the explanatory ambitions of the linguistic
approach. The general worry is – as Putnam puts it – that ‘the “exciting”
thesis that logic is true by convention reduces to the unexciting claim that
Transition to Part C
logic is true by conventions plus logic’ (1979: 424) – or, as we might rather
put it: The exciting project of explaining necessities in terms of linguistic
conventions reduces to the unexciting project of explaining necessities in
terms of linguistic conventions plus logic.
I shall consider three worries along such lines: i) that we need to make
a non-conventional distinction between admissible and inadmissible linguis-
tic rules, and that this distinction will be based, in some sense, upon the
notion of a logically correct rule; ii) that we need to appeal to a non-
conventional notion of logical consequence; and iii) that we need to take
a non-conventional starting-point for granted, and that this starting-point
will consist of basic logic.
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In this chapter I consider the worry that there might be non-conventional
constraints on what linguistic rules we can legitimately adopt. This threat-
ens to undermine the linguistic approach in a couple of ways: First, it would
then be natural to worry that the source of these constraints could frustrate
its explanatory ambitions. If, for instance, it is suggested that we should
only adopt rules that are, in some sense, logically coherent or innocent,
then it would seem that, far from it being the case that the linguistic rules
explain the logical necessities, logic constitutes an antecedent constraint
which explains which rules may be legitimately adopted.
Second, there is an epistemological concern: If there are such con-
straints, then the obvious question is how we could know that they are
being respected – how we could know, that is, that the rules we employ
are indeed legitimate. The question then becomes whether we can answer
this question without surrendering the subjective-constitutive strategy and
reintroducing the problem of inexplicable agreement.
The chapter is structured as follows: I begin (7.1) by motivating the idea
that there are objective constraints on what linguistic rules we may adopt
via a discussion of so-called ‘disharmonious’ rules. Next (7.2), I consider a
line of response advocated by Peacocke and (at one point) Boghossian, but
argue that this line is unavailable to an adherent of the linguistic approach
given how the commitments of this approach were articulated in Part A. I
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then (7.3) argue that the better response is to maintain that disharmonious
rules are not objectively bad – or more accurately: They are objectively
bad only in a pragmatic sense which is compatible with the linguistic ap-
proach. Finally, I articulate (7.4) and respond to (7.5) a remaining worry:
Namely that the linguistic approach is powerless to account for the fact
that it is possible, given a set of introduction rules to, in a sense, derive the
appropriate elimination rules.
7.1 The Problem of Disharmonious Rules
The most prevalent reason for supposing that there are objective, norma-
tive constraints on what linguistic rules we can adopt comes from the idea
that such rules can take the form of introduction and elimination rules
(cf. Gentzen 1935), and that we must require that introduction rules and
elimination rules are appropriately related – that they are, as it is said, in
harmony. Intuitively, the thought is that the elimination rules should allow
us to “get out” no more or less than we “put in” via the introduction rules.1
Unfortunately, harmony is by no means guaranteed. Most infamously,
there is Prior’s (1960) tonk connective, which is governed by the following
pair of introduction and elimination rules:
ϕ
Tonk-I:
ϕ tonk ψ
ϕ tonk ψ
Tonk-E:
ψ
The problem, of course, is that such disharmonious rules license inferences
which it seems plain that shouldn’t be licensed. Indeed, with the help of
these rules ‘any statement whatever may be inferred, in an analytically valid
way, from any other’ (Prior 1960: 38–9).
However, disharmonious rules may be problematic without having this
disastrous effect. Here is an example due to Michael Dummett:
1There have been several suggestions for pinning down this notion more precisely.
Steinberger (2011) provides a good introduction to the difficulties present here.
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A simple case would be that of a pejorative term, e.g. ‘Boche’. The
condition for applying the term to someone is that he is of German
nationality; the consequences of its application are that he is bar-
barous and more prone to cruelty than other Europeans. We should
envisage the connections in both directions as sufficiently tight as
to be involved in the very meaning of the word: neither could be
severed without altering its meaning. (1981: 454)
Although the rules for ‘boche’ do not automatically make all sentences of
the language assertible, it remains plausible that these rules are objectively
faulty (and not just for ethical reasons), since they, again, appear to license
inferences that aren’t truth-preserving.
The immediate problem for the linguistic approach, then, is that we
cannot, it seems, say merely that an inference is logically valid if it is licensed
by our linguistic rules; at the very least we must add the requirement that
the rules aren’t defective due to disharmony. But that raises the question of
how to explain this constraint, and we might well worry that the linguistic
approach lacks the resources to do so.
7.2 The Peacocke-Boghossian Response
An adherent of the linguistic approach has two broad options here: They
could argue that, contrary to appearances, disharmonious rules are not
objectively bad in the sense of allowing invalid inferences, or argue that
such rules can be banned for reasons that do not undermine the linguistic
approach. In this section I shall consider a suggestion for banning such rules
which, however, fails to satisfy this condition. To be clear: I shall not be
criticising the proposal as such, only arguing that it is incompatible with the
linguistic approach understood as a version of the subjective-constitutive
strategy.
It is frequently claimed that the tonk rules fail to pick out a genuine
meaning since there simply is no such connective. In fact, Prior himself
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offers this diagnosis:
There are in fact no contonktion-forming signs [. . . ]; and the infor-
mation that ‘tonk’, or anything else, is such a sign, is simply false.
‘Contonktion-forming sign’, like ‘present King of France’, is a per-
fectly clear description which applies to nothing whatever. (1964:
192)2
Now, if this suggestion is provided without any further story about when
and why proposed definitions do succeed in picking out genuine connectives
(and meanings more generally), then we are confronted with the kind of
conceptual Platonism that we have already established is incompatible with
the linguistic approach: If it is just a brute fact about some language-
antecedent conceptual domain that no meanings obey disharmonious rules,
then we would have to ask, first, how we know that this is so, and, second,
how we know that other (harmonious) rules always succeed in picking out
meanings. Briefly put: we would be confronted with the kind of agreement
problem which the linguistic approach is designed to dissolve.
Whether the suggestion that ‘tonk’ fails to pick out a genuine meaning
is of any use in this context will therefore depend on what the criteria for
picking out a genuine meaning are. A prominent contemporary suggestion
– advocated by Peacocke and, at one point, Boghossian – goes as follows:
On the approach I myself favour, the semantic value of a logical con-
stant is fixed as that function which makes truth-preserving those
transitions involving the constant which one who understands the
constant must find primitively (underivatively) compelling. This ap-
proach still leaves room for justification, for when a proposed logical
constant does have a sense, there will be a semantic value for which
its distinctive methods of inference are correct. This kind of jus-
tification is not vacuous, since there are some “rules” for which no
2Sider too advocates this diagnosis (2011: 103).
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truth-preserving semantic value can be given, and those for “tonk”
are amongst them. (Peacocke 1992: 803)3
For our purposes, however, this suggestion won’t do. The constraint that
the rules must be truth-preserving introduces precisely the kind of external
standard of correctness which we are crucially trying to avoid. Indeed, the
problem can be sharpened. For note that it is not just truth-preservation
as a matter of fact that is needed, but guaranteed truth-preservation. After
all, Peacocke would want to rule out a connective such as:
ϕ
Klonk-I:
ϕ klonk ψ
ϕ klonk ψ
Klonk-E: Snow is white
Since ‘snow is white’ is true, these rules are actually truth-preserving,4 and
so, if these are to be ruled out by invoking truth-preservation, it is clear
that guaranteed truth-preservation must set the bar. However, guaranteed
truth-preservation is just logical validity, and since this is something the
linguistic approach is meant to explain, the account would end up being
viciously circular.
The problem here is brought out quite clearly in the following passage
by Boghossian:
But we can readily see that there can be no consistent assignment
of truth value to sentences of the form ‘A tonk B’ given the intro-
duction and elimination rules for ‘tonk’. Given those rules, both
‘A→ A tonk B’ and ‘A tonk B→ B’ have to come out tautologous,
for any A or B. It is impossible to satisfy that demand. (2001: 32–3)
Thus, essentially, the linguistic rules cannot explain why tautologies are
tautologies; rather, the tautologies are invoked to explain why linguistic
rules are genuine linguistic rules.
3Cf. also Boghossian (2001: 33–4), although Boghossian offers a different account in
(2003a) and (2003b), and acknowledges the change of heart in (2008: 5).
4At least if we are willing to say that ‘ϕ klonk ψ’ is true if ‘ϕ’ is.
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7.3 Disharmony as a Pragmatic Problem
A more promising route, in the present context, is to argue that while
disharmonious rules are problematic, they are problematic for solely prag-
matic reasons. This would require us to both: i) explain why these rules
are not problematic in the non-pragmatic sense that they license invalid
inferences, and ii) explain what the pragmatic problem consists in. I shall
attempt these tasks in order.
Tolerating Tonk
With regard to (i), it will perhaps come as no surprise that we can use a
strategy which has been invoked several times already: Here too it is highly
relevant to point out that a change in our linguistic conventions must be
expected to affect the meaning of sentences in our language. It is, after
all, the primary purpose of the linguistic conventions to fix what sentences
mean.
This means that we cannot assume that sentences retain their customary
meanings if ‘tonk’ is introduced. As Dummett rightly points out:
When an expression, including a logical constant, is introduced into
a language, the rules for its use should determine its meaning, but
its introduction rules should not be allowed to affect the meanings of
sentences already in the language. If, by its means, it becomes possi-
ble for the first time to derive certain such sentences from other such
sentences, then either their meanings have changed, or those mean-
ings were not, after all, fully determined by the use made of them.
In either case, it will not be true that such a derivation demonstrates
that the conclusion holds good according to previously acknowledged
criteria. The introduction of a new constant has created new criteria
for the truth of statements not containing it. (1991: 220)
If, now, the meaning of a sentence such as ‘snow is green’ changes as a result
of adopting the tonk rules, we are not in a position to say that because these
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rules allow us to infer ‘snow is green’ from, say, ‘all humans are mortal’,
they fail to preserve truth. The reason is that we have been given no reason
to suppose that ‘snow is green’ is false in a language governed by such rules.
More recently, Jared Warren has offered a more detailed version of this
response. He insists that in order to show that ‘tonk’ constitutes anything
more than a pragmatic problem, we must rely on what he calls ‘the transla-
tion mistake’ – that is: ‘the mistake of being misled by superficial features
into thinking that a homophonic translation is appropriate when it is not’
(2015c: 8). Warren initially suggests that in the case of a community oper-
ating with the tonk rules, homophonic translation is strongly discouraged
due to charity considerations (2015c: 8). However, he later points to what
I agree is the more principled reason (which is also the reason given by
Dummett above): The inadequacy of homophonic translation follows nat-
urally from the very account of meaning for which tonk is supposed to be
a problem (2015c: 14).
The idea, after all, is that meaning is determined via rules which es-
tablish when sentences can be correctly asserted.5 Thus, if the rules are
changed so as to make it correct to utter a sentence in a circumstance
where it previously wouldn’t have been correct, then the meaning of this
sentence has changed. But this is precisely what adding ‘tonk’ does. In-
deed, a neat way of seeing this is to notice that the rule for tonk elimination
is also an introduction rule for sentences quite generally.
Moreover, by drawing on related ideas we can say more about exactly
how the content of a sentence changes when ‘tonk’ is introduced: It is nat-
ural to say, in this context, that what a sentence says is given by the range
of circumstances in which it would be correct to assert it (in accordance
with the rules which have been adopted). As Dummett puts it: ‘we know
what has been asserted when we know in what case the assertion is correct’
5Note that both introduction rules and elimination rules can be viewed in this light
– the elimination rules acting as licenses to assert other sentences. Note, also, that these
rules are presumably not all intra-linguistic.
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(1991: 166).6 Thus, for instance, I know that ‘snow is green’ says that snow
is green because I know that an assertion of this sentence would be correct
only if this is the case (this is how the sentence is capable of conveying this
information).
If we introduce ‘tonk’, however, we are allowing that ‘snow is green’
(and, indeed, any sentence of the language) could also be correctly asserted
in any circumstance which is such that at least one sentence of the language
gets classified as assertible. The upshot, then, is that once the rules for tonk
are adopted, all sentences of the language get the same meaning – they all
end up saying, basically: At least one sentence of this language is assertible.
Alternatively, each sentence can be read as a disjunction of everything that
was expressible prior to introducing ‘tonk’.7
Against this background we can in fact go beyond the claim that homo-
phonic translation is inappropriate when dealing with a language containing
‘tonk’, and make the case that the tonk rules are truth-preserving after all.
For the natural way to understand truth, on this conception – at least as
an initial approximation – is to say that a sentence is true if and only if it
would be correct to assert it – if, that is, the circumstances are such that
the rules we have adopted license uttering it.8 Crucially, this means that if
a language contains ‘tonk’ and at least one sentence of the language is true
(correctly assertible), then all sentences of the language are true.
Williamson makes the following comment about ‘tonk’ and truth-
preservation:
If assent to instances of those rules is necessary for understanding
them, because necessary for understanding ‘tonk,’ it hardly follows
6We can leave open, for our purposes, whether it must always be possible, in principle,
to recognise whether an assertion is correct.
7Thus, for instance, if the original language only contained ‘snow is white’ and ‘snow
is green’ (governed by the customary rules), these sentences would both end up saying
that snow is white or green once ‘tonk’ is introduced, since they would both end up being
assertible just in case snow is either white or green.
8Note that we may allow that an assertion could be correct in this sense even if it is
unjustified because the speaker does not have adequate grounds for believing that it can
be correctly uttered.
172
7.3. Disharmony as a Pragmatic Problem
that the rules are truth-preserving (in the context of someone who
understands ‘tonk’); they are so only if either every sentence or no
sentence of the language is true (including atomic sentences, in which
‘tonk’ does not occur). (2007: 79–80)
The response just offered admits that this is quite right, but adds that, due
to how the linguistic rules affect the semantics of the language, introducing
tonk has the effect of ensuring that either every sentence or no sentence of
the language is true.
Similar considerations apply to ‘boche’. Here the elimination rule simul-
taneously acts as an introduction rule for ‘x is barbarous’. Consequently, a
sentence like ‘Smith is barbarous’ does not retain its meaning when ‘boche’,
as Dummett understands it, is introduced.9 We are not forced, therefore,
to concede that the rules for ‘boche’ are objectively bad because they li-
cense inferences that are not truth-preserving. Indeed, since someone’s, say
Smith’s, being German is now sufficient to make an utterance of ‘Smith is
barbarous’ correct, the adherent of the linguistic approach should maintain
that this sentence now says, essentially, that Smith is either barbarous or
German – thus ensuring that the boche rules are truth-preserving.
It may be objected, perhaps, that this overlooks that our linguistic prac-
tices are interconnected with practices more broadly. It may be said, for
instance, that if it is correct to call someone ‘barbarous’, then this also
licenses treating them in certain ways, such as criticising or even punishing
them. And yet we should certainly object to the idea that we could make it
correct to criticise or punish every German person simply by adopting cer-
tain linguistic conventions. Thus, it might be said that the boche rules are
objectively bad after all, since they allow us to invalidly infer that someone
ought to be criticised or punished even if they don’t.
However, an adherent of the linguistic approach is well within their
rights to insist that we would be wrong to justify punishing or criticising
9I should say that I’m not convinced that ‘boche’, understood as strictly as Dummett
requires, is part of English.
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someone via a bare appeal to the boche rules. Even if it was initially
OK to infer, from the fact that ‘barbarous’ correctly applies to someone,
that they deserve some form of punishment, it should simply be insisted
that once ‘boche’ is introduced, ‘x is barbarous’ no longer has a meaning
which would make it OK to criticise or punish someone on the basis that
‘barbarous’ correctly applies to them. To think that it does would simply
be to make an ethical mistake.
Pragmatic Problems
I conclude, then, that the case of disharmonious rules does not force the
adherent of the linguistic approach to admit that some linguistic rules are
inadmissible due to licensing invalid inferences. It remains to show that
we have a plausible explanation of why such rules are nevertheless held to
be defective in some way. In the case of ‘tonk’ this is quite clear: It is
obviously a pragmatic disaster that all sentences of the language end up
being, essentially, devoid of content. We end up with a language in which
all sentences are assertible if at least one is, and so the expressive power of
the language will be next to nothing. This, however, does not generalise
to ‘boche’ which does not have such disastrous global effects. Is there
anything we can point to which suggests why these rules are nevertheless
pragmatically problematic?
I think there is. Consider again Dummett’s claim that ‘when an expres-
sion, including a logical constant, is introduced into a language, the rules
for its use should determine its meaning, but its introduction rules should
not be allowed to affect the meanings of sentences already in the language’.
Why, now, is this to be avoided? Well, plainly, it is likely to cause consid-
erable difficulties if we introduce new vocabulary in such a way that we are
forced us to revise our understanding of expressions whose meanings are
already, so to speak, “internalised”.
I am, for instance, accustomed to hearing ‘Smith is barbarous’ as a
claim about Smith’s character – as an assertion which is correct if and only
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if Smith is barbarous. If, now, ‘boche’ were to be introduced, then, we might
say, I would not be hearing this claim correctly. For now we are supposing
that Smith does not have to be barbarous in order for it to be correct to
assert this sentence. It might be correct to assert it simply because Smith is
German. Consequently, I would then have to train myself to hear ‘Smith is
barbarous’ as saying that Smith is either barbarous or German (these now
being the scenarios in which the sentence can be correctly uttered). It is
quite clear, as I see it, that we have good pragmatic reasons to try to avoid
situations like this (which is not to say, of course, that these reasons must
always be decisive).
7.4 Excessively Weak Elimination Rules
So far, I have argued that a plausible case can be made that: i) dishar-
monious linguistic conventions are not objectively mistaken in the sense of
allowing invalid inferences, and ii) the perceived defectiveness of such rules
can be explained in terms of pragmatic considerations.
However, this does not quite suffice to dispel the worry that there is
a significant problem for the linguistic approach in the vicinity. Up until
now, we have been concerned with cases where an elimination rule allows
us to make an inference that is not (on the face of it) justified by the
corresponding introduction rule – cases, that is, where the elimination rule
is too strong relative to the introduction rule. Another possibility, though,
is that the elimination rule might be too weak compared to the introduction
rule, and so fail to license inferences which appear to be perfectly justified
by the relevant introduction rule(s) (Steinberger 2011: 621).10
Perhaps it may be suggested that such cases do not pose a threat to
the linguistic approach. After all, the problem with ‘tonk’ and the like was
that the rules seemed to license objectively mistaken inferences, thereby
raising the question of whether logic places an antecedent constraint on
10In Dummett’s terminology a system in which the elimination rules are neither too
weak nor too strong is said to be stable (1991: 287).
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which rules may be legitimately adopted. If the elimination rules are too
weak, however, there is no danger of this happening, and this may lead
someone to say that such rules aren’t really that problematic. There is
nothing objectively wrong, it may be said, with speaking a language which
does not take full advantage of the deductive resources.
However, the problem which excessively weak elimination rules poses
for the linguistic approach cannot be so easily dismissed: Even if there is
nothing objectively wrong about employing such rules (which isn’t clear), we
are still left with a pressing question: When we say that an elimination rule
fails to take full advantage of the deductive resources in the corresponding
introduction rule, what explains why this is so? According to the linguistic
approach, after all, logical necessities and validities are to be explained in
terms of the linguistic rules, but here it seems that by hypothesis we are not
appealing to the linguistic rules since these are what is being criticised.
Suppose, for instance, that we are confronted with a language just like
English except that ‘and’ (which I shall hereafter call ‘and*’) is governed
by the following pair of rules:
ϕ ψ
And*-I:
ϕ and* ψ
ϕ and* ψ
And*-E: ϕ
In other words, ‘and*’ is governed by the same rules as our conjunction,
except that the elimination rule is asymmetric – allowing us only to infer
the first conjunct. The problem, now, is that it is extremely difficult to
resist the conclusion that the members of this linguistic community would be
completely justified, were they to also infer the truth of the second conjunct*
from a given conjunction*. This inference, we want to say, would be logically
valid for them. But, of course, their rules don’t license this, so what explains
this validity?
Put differently, the point is that Gentzen seems to be quite right when
he writes: ‘The introductions represent, as it were, the “definitions” of the
symbols concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in the final analy-
sis, than the consequences of these definitions.’ (1935: 295) How can an
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adherent of the linguistic approach account for the appearance of conse-
quence – the seeming correspondence between introduction rules and the
right elimination rules – here?
7.5 Explaining the Correspondence
One strategy open to an adherent of the linguistic approach is to argue
that since the rules for and* were introduced in a language, the relationship
between the introduction rule and the (proper) elimination rules could be
explained by appealing to the linguistic conventions of the language in which
they were introduced. However, I shall be considering a response along
different lines: In what follows I shall argue that the “correspondence”
between introduction and elimination rules – when the character of these
rules are properly understood – effectively takes care of itself.
The Need for Bounds
The first thing to note is that it is in fact false that we can determine the
appropriate elimination rules once we are given the introduction rules. We
also need the information that these are all the introduction rules.
This point is quite uncontroversial, but it may be helpful to consider an
example: Suppose we are told that some connective ‘#’ is governed by the
following introduction rule:
ϕ ψ#-I:
ϕ # ψ
If we are asked what the corresponding elimination rule is, it would in-
deed be natural to suggest, essentially, a notational variant of conjunction
elimination. And we might argue for this as follows:
#-I tells us that in order to reach the conclusion that ‘ϕ # ψ’
is assertible we should have to go via a step at which both ‘ϕ’
and ‘ψ’ are established to be assertible. So, if we are confronted
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with an assertion of ‘ϕ # ψ’, and we suppose that it has been
reached in a legitimate way, then we should be in a position to
assert both ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’.11
This reasoning, however, patently relies on the assumption that what we
have been given is the only route to asserting ‘ϕ # ψ’. For suppose, now,
that we are told that there is also a further introduction rule:
Snow is white#-I2: ϕ # ψ
Clearly, our suggested elimination rule would now be quite unwarranted,
and the general lesson is neither controversial nor difficult to spot: In order
to form an adequate conception of the proper elimination rule(s), we need a
conception of everything that is regarded as a sufficient ground for asserting
a sentence of the relevant kind, and that is to say that we need to know all
the introduction rules and that these are all the introduction rules – or as
I shall say: We need a bounded conception of these rules.
Inferentialism and Natural Language
The next thing I want to draw attention to is that there is in fact a slight
awkwardness in transferring talk about introduction and elimination rules
from the context of a formal proof-system to the context of natural language
like English.
In the context of a formal system, after all, it is quite sensible to lay
down, say, that the introduction rule for conjunction is:
ϕ ψ
ϕ ∧ ψ
and maintain that this should be understood, quite rigidly, as saying that a
conjunction can be asserted (or written down) if and only if both conjuncts
11More accurately, the argument establishes that this rule could be justified on the
basis of #-I; it does not quite suffice to establish that this is the strongest rule that could
be so justified.
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are already asserted (written down at the earlier stage). This allows for a
straightforward decision procedure when it comes to assessing whether a
conjunctive sentence has been asserted in accordance with the rules or not:
We simply check whether we find both conjuncts at the previous stage.
However, this is plainly not the introduction rule that governs conjunc-
tion in natural languages, as is clear from the fact that we cannot check
whether a conjunctive claim has been correctly asserted by checking whether
the conjuncts have already been asserted. After all, I might well be assert-
ing a conjunction in accordance with the rules of English even if neither
I nor anyone else have ever asserted the conjuncts. Nor should we say, I
think, that strictly speaking the rule is that both conjuncts must already
be asserted, but that we are tacitly allowing a short-cut whereby we can
assert a conjunction when we realise that we could have taken the trouble
to assert the conjuncts first. What reason is there for saying that this is
a short-cut with regard to the rule we use as opposed to simply being the
rule we use?
I am not, of course, suggesting that those who advocate inferentialism
as an account of natural language semantics disagree with this. My point is
just that, unlike in the case of a formal proof-system, the introduction rule
for conjunction in natural language cannot be: a conjunction is assertible
if both conjuncts are asserted; it must be something like: a conjunction
is assertible if both conjuncts are assertible – that is to say: ‘ϕ and ψ’ is
assertible if ‘ϕ’ is assertible and ‘ψ’ is assertible.
An analogous observation pertains to elimination rules. The fact that
someone (either me or someone else) has uttered the conjunction ‘snow is
white and grass is purple’ does not make it correct for me to utter ‘grass
is purple’. The utterance of this sentence might be mistaken even if the
conjunction has been asserted because it does not follow that the conjunc-
tion was in fact (correctly) assertible.12 In other words: it is not a rule of
English that ‘ψ’ can be asserted if ‘ϕ and ψ’ has been asserted. What is
12Someone who infers a (false) conjunct from a (mistaken) conjunction may of course
be blameless, in a certain sense, but we still don’t treat this as a correct utterance.
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arguably a rule is that ‘ψ’ can be asserted if ‘ϕ and ψ’ is assertible.
This is not to deny that the inference from ‘ϕ and ψ’ to ‘ψ’ is quite
correct. The point I am making concerns, rather, how this inferential matter
can be said to inform our conception of how to use the sentences involved,
and what I am stressing is that, in a natural language context, correctly
asserting a sentence cannot be equated with correctly inferring it.
Based on this, I maintain that if we are to transfer talk about intro-
duction and elimination rules from the context of a proof-system to the
context of natural language semantics, then these should be understood as
regulating assertibilities rather than assertions: Such rules govern relations
of assertibility between sentences quite independently of whether they are
actually asserted. On the introduction side of things, they tell us how the
assertibility of a sentence can be established on the basis of the assertibility
of other sentences; on the elimination side, they tell us how the assertibility
of the sentence can be unpacked into the assertibility of other sentences.
This, we may note, somewhat blurs the distinction between an inferen-
tialist and a truth-conditional treatment of the logical constants. Indeed,
these essentially coincide if, in accordance with what as said in the previ-
ous section, we understand truth to be a matter of making assertions in
accordance with the rules. For to say, e.g., that a conjunction is assertible
if both conjuncts are assertible, is then to say that a conjunction is true if
both conjuncts a true. However, this is, I maintain, entirely appropriate.
It would be a weakness of the inferentialist account if it didn’t allow us to
recover something in the vicinity of the truth-conditional clauses.
Excessively Weak Elimination Rules Again
We can now return to our initial problem. The question was how to account
for the fact, made vivid by excessively weak elimination rules in particular,
that the elimination rules can generally be seen as consequences of the
introduction rules (and, of course, vice versa). That is, the introduction
rules appear to suffice to guarantee that certain other inferences are truth-
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preserving, and the linguistic approach seems ill-equipped to explain this.
The solution is to point out that this problem vanishes once we both:
i) recognise that this is only true if our conception of the introduction
rules is bounded, and ii) understand the rules as regulating assertibilities as
just argued. The crucial point is that if the rules are understood in terms
of assertibility, then there is no difference between setting a bound on the
introduction rules and establishing elimination rules. Take the introduction
rule for conjunction:
(A) ‘ϕ and ψ’ is assertible if ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’ are assertible.
Turning this into a bounded introduction rule is, in effect, to replace it with:
(B) ‘ϕ and ψ’ is assertible if and only if ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’ are assertible.
But going from (A) to (B) is plainly equivalent to adopting, in addition to
(A), the elimination rule:
(C) If ‘ϕ and ψ’ is assertible, then both ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’ are assertible.
Now, it may be asked if this isn’t just a matter of deriving the elimination
rule from the bounded introduction rule (in accordance with the logic which
governs the conditionals here), and whether it isn’t precisely this entailment
which an adherent of the linguistic approach would struggle to explain.
This, however, would be to misunderstand the point I’m making. First,
as mentioned, it is open to an adherent of the linguistic approach to point
out that when the rules are explicitly formulated like this, we can presum-
ably rely on the linguistic conventions of the metalanguage to explain how
(C) follows from (B) should we want to.
The point I am making here, however, is that if we turn our focus
away from matters having to do with the formulation of the rules, and just
consider what it would it would be like for rules like these to actually be
implemented in linguistic practices, then the whole question of justifying
elimination rules on the basis of introduction rules disappears. The reason
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is that once the rules are understood to be governing assertibility relations,
we cannot even make the required distinction between adopting a bounded
introduction rule and adopting the “right” elimination rule.
To see this, let us return to the and* rules presented above. My claim is
that if we imagine a community who goes by And*-I, and who: i) treats this
rule as governing relations of assertibility, and ii) does not treat sentences
of the form ‘ϕ and* ψ’ as assertible in any other circumstances, then we are
automatically imagining a linguistic community which treats ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’ as
assertible whenever ‘ϕ and* ψ’ is assertible – a linguistic community, that is,
which goes by the “correct” elimination rule. It makes no sense to suppose
that they go by the weaker rule And*-E, since the bounded introduction rule
already ensures that situations in which the treat ‘ϕ and* ψ’ as a correct
assertion are situations in which they treat both ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’ as correct
assertions. There is, therefore, no question of them having to derive the
right elimination rules; they are already built in.
Fundamentally, the point is that once we drop the requirement that
the assertions actually have to be made, we lose the “directionality” which
allows us to even make a proper distinction between introduction and elim-
ination here. Indeed, it becomes misleading to talk about two different
kinds of rules at all, as opposed to a single underlying correlation between
the assertibility of certain sentences and certain conditions being fulfilled.
The introduction aspect tells us that if the conditions are satisfied, then the
sentence can be correctly asserted, whereas the elimination aspect tells us
that if the sentence is correctly asserted, then the conditions are satisfied.
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Conventions and Consequences
In this chapter, I consider various versions of the worry that the linguis-
tic approach must assume – and therefore leave unexplained – a non-
conventional consequence relation in order to account for how we get from
a (presumably finite) set of initial linguistic conventions to all the necessary
truths that need explaining.
I begin (8.1), by discussing the famous Quine-Carroll regress argument.
This argument is frequently thought to show that unless some notion of
logical consequence is taken for granted, any linguistic convention will be
“logically inert” in a way which makes it impossible to explain how finitely
many conventions could give rise to infinitely many logical necessities. I
argue that – as Quine himself acknowledged – the argument does not suffice
to establish this. In the course of doing so, I shall attempt to clear up some
of the confusion that surrounds this argument in the literature, where there
is surprisingly little agreement as to just what its scope is.
In section 8.2, I consider a related argument, prominently articulated
by Dummett, which suggests that an adherent of the linguistic approach
faces an unpalatable choice between appealing to an unexplained notion of
consequence and surrendering the notion of a rationally compelling proof.
I argue that this dilemma – at least as initially formulated – can be avoided
via an unconsidered alternative.
As Dummett himself stresses, however, the true force of this dilemma
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emerges only against the background of Wittgenstein’s “rule-following con-
siderations”. Although this Wittgensteinian theme raises issues that go
well beyond anything that can be satisfactorily dealt with here, I shall ar-
gue (8.3) that a decent case can be made that an adherent of the linguistic
approach can and should accept the lessons of Wittgenstein’s arguments.
8.1 The Quine-Carroll Regress
In this section I shall proceed as follows: After articulating the regress
argument, I consider the standard response (suggested by Quine himself),
namely to allow linguistic conventions to be implicitly adopted. What is
puzzling about this response, however, is that some commentators have
found it quite unclear how this move could be of any help – indeed, they have
found it quite clear that it is of no help. Leaving this puzzle unresolved for
the time being, I move on to another suggested response: allowing linguistic
conventions to take the form of inference rules. Here too, however, we find
that whereas some tout this as a solution, others appear to find it obvious
that this move is futile. I then argue that the proper response to the regress
argument involves combining elements from both these ideas, and suggest
that the lack of agreement in the literature is due to the fact that this has
not been sufficiently appreciated.
The Regress Argument
In section II of ‘Truth by Convention’ (Quine 1936),1 Quine considers
whether the method of “postulation”, whereby we assign truth-values to
sentences by stipulation, could be said to make propositional logic true by
1This paper is frequently grouped together with Quine (1951) and (1960a) as a paper
in which Quine straightforwardly attacks Carnap’s views (cf. e.g. Becker 2012: ch. 1).
However, Richard Creath has argued (to my mind persuasively) that this is mistaken,
and that the earlier paper is ‘a request for further clarification’, which is ‘done in the
spirit of a friendly amendment to Carnap’s work.’ (1987: 478) Quine himself said of
‘Truth by Convention’ that it ‘already bore the seeds of [his] apostasy’ (1985: 121–2; cf.
also 1986: 16).
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convention. He observes (1936: 107) that since there are infinitely many
theorems of propositional logic, we cannot achieve this by postulating each
theorem individually. Instead we must ‘avail ourselves of conditions finite
in length which determine infinite classes of expressions.’ (1936: 107)
Initially, Quine remarks, optimistically, that ‘such conditions are ready
at hand’ (1936: 107), and proposes the following three conventions:
(I) Let all results of putting a statement for ‘p’, a statement for ‘q’, and
a statement for ‘r ’ in ‘If if p then q then if if q then r then if p then
r ’ be true. (1936: 108)2
(II) Let any expression be true which yields a truth when put for ‘q’ in
the result of putting a truth for ‘p’ in ‘If p then q’. (1936: 108)
(III) Let all results of putting a statement for ‘p’ and a statement for ‘q’
in ‘If p then if ¬p then q’ or ‘If if ¬p then p, then p’, be true. (1936:
110; ‘∼’ replaced with ‘¬’)
In more standard (and less horrible) terminology: (I) introduces the axiom
schema ‘(p → q) → ((q → r) → (p → r))’, (II) introduces modus ponens,
and (III) introduces the two axiom schemas ‘p → (¬p → q)’ and ‘(¬p →
p)→ p’.
In the third section of the paper, however, Quine adopts a more critical
approach. This is where he introduces the regress argument:
In the adoption of the very conventions (I)–(III), etc., whereby logic
itself is set up, however, a difficulty remains to be faced. Each of
these conventions is general, announcing the truth of every one of an
infinity of statements conforming to a certain description; derivation
of the truth of any specific statement from the general convention
thus requires a logical inference, and this involves us in an infinite
regress. (1936: 120)
Before explaining in detail just how the regress is generated, Quine informs
us that ‘for present purposes’, it will be simpler to rewrite (II) as:
2The formulation has been altered to mention the relevant sentence schema explicitly.
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(II′) No matter what x may be, no matter what y may be, no matter what
z may be, if x and z are true [statements] and z is the result of putting
x for ‘p’ and ‘y’ for ‘q’ in ‘If p then q’ then y is to be true. (1936: 103;
square brackets in original)
This, though, is somewhat cumbersome, so I suggest that we simplify it as
follows:
(II*) For all sentences x, y and z, if x and y are true, and y is a conditional
sentence with x as its antecedent and z as its consequent, then z is
also true.
Suppose, now, that we have already established the following:
(i) A is true.
(ii) B is true.
(iii) B is a conditional sentence which has A as its antecedent, and C as
its consequent.
And the aim is to use (II*) to get from (i)–(iii) to:
(iv) C is true.
Let us concede, for the sake of argument, that we can use universal instan-
tiation on (II*) to get:
(1) If A and B are true, and B is a conditional sentence with A as its
antecedent and C as its consequent, then C is also true.
And let us also concede that we can use conjunction introduction to render
(i)–(iii) as:
(2) A and B are true, and B is a conditional sentence with A as its
antecedent and C as its consequent.
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Now, clearly, we can infer (iv) from (1) and (2) using modus ponens. How-
ever, the whole point of the task we are now engaged in is to show how
(II*) is actually responsible for licensing this move. Thus, we need to show
how (II*) allows us to get from (1) and (2) to (iv). But this task, as Quine
points out, is ‘exactly analogous to our original task’ (1936: 104). That is
to say, we are now charged with the task of showing how (II*) allows us to
get from:
(i′) (1) is true.
(ii′) (2) is true.
(iii′) (2) is a conditional sentence which has (1) as its antecedent, and (iv)
as its consequent.
to:
(iv′) (iv) is true.
We are thus faced with an instance of the same problem we started out with,
and a little reflection reveals that there is indeed an infinite regress here:
If we did try to make it explicit how (II*) allows us to get from (i′)–(iii′)
to (iv′), we would merely discover that yet another instance of essentially
the same task needs to be carried out. It appears, then, that adopting
convention (II*) ‘gets us nowhere, very slowly’ (Hale 2013: 119).
As Quine suggests in a footnote (1936: 121), the regress here is es-
sentially that pointed out by Lewis Carroll in ‘What the Tortoise Said to
Achilles’ (1895). The point, however, is that it takes on a particular sig-
nificance in the context of the linguistic approach: The question isn’t just
whether we can avoid the regress, but whether we can do so without sur-
rendering this approach in the process.
Implicit Conventions
Quine himself suggested one strategy for doing so:
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It may be held that we can adopt conventions through behaviour,
without first announcing them in words; and that we can return and
formulate our conventions verbally afterward, if we choose, when a
full language is at our disposal. [. . . ] So conceived, the conventions
no longer involve us in a vicious regress. Inference from general
conventions is no longer demanded initially, but remains to the sub-
sequent sophisticated stage where we frame general statements of
the conventions and show how various specific conventional truths,
used all along, fit into the general conventions as thus formulated.
(1936: 123)3
Although Quine worried that ‘in dropping the attributes of deliberateness
and explicitness from the notion of linguistic convention we risk depraving
the latter of any explanatory force’ (1936: 106), more recent writers have
tended to think that Quine was overly pessimistic here. A prevalent atti-
tude in the contemporary literature, therefore, is that as long as we accept
(as we should presumably want to accept anyway) that some linguistic con-
ventions are initially adopted implicitly through behaviour, then the regress
argument can pretty much be set to one side.4
What is puzzling, however, is that a competing strand in the literature
holds that appealing to implicit conventions achieves nothing at all in this
context. Hale, for instance, writes that ‘Quine ought not have so read-
ily conceded that his regress can be avoided by retreat into inexplicitness’
(2013: 126), and elaborates on this as follows:
Resort to some inexplicit analogue of explicit stipulation – some sort
of communal agreement to treat the relevant sentences as immune
to revision – would still run foul of the problem of finitude. For we
3Quine reiterates that the regress argument only targets explicit conventions in
(1960a: 357) and again in (1969).
4Richard Creath (1987; 2003), Paul Syverson (2003), Jody Azzouni (2014) and Jared
Warren (2017) all take this line, typically citing the work of David Lewis (1969) as
contributing to rehabilitate the notion of an implicit convention. Quine too concedes
that Lewis’s work addresses his earlier concerns about this notion (1969).
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would still have, at best, only finitely many direct guarantees of con-
ventional truth, and any attempt to provide, for the infinite remain-
der by appeal to logical consequence would serve only to highlight
further as yet unconventionalized necessities (Dummett’s point), or
would degenerate into an infinite regress (Quine’s). (2013: 127)
The puzzle is not just that Hale disagrees with the claim that the regress can
be avoided by appealing to implicit conventions, but that, on his reading, it
is quite mysterious why anyone would even think so in the first place. The
explicit/implicit issue appears quite orthogonal from the central problem of
getting infinitely many necessities from finitely many conventions.
Some of Quine’s remarks related to this adds to the puzzlement. Having
presented the regress, he writes:
Alternatively the difficulty which appears thus as a self-
presupposition of doctrine can be framed as turning upon a self-
presupposition of primitives. It is supposed that the if -idiom, the
not-idiom, the every-idiom, and so on, mean nothing to us initially,
and that we adopt conventions (I)–(VII) by way of circumscribing
their meaning; and the difficulty is that communication of (I)–(VII)
themselves depend upon the free use of those very idiom which
we are attempting to circumscribe, and can succeed only if we are
already conversant with the idioms. (1936: 104)
This certainly does suggest a reason why relying solely on explicit conven-
tions will be doomed to failure: In order to understand the explicit conven-
tions, we need to already understand the relevant language – including any
logical expressions that figure in those conventions. Since, now, we cannot
avoid employing such expressions here, this route is closed off.
This is certainly very plausible, but it is puzzling why Quine would
invoke anything as complicated as the regress argument to make this point.
It is quite obvious, after all, that we cannot, in general, rely solely on explicit
conventions: We cannot teach someone their first language by telling them
what the linguistic conventions are. As Richard Creath puts it: ‘Quine’s
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claim would be little more than an instance of the more general truth that
without a language you cannot say much of anything.’ (2003: 248)
The suggested appeal to implicit conventions thus leaves us with a num-
ber of puzzles: Just what is the relevant difference between implicit and
explicit conventions supposed to be? Why is there so little agreement as
to whether this response is successful? And how does the regress argument
go beyond the fairly mundane point that the use of the logical constants
cannot be taught explicitly to someone who knows no such expressions?
We get a better understanding of these issues, I believe, by looking at a
different response to the regress argument.
Conditional Legislations and General Dispositions
As mentioned, Quine’s regress is a close cousin of that of Lewis Carroll. So,
given that a standard diagnosis of what goes wrong in Carroll’s dialogue
is that the Tortoise is failing (perhaps deliberately) to draw the distinction
between premises and rules of inference (cf. e.g. Clark 2007: 97–9), it is
natural to ask whether Quine’s regress can be avoided if we appeal, not
just to postulation of truth, but also to linguistic conventions that license
rules of inference. This, effectively, is Theodore Sider’s line of thought when
he suggests that someone who wants to avoid the regress might appeal to
‘conditional legislations’ – where such a legislation ‘results in its being the
case that if certain sentences are true by convention, then so is a certain
further sentence.’ (2011: 100)
Again, however, the literature on the subject is puzzling. First of all, it
appears that Quine does consider precisely this idea. His convention (II),
after all, was:
(II) Let any expression be true which yields a truth when put for ‘q’ in
the result of putting a truth for ‘p’ in ‘If p then q’.
This is a pain to read, but what it says is that whenever we have two
sentences such that one is a conditional and one is the antecedent of that
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conditional, and both these sentences are true, then we are to assign True
to the consequent of this conditional as well. Isn’t this precisely the kind
of convention that Sider is proposing? And if so, how could it possibly be
a way of avoiding the regress?
Indeed, others have read Quine’s regress as targeting precisely the sug-
gestion that Sider offers as a response. Hale, for instance, sees Quine’s
argument as torpedoing the idea that we could get infinitely many logical
truths from finitely many conventions by ‘conventionalizing the means of
deduction’ (2013: 119) – for instance by including the rule of modus ponens
as a convention. Again we see that there is surprisingly little agreement as
to just what the regress argument shows and how it is meant to work.
Here, however, Quine must take some of the blame. For although his
convention (II) is in the form of a ‘conditional legislation’ (i.e. inference
rule), there is a rather suspicious transition in the move from (II) to (II′),
and, in particular, to his instruction, when presenting the regress, that we
are to ‘take (II′) as a premiss’ (1936: 120; my emphasis).5 This is markedly
different from what seemed to be the initial instruction in (II). We are not
told, as before, to distribute truth-values in accordance with (II), but to
assign the truth-value True to (II′) itself. We may say that whereas (II)
was introduced as a postulation – an instruction as to how to distribute
truth-values – (II′) is to be treated as a postulate – a sentence which is
stipulated to be true.
In the end, then, convention (II) is simply not treated as a conditional
legislation, and so the appearance that Quine considers such legislations
is largely illusory. Still, this is not quite to show that the regress can be
avoided. For it may be said that the proper lesson of Quine’s argument is
that we cannot really adopt such (general) conditional legislations unless
some background logic is already in place. Thus, Hale writes:
Our convention corresponding to modus ponens is, and has to be,
general. To apply it, we must make some inferences. In this case,
5Carlo Giannoni also criticises Quine on these grounds (1971: 60).
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besides observing that a truth results from substituting q for B and
some truth p for A in A → B, we must infer from our general con-
vention that if a truth results from putting q for B and p for A in
A → B, then q has to be true, and thence infer (by modus ponens
once again) that q is to be true. Since these inferences must them-
selves be accorded the same or similar treatment, we can never get
to first base. (2013: 120)
In other words: to really adopt a functioning modus ponens rule, we would
have to adopt a general convention that is applicable in infinitely many
cases, but in order to do this we already need some logic.6
However, this passages trades on an ambiguity with regard to generality.
It is true that there is a good sense in which the modus ponens convention
must be general, and it is also true that if adopting modus ponens involves
coming to accept a general – in the sense of ‘universally quantified’ – claim
of the form ‘For all sentences, if so-and-so, then infer so-and-so’, then infer-
ences are needed both in order to apply it to a specific case and in order to
move from the antecedent to the consequent. It is not true, however, that
adopting a general convention must involve accepting a universally quanti-
fied claim (even implicitly), as opposed to acquiring a general disposition
to treat certain sentences as assertible in certain contexts – at least there
is nothing in the regress argument which rules this out.
Nor do I think we should want to rule it out, since we should then have
to deny, e.g., that a child could implicitly adopt a general convention to call
red objects ‘red’, unless she has already mastered modus ponens and the
rule for eliminating the universal quantifier (we may in fact suppose that
the child has not learned to use either quantifiers or conditionals). Even if
we, if asked to make explicit the convention that the child has mastered,
might say that she has internalised the instruction: ‘For all objects x, if x is
6Hale’s way of putting it suggests that even if we did adopt a general modus ponens
convention, there would still be the issue of how to apply it. I prefer to say that this
casts doubt on whether such a convention could be adopted at all since it is unclear what
it would be to adopt such a rule without proceeding to make correct applications of it.
I shall return to this issue when discussing the rule-following considerations below.
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red, then ‘red’ can be predicated of x ’, this is not to say that she, in order
to apply this rule, must first infer, by universal elimination, an instance of
this sentence, and then use modus ponens to arrive at the consequent.
More generally, the point is that the regress does not really get a grip
if we allow that adopting a linguistic convention could amount to implic-
itly acquiring a general disposition, since we have been given no reason to
suppose that exercising a general disposition on a particular occasion must
be a matter of logical inference: ‘The sense in which the truth of individual
logical truths “follows from” conventions is not the same as that in which
the consequent of a logically true conditional follows from the antecedent.’
(Tennant 1987: 88)7
Conclusions Regarding the Quine-Carroll Regress
Quine was therefore entirely right to make the concession that he did: There
is nothing in the regress argument which rules out the idea that finitely
many conventions could give rise to infinitely many logical necessities, pro-
vided that adopting a linguistic convention could amount to something like
implicitly acquiring a general disposition with regard to language-use.
Moreover, we can now say more about why there is so little agreement
as to whether making the conventions implicit is of any help in this context.
For although those, like Hale, who deny this are right that we do not avoid
the regress merely by making the conventions implicit, they are wrong more
generally insofar as they fail to see that by allowing implicit conventions
we open the door to the idea that adopting a linguistic convention could
amount to acquiring a general disposition through behaviour.
Thus Hale is correct that if our focus is on ‘conventional assignments
of truth to complete sentences’, it does not much matter whether this is
understood to be carried out explicitly or implicitly (2013: 126–7): Since
we can only do this for finitely many sentences, it won’t get us to infinitely
many logical truths, and, as the regress make vivid, it doesn’t help if these
7Cf. also A. Miller (2014).
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sentences themselves are universal claims. The importance of allowing lin-
guistic conventions to be implicitly adopted emerges only when we conceive
of these in terms of general dispositions. For now it makes a big difference
whether we are meant to conceive of adopting a convention in terms of
agreeing to a sentence which captures the relevant disposition, or whether
we are just meant to acquire the disposition through training.
So, taking Quine’s convention (II) as an example, the idea isn’t that
we might implicitly accept this sentence, but that we might implicitly align
our linguistic behaviour with (II): We might simply start treating any sen-
tence which constitutes the consequent of a true conditional with a true
antecedent as itself being true, and so acquire a general disposition which
would result in us making inferences in accordance with modus ponens.
Now, I should say that this is primarily intended as an in principle coun-
terexample to the regress argument. I do not think that this is the account
that an adherent of the linguistic approach should give about either modus
ponens in particular or propositional logic more generally. First, I doubt
that our dispositions are as straightforward as this (sometimes we are dis-
posed to reason according to modus tollens rather than modus ponens).
Second, and more importantly, I do not think that an adherent of the lin-
guistic approach should be focusing on postulation of truth (either directly
or conditionally); the linguistic conventions that are implicitly adopted are
more plausibly construed as establishing relations of assertibility between
sentences as outlined in the previous chapter.
Still, it is crucial to show that the regress can be avoided, since it would
otherwise be very natural to suppose that any version of the linguistic ap-
proach would have to fall victim to it. Moreover, the key to avoiding the
regress – namely the appeal to general dispositions – figures prominently in
what I take to be the most promising version of the linguistic approach as
well.
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8.2 Explaining Consequences
The regress argument provides one possible route to the conclusion that no
finite set of linguistic conventions could account for infinitely many logical
truths, and I have argued that this route is unsuccessful. This, though, is
not to say that there are no problems in the vicinity: One especially natural
worry is that even if we assume that an initial set of conventions can give
rise to further necessities/validities, this would still be a problem for the
adherent of the linguistic approach, since they would be powerless to explain
the status of this very entailment. Roughly put: if it said that adopting
such-and-such conventions commits us to so-and-so, then the natural follow-
up is (of course): ‘And what explains that?’ with the insinuation that the
linguistic approach here reaches a dead end.
In this section I approach this issue via a dilemma articulated by Dum-
mett (1959). Although Dummett’s discussion eventually draws on Wittgen-
stein’s ‘rule-following considerations’, the dilemma is initially presented in
a more näıve form. Since this näıve form of the dilemma embodies an ob-
jection which many have found to be convincing in its own right, I shall
postpone bringing in the rule-following considerations to section 8.3, and
first discuss the dilemma as initially presented.
Dummett’s Dilemma
Dummett’s dilemma centres around the question: Do our linguistic conven-
tions have consequences? If the adherent of the linguistic approach denies
this, she is, in Dummett’s terminology, a ‘full-blooded conventionalist’; if
she affirms it, she is a ‘modified conventionalist’. The problem is that nei-
ther position is satisfactory.
The following example will help to illustrate the difference between mod-
ified and full-blooded conventionalism as well as the difficulties faced by
each:8 Let us suppose that an adherent of the linguistic approach holds
8This example is not found in Dummett (1959), but is used by Jared Warren (2017)
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that both modus ponens:
ϕ ϕ→ ψ
MP:
ψ
and conditional proof :
(i)ϕ
..CP: .
ψ
(i)
ϕ→ ψ
are valid rules of inference because these rules are directly adopted as lin-
guistic conventions, thereby (partly) circumscribing the meaning of the ma-
terial conditional.
Now consider another rule of inference featuring only the conditional,
namely hypothetical syllogism:
ϕ→ ψ ψ → χ
HS: ϕ→ χ
The question which divides the modified and the full-blooded convention-
alist is: Did we already commit to (HS) when we adopted (MP) and (CP)?
The modified conventionalist says yes. The validity of (HS) is a consequence
of (MP) and (CP), so having accepted these two, we have no choice but to
admit that (HS) is a valid rule of inference. The full-blooded conventionalist
on the other hand, will say that accepting (HS) is a new convention and not
a consequence of (MP) and (CP). Nothing about the acceptance of (MP)
and (CP) forces us to accept (HS); this, rather, involves a new stipulation
which further circumscribes the meaning of the material conditional, thus
modifying the concept (cf. Dummett 1959: 333).
It is not difficult to see why someone who approaches this issue with
a standard conception of proof in mind would be troubled by full-blooded
conventionalism. If the full-blooded conventionalist is right, we are never
forced to accept the conclusion of a proof; there is always an element of
in a discussion of the regress argument.
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choice. Dummett thought (controversially) that Wittgenstein was prepared
to accept this conclusion, but Dummett was not prepared to do so himself:
It seems extraordinarily difficult to take this idea seriously when
we think of some particular actual proof. It may of course be said
that this is because we have already accepted the proof and thereby
subjected our concepts to the modification which acceptance of the
proof involved; but the difficulty of believing Wittgenstein’s account
of the matter while reading the proof of some theorem with which
one was not previously familiar is just as great. (1959: 333)9
Now, it is important to be clear about what is and is not being claimed
here. The full-blooded conventionalism can presumably accept that, phe-
nomenologically speaking, we often find proofs to be compelling.10 They
will deny, however, that proofs are rationally compelling. Thus, even if it
may well be the case that I cannot resist accepting a step in a proof, the
full-blooded conventionalist will say that I would not have made a mistake
if I had refused to accept it. To use a helpful analogy suggested by Crispin
Wright (1990: 95): We can acknowledge that we are often phenomenologi-
cally compelled to find a situation funny while maintaining that we would
not be “getting the world wrong” if we didn’t.
The crucial claim, then, is that, according to the full-blooded conven-
tionalist, we are never rationally compelled to accept a given step in a proof.
But as Dummett points out in a later paper on the subject (Dummett 1993):
A conception of proof which denies that proofs are rationally compelling
is hardly a conception of proof at all. Thus, full-blooded conventionalism
‘can make our linguistic practices the whole source of necessity and of truth
only by discrediting those practices, and, indeed, the concepts of necessity
and truth themselves: that is its incoherence.’ (1993: 457)11
9Indeed, in a later paper Dummett uses considerations like this to ‘conclude that the
celebrated “rule-following considerations” embody a huge mistake’ (1993: 460).
10At least Wittgenstein does accept this in places (1978: Part III, §55) – although
there are also places where he appears to deny it (1978: Part IV, §30).
11Note, however, that in this paper, Dummett uses the label ‘full-blown internalism’
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The problem for modified conventionalism, on the other hand, is that
it appeals to resources which it cannot account for, namely a convention-
independent notion of consequence:
This account is entirely superficial and throws away all the advan-
tages of conventionalism, since it leaves unexplained the status of
the assertion that certain conventions have certain consequences. It
appears that if we adopt the conventions registered by the axioms,
together with those registered by the principles of inference, then we
must adhere to the way of talking embodied in the theorem; and this
necessity must be one imposed upon us, one that we meet with. It
cannot itself express the adoption of a convention; the account leaves
no room for any further such convention. (Dummett 1959: 328–9;cf.
also 1993: 460)12
Note that the problem with modified conventionalism, as Dummett here
presents it here, is apparently disconnected from Wittgenstein’s rule-
following considerations. Indeed, Dummett has yet to bring these into the
discussion, and when he does bring them in, their role is, initially, to explain
why anyone (Wittgenstein, he thinks) would ever embrace full-blooded con-
ventionalism.
The dilemma, then, as it is initially formulated, is this: The adherent
of the linguistic approach owes us an explanation of why it is that (HS)
follows from (MP) and (CP). However, if they say, with the full-blooded
conventionalist, that is is due to some further convention, then they under-
mine the very notion of proof which they are trying to account for; and if
they say, with the modified conventionalist, that this is due to something
else, then they have abandoned the idea that necessities are to be explained
in terms of linguistic conventions.
instead of ‘full-blooded conventionalism’ – presumably because he is writing for a volume
on Putnam.
12This objection has been made by many, including Ewing (1940: 237; 1951: 34–4),
Putnam (1979: 424), Stroud (1981: 234), Wright (1980: 348), Baker (1988: 235), and
Juhl and Loomis (2010: 187).
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A Neglected Alternative
However, this dilemma is too quick in that it overlooks an alternative. To
see this, let us consider how an exchange between Carnap (in his syntax
period)13 and Dummett on this topic might go: Continuing our above ex-
ample, Carnap proposes a formal language which contains both (MP) and
(CP), but not (HS) among the explicitly stated “rules of transformation”.
Dummett asks whether Carnap nevertheless agrees that (HS) is a valid rule
of the language, and Carnap replies that, yes, this is indeed so because its
validity follows from the transformation rules – in particular, it follows from
the stipulated validity of (MP) and (CP).
Dummett now objects that, in that case, Carnap has not succeeded
in explaining logical truth/validity in terms of the conventionally adopted
rules; instead, he is presupposing an unexplained notion of consequence,
which leaves him unable to account for the convention-transcendent logical
truth that if we accept (MP) and (CP), then it follows that we must accept
(HS) as well.
Carnap is slightly puzzled by this accusation, and replies that he can
very well explain this in terms of the conventionally adopted transformation
rules of his language. He offers the following proof:
(1)ϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ ψ → χ
Proof HS: χ
(1)ϕ→ χ
This proofs shows, Carnap says, why it is that if you accept (MP) and
(CP), then (HS) will hold as a derived rule. And crucially, he continues,
this explanation appeals only to the conventionally adopted rules (MP)
and (CP) themselves. There is no appeal either to a further convention
or to facts about consequence which elude explanation. What exactly is it,
Carnap then asks Dummett, that this leaves unexplained, thereby rendering
the account ‘entirely superficial’?
13Although let us suppose that he was acquainted with Gentzen’s work.
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Now, perhaps Dummett will point to some tacit assumption in this
proof. It may be said, for instance, that in order to see this as a proof
of (HS), we must make certain high-level assumptions about how proofs
behave – notably that if we chain valid steps together, then the result is
a valid proof.14 However, even if Carnap were to accept this, this would
only force him to retreat to the position that (HS) is a consequence of
(MP), (CP) and some rule which licenses chaining together valid steps; it
would not show that there is something fundamentally incoherent about
the idea that (HS) might be explained as a consequence of some initial set
of conventions.15
The point I am making, then, is not so much that this particular proof
definitely settles the matter, but that the dilemma is too quick since it
overlooks the possibility of giving an explanation of (HS) in terms of the
very conventions that are said to have (HS) as a consequence. Thus, more
generally, it is far from clear that we are forced to choose between appealing
to either convention-transcendent principles or further conventions when
attempting to explain how one necessity could be a consequence of an initial
set of conventions: It might be that we can offer an explanation which
appeals only to these initial conventions themselves.16
Of course, the objection is certainly fair insofar as it points out that the
modified conventionalist cannot merely say, if asked why (HS) is valid, that
this is a consequence of the conventions we have adopted. They cannot
simply invoke the notion of consequence and then leave this entailment
unexplained. However, there is a big difference between just saying that
(HS) follows from our conventions, and giving a detailed explanation, in
terms of these conventions, which shows why we are committed to (HS) if
14The idea, essentially, would be that we need some rule corresponding to the ‘cut
rule’ of the sequent calculus.
15As a matter of fact, however, I doubt (for reasons given in the previous chapter)
that it makes sense to have a debate about something analogous to the cut rule if we
understand the rules to be governing relations of assertibility in a natural language.
16This is, I believe, essentially the response favoured by Jonathan Bennett in a discus-
sion of Dummett’s argument (1961: 19–20). Neil Tennant offers similar considerations
against Quine’s regress argument in his (1987).
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we commit to (MP) and (CP), and nothing has been said which rules out
this latter option.
Matters of Convention
It may be said that even if this is so, the modified conventionalist is still
forced to conceded that it is not a matter of convention that if we adopt
(MP) and (CP), then (HS) too must be valid – for we cannot, according
to the modified conventionalist, choose to adopt (MP) and (CP) and yet
reject (HS).
This, however, is not really news. For one lesson from chapter 5 is that
an adherent of the linguistic approach should refrain – quite generally –
from saying that necessary truths hold as a “matter of convention” in this
sense. Take, for instance, the claim that triangles are necessarily three-
sided. Even the modified conventionalist should say that this is no matter
of convention, and insist that we could not choose to have it otherwise. The
idea, rather, is that we can offer an explanation of why this is necessary
which appeals only to the linguistic rules we have conventionally adopted.
And while saying that the rules have been conventionally adopted is to say
that we could have adopted different rules, it is not to say that we could
have decided to make it false (or contingently true) that triangles have
three sides. The reason, which is presumably familiar by now, is that the
conventions are meant to be constitutive of our concepts – which means
that a change in the conventions would result in a change of subject.
This, I maintain, is also the line that the modified conventionalist should
take with regard to the claim that (HS) is a consequence of (MP) and (CP).
They should, that is, concede that it is no “matter of convention” that this is
so (in the sense that we could not choose to have it otherwise), and instead
maintain that the real question is whether we can provide an adequate
explanation – in terms of the linguistic rules that we have conventionally
adopted – of why this entailment holds. What I have been arguing in this
section is that Dummett’s dilemma, in its initial “näıve” formulation, does
201
8. Conventions and Consequences
not foreclose the possibility of such an explanation.
8.3 The Rule-Following Considerations
However, it is clear that Dummett sees the real source of the problem with
modified conventionalism to lie in Wittgenstein’s rule-following considera-
tions: ‘I believe that whether one accepts Wittgenstein’s account or rejects
it, one could not after reflecting on it remain content with the standard
view which I have called modified conventionalism.’ (1959: 341)
In this section I ask, therefore, whether the rule-following considerations
undermine the response to the dilemma that was just provided. Although
this is a massive topic that cannot be fully dealt with in this context, I
shall argue that a reasonable case can be made that these considerations
do not undermine the linguistic approach – at least provided that we can
learn to live with a thoroughly language-internal notion of normativity in
this context.
Dummett’s Dilemma Again
Let us return to (Proof HS). As Dummett reads Wittgenstein, the prob-
lem concerns how the acceptance of the general rules (MP) and (CP) suffice
to license the particular use made of those rules in the proof:
In order to follow the proof, we have to recognize various transi-
tions as applications of the general rules of inference. Now even if
these rules had been explicitly formulated at the start, and we had
given our assent to them, our doing so would not in itself constitute
recognition of each transition as a correct application of the rules.
(Dummett 1959: 330)
For the lesson of Wittgenstein’s remarks is precisely that:
there is nothing in our formulation of the axioms and of the rules of
inference, and nothing in our minds when we accepted these before
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the proof was given, which of itself shows whether we shall accept
the proof or not (Dummett 1959: 330).
The full-blooded conventionalist is prepared to accept this conclusion and
maintains that it is, in effect, a matter of convention whether we accept a
given step in a proof as a genuine application of a general rule. But what can
the modified conventionalist say here? It is because Dummett thinks that
no good conventionalist answer is forthcoming that he sees Wittgenstein’s
remarks as undermining this proposal.
Note, in particular, that if the modified conventionalist maintains that
it is simply a brute conceptual fact about the rules we have conventionally
adopted what the correct applications are, then we should indeed agree with
Dummett that this ‘throws away all the advantages of conventionalism’
(1959: 328). The reason is that this would essentially be a version of
the conceptual Platonism we have already rejected (back in chapter 3) as
inconsistent with the subjective-constitutive strategy. For if it is simply a
brute fact about some particular rule how it is to be correctly applied on
some particular occasion, then we should again have to ask how we get to
be justified in believing that what we think is the correct way of applying
it actually is. We are thus once again faced with a problem of inexplicable
agreement.
The dilemma has thus re-emerged in the following form: What explains
why a given application of a general convention is a correct application?
If we hold this too to be a matter of convention, then we are giving up
on the notion of proof as rationally compelling. But if we hold that this
is explained by some non-conventional fact F, then we are left with the
question ‘and how do we get to know that F is the case?’ – the kind of
question which the linguistic approach was meant to get rid of.
The topic of rule-following is, of course, a vast one which has inspired a
huge literature, and it would be foolish to think that it could be adequately
treated in the present context. I shall be content with arguing: i) that the
coherence of the dilemma just stated can be challenged, and ii) that it may
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be possible for an adherent of the linguistic approach to hang on to an ad-
equate notion of proof even in the face of the rule-following considerations.
I concede, however, that this is a complicated issue deserving of a fuller
treatment than I can offer here.
Language-Internal Conceptions of Normativity
It is a staple of the linguistic approach that the notion of logical correctness
only makes sense relative to a given language (linguistic/logical framework).
Here is Alan Richardson’s characterisation of Carnap’s view, according to
which not only logical correctness, but “theoretical” normativity more gen-
erally is a language-relative matter:
The very notion of a theoretical reason, therefore, makes sense only
internal to a logical framework. Thus, there is no realm of theoretical
reasons that can be appealed to in advance of the adoption of a logical
system. (Richardson 2007: 300)17
There are, however, two things that can be meant by saying that the notion
of logical correctness only makes sense relative to a given language. First, it
may be a mere insistence that normative-logical claims must be put in the
form of conditionals where the antecedent specifies the relevant linguistic
context. This would involve insisting, for instance, that we shouldn’t say
that modus ponens is a valid rule of inference as such, but, rather, that if
such and such linguistic conventions have been adopted, then modus ponens
is a valid rule of inference.
“Relativisms” like this, however, do not really avoid the notion of an
absolute standard of correctness. Here is Putnam making the point:
When one first encounters relativism, the idea seems simple enough.
The idea, in a natural first formulation is that every person (or, in a
modern ‘sociological’ formulation, every culture, or sometimes every
17Cf. also Friedman (1995: 313) and Creath (2007: §I).
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‘discourse’) has his (its) own views, standards, presuppositions, and
that truth (and also justification) are relative to these. One takes it
for granted, of course, that whether X is true (or justified) relative
to these is itself something ‘absolute’. (1981: 121)
The point, of course, is that merely conditionalising doesn’t get rid of an
absolute (here: language-transcendent) standard of correctness since the
conditionals themselves would constitute precisely such a standard.
I shall call this the ‘superficially language-relative conception of nor-
mativity’, in contrast with a thoroughly language-relative one. This latter
idea is considerably harder to articulate, but can be approached via the
Wittgensteinian theme that justification must come to an end within the
context of a shared language. On this conception, saying that the notion
of logical correctness only makes sense relative to a language is thus to
say something about when a justificatory project is possible at all. The
following remark by Wittgenstein is suggestive:18
‘I write the number “16” here because it says “x2” there, and “64”
here because it says x3 there.’ That is what every justification looks
like. In a certain sense it takes us no further. But indeed it can’t
take us further i.e. into the realm of metalogic. (The difficulty here
is: in not trying to justify what admits of no justification.) (1974:
Part I, §61)
Now, we can, presumably, go a bit further with the justification than
Wittgenstein allows: We can break down the calculations (spell out the
exponentiations in terms of multiplications, carry out the multiplications
as explicitly as possible etc.). However, the more important point is that if,
now, someone contests these calculation (in a way which does not amount
to pointing out something we recognise as a mistake on our part), then we
can do no more than say that this is how we’ve defined exponentiation,
multiplication and so on. And if this is contested (in the manner of the
18The context is a table which is to be filled in with various powers of various numbers.
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rule-following sceptic), then the attempt at justification must give way to
instruction.19
On a thoroughly language-internal conception, then, the idea is not that
claims about logical correctness must be conditionalised, but that there are
no (theoretical) normative constraints – including conditional ones – outside
the context of a shared language. If the assumption of a shared language
breaks down – if, say, it transpires that someone is using ‘+’ in a quus-like
fashion – then there can be no question of trying to justify one way of using
the expression over the other.
Arguably, we find this attitude in a reply Carnap made to a criticism
by E. W. Beth (1963). This criticism was based, in part, on the idea
(closely related to the rule-following considerations) that the syntactical
rules which Carnap articulates in LSL don’t suffice to settle the correct use
of the relevant expressions since these rules do not by themselves rule out
deviant interpretations. Here is the relevant passage of Carnap’s reply:
Since the metalanguage ML serves as a means of communication
between author and reader or among participants in a discussion,
I always presupposed, both in syntax and semantics, that a fixed
interpretation of ML, which is shared by all participants, is given.
This interpretation is usually not formulated explicitly; but since ML
uses English words, it is assumed that these words are understood
in their ordinary senses. The necessity of this presupposition of
a common interpreted metalanguage seems to me obvious. (1963b:
929)
Carnap is here partly making a fairly trivial point about communication:
namely, that successful communication presupposes that the parties (to a
reasonable extent) share a common language. However, we can also connect
this with Carnap’s language-internal conception of normativity. The point
would then be that it is only within the context of the metalanguage that
19Although a certain kind of justification is still possible: If both parties agree to
regard the linguistic community as an authority, then a justification in terms of the
verdicts of others could be provided.
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we can think of the syntactical rules which Carnap articulates in LSL as
yielding any normative constraints. Even conditional claims like ‘if you
adopt the rules of Language I, you must accept so-and-so’ do not register
normative constraints which can be utilised to justify a particular way of
“going on” unless we can take the assumption of a shared metalanguage for
granted.
This is not to say that such conditional claims are wrong unless they are
qualified. We are not mistaken when we say that if someone (anyone) uses
‘+’ to mean plus, they ought to say that 68+57 = 125. The point, rather, is
that the constraints which such claims purport to register are entirely devoid
of normative/critical potential outside the context of a shared language.
To see why this is, we may bring in the rule-following considerations. For
the lesson of these Wittgensteinian remarks (as I read them anyway) is that
there is no appropriate way of discharging the antecedent in a claim like ‘if
someone uses ‘+’ to mean plus, they ought to say that 68 + 57 = 125’. We
have no neutral criterion for saying that someone (including ourselves) is us-
ing an expression with a particular meaning or, equivalently, have adopted a
particular linguistic convention. We cannot, for instance, point to anything
concerning how the expression was used in the past.
By saying that we have no neutral criterion I mean to draw attention to
the fact that our criterion here is simply whether someone goes on to use
expressions in what we take to be the appropriate ways – or, if not, are at
least responding appropriately to correction. This is, I believe, the point
Wittgenstein makes in the following famous passage:
For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule
which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of appli-
cation, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going
against in”. (Wittgenstein 1953: §201)
It is clear, however, that if our criterion for whether someone has adopted
(or ‘grasped’) the plus rule is that they go on to apply ‘+’ in the expected
ways, then we could not use this criterion to discharge the antecedent in
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the above conditional and then use this to criticise someone who deviates
from us. For by our own lights we shall then not be dealing with someone
who has adopted the rule in question.
Against this background, then, we may regard the rule-following consid-
erations as pushing us from a superficially language-relative conception of
normativity to a thoroughly language-relative one. The conditionals arrived
at on the superficial conception turn out to be “normatively inert” outside
the context of a shared language because – as the rule-following considera-
tions teach us – we cannot discharge the antecedent in a way which would
allow us to appeal to these conditionals in cases where the assumption of
a shared language breaks down. we cannot, therefore, use them to justify
one way of ‘going on’ over another.
Rejecting the Dilemma
Suppose, then, that the adherent of the linguistic approach accepts the
lessons of the rule-following considerations and consciously accepts a thor-
oughly language-internal conception of normativity. Where does this leave
them with the dilemma we started out with? We may start by noting that
the distinction between modified and full-blooded begins to seems some-
what problematic. For it really isn’t obvious whether we should say that
this person advocates the modified or the full-blooded variant.
One the one hand, we cannot expect this person to say, with the full-
blooded conventionalist, that it is possible to adopt (MP) and (CP), and
then decide, by a further convention, whether the applications that are
made of these rules in (Proof HS) are correct applications. That, after
all, would require some independent grasp on what adopting (MP) and (CP)
amounts to. But we said that one lesson of the rule-following considera-
tions is that there is nothing which establishes that a particular linguistic
rule/convention has been adopted except simply going on to apply the rel-
evant expressions in the expected ways. Thus, if we look at (Proof HS)
and come to the verdict that the conditional is indeed being used in accor-
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dance with (MP) and (CP) here, then there is no room for the idea that we
could have adopted these conventions without allowing these applications.
And yet it would clearly be misleading to suggest that we have any-
thing like a straightforward vindication of modified conventionalism. There
the idea was that we could impose normative constraints on ourselves by
doing something called ‘adopting linguistic conventions’, which would then
commit us to go to apply linguistic expressions in certain ways. This idea,
however, is incompatible with a thoroughly language-internal conception
of normativity, since it would mean acknowledging language-transcendent
(albeit conditional) normative constraints of the form ‘if you have done
so-and-so, then this expression should be used thus-and-so’.
Neither modified nor full-blooded conventionalism, then, adequately
captures the present position, and the reason is that they both rely on an as-
sumption which someone who has accepted the lessons of the rule-following
considerations and adopted a thoroughly language-internal conception of
normativity rejects. Both positions assume, that is, that we can first form
a conception of what it is to adopt (MP) and (CP), and then ask what (if
anything) has thereby been settled with regard to how to apply these rules.
This, however, is the picture which is exposed as mistaken by the rule-
following considerations. We cannot point to anything which would es-
tablish that someone has adopted a particular rule (say the addition rule
rather than the quaddition rule). All we can do is consider whether they
are, in actual cases, using the expression in what we would regard as the
appropriate way.
The response to the dilemma, then, is to reject the legitimacy of the
perspective from which it is posed: We cannot make a distinction between
the “act” of adopting a linguistic convention and the practice of applying it
in the ways we take to be appropriate. We cannot therefore ask whether the
(alleged) gap between a general convention and its applications is “bridged”
by a further convention (full-blooded conventionalism) of something else
(modified conventionalism).
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Proof and Normativity
Rejecting the dilemma, however, is perhaps not enough. For we should still
ask whether the present position manages to avoid the undesirable conse-
quences of both modified and full-blooded conventionalism. These were:
i) that modified conventionalism brings in an external standard of correct-
ness, and ii) that full-blooded conventionalism undermines our conception
of proof as rationally compelling.
Now, there is, I think, little grounds for the charge that a thoroughly
language-internal conception of normativity shares the vices of modified
conventionalism. Conversely, however, the danger of undermining the no-
tion of proof as normatively compelling seems highly present. Indeed a
natural suggestion is that the position we have ended up with is essentially
one that allows us to talk as a modified conventionalist (by denying that
we could adopt a linguistic rule and then settle how to apply it by a further
convention) but which has as all the normativity-undermining consequences
of the full-blooded variant.
There is certainly some justification to this criticism and we should be
clear about what is conceded: Accepting a thoroughly language-internal
conception of normativity means acknowledging that accepting a step in a
proof is not a matter of being rationally compelled to do so by what has
gone before (the training one has received, how expressions have been used
in the past etc.). This after all would be to admit of language-transcendent
(albeit conditional) normative constraints along the lines of ‘if you have
received such-and-such training, then you must acknowledge this step as
valid’. Within the context of a shared language, we may take it for granted
that accepting a given step is the correct thing to do, but if someone con-
tests this (in the manner of the rule-following sceptic), then there is no
justification which we could offer.
There is, therefore, indeed a sense in which we are free, at any given
stage, to reject or accept a step in a proof: There is no language-
transcendent standard which determines which option is the correct one
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– even relative to how the relevant expressions have been used in the past
etc.
This admittedly sounds bad, given that we want to hang on to a notion
of proof which is rationally constrained in certain ways. Certainly, we must
avoid a kind of relativism about proofs, according to which there is no fact
of the matter as to whether something can be proved or not, and an invalid
proof of something could be made valid simply by accepting it. I shall close
this chapter by outlining a potential strategy for avoiding this conclusion
which is open to someone who advocates both the linguistic approach and
a thoroughly language-internal conception of normativity.
Consider the following example: Suppose someone claims to have dis-
proved Goldbach’s conjecture, but that it turns out that their proof relies
on using ‘+’ in accordance with Kripke’s quus rule (Kripke 1982: 9).20
The natural response is of course to reject the proof on the grounds that
this is not the correct way of adding. But let us suppose that the deviant
mathematician then invokes a dose of rule-following scepticism: There is
nothing we can point to, they say, which establishes that their proof is not
in accordance with how ‘+’ has been used so far.
We reply that, be that as it may, it does not change the fact that we
have, here and now, a conception of how ‘+’ is to be used and that the proof
in question does not conform with this conception. The deviant mathe-
matician objects that this is just a matter of us being phenomenologically
compelled to treat ‘+’ in a certain way. It doesn’t establish that there is
anything wrong with their proof.
Here is how I think someone who advocates a thoroughly language-
internal conception of normativity should reply: There is indeed nothing
wrong with the proof as such, and there is no objective standard which
could be used to show that the proof is mistaken relative to how ‘+’ has
been used in the past or the like. However, the crucial point is that our
present conception of how ‘+’ is to be used (the source of the “phenomeno-
20The conjecture is then easily disproved by showing that even numbers greater than
112 cannot be written as sums of two numbers at all, let alone primes.
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logical compulsion”) also informs our conception of what Goldbach’s con-
jecture states (since it involves the notion of addition). We are therefore
perfectly within our rights to say that although we cannot point to any-
thing which establishes that the proof is mistaken (except our own verdicts
to the contrary), it does not prove Goldbach’s conjecture as we (here and
now – informed by our present conception of how to add) understand it. It
is simply a proof of something else.
Although we may of course recognise the deviant mathematician’s right
to call what they have disproved “Goldbach’s conjecture”, this is not partic-
ularly troublesome. For we retain the right to look at Goldbach’s conjecture
– as we understand it – and deny that it could be disproved in the manner
suggested.
I propose, then, that an advocate of the thoroughly language-internal
conception should aim to constrain the notion of a proof, not by appealing
to some objective fact which is meant to determine in advance whether a
given step in a proof should or should not be accepted, but by appealing to
the relationship between one’s conception of how the relevant expressions
are to be used and one’s conception of what is to be (or has been) proved.
We may then say that the notion of proof is constrained by the fact that
if one decides to accept some particular step rather than reject it or vice
versa, then this will change what has or has not been proved in the process.
As Wittgenstein puts it: ‘In order to see what has been proved, look at the
proof.’ (1978: Appendix III, §17)
The crucial point is that this is compatible with conceding that we
cannot justify our conception of how the expressions are to be used (that
we cannot justify, for instance, our insistence that ‘+’ is not governed by
the quus rule). We don’t need such a justification as long as we can say that
it is this conception which constrains what counts as a proof of Goldbach’s
conjecture by our standards.
There is of course a lot more to say about this issue, and the strategy I
have offered for rationally constraining the notion of a proof can certainly be
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challenged. For my present purposes, however, I am content to have argued
that such a strategy is available, and I concede that whether the linguistic
approach allows for a satisfactory notion of proof depends on whether this
(or some other) strategy can be worked out and defended in more detail.
Let me close the discussion of these complex and difficult issues by
bringing it explicitly back to the linguistic approach and the question of
whether our linguistic conventions can have consequences. The view we
have ended up with answers this affirmatively. Adopting (MP) and (CP),
for instance, gets you (HS) for free. If it is asked what explains this, the
proper answer (given in section 8.2 above) is to give a proof of (HS) which
relies only on (MP) and (CP) – a proof, that is, which appeals neither to a
further convention, nor “something else”. If, now, it is asked why adopting
the general conventions (MP) and (CP) should force us to recognise this
particular proof, we can do no more than say that accepting proofs like
this is the criterion for having adopted those conventions. And if someone
disagrees, then we should simply admit that no further justification can be
offered; all we can do is try to teach them our ways (if they are interested).
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First Principles
In this chapter I consider the worry that to get the linguistic approach off the
ground in the first place, we need to assume a non-conventional starting-
point, and, in particular, that we need to take some logic for granted in
order to explain any necessities or validities in the manner suggested.
I begin (9.1) by considering how this affects some typical passages from
the logical positivists. Then, in section 9.2, I defuse the worry that this
problem is obviously inescapable because any attempt at explanation must
rely on some reasoning and hence some logic. I do so by drawing on Dum-
mett’s distinction between gross and pragmatic circularity.
A standard suggestion for getting the linguistic approach off the ground
is to appeal to implicit definition. In section 9.3 I briefly explain why I
am not convinced that this is the quick fix it is sometimes made out to be.
Instead, I shall focus on the idea that our linguistic conventions can interact
in ways such that certain sentences come out as true no matter what is the
case.
In section 9.4 I articulate and discuss a dilemma for this view: If ‘no
matter what is the case’ is a quantification over possibilities, then we have
smuggled in what we ought to be explaining, but if impossible cases are
allowed, then we will not be able to explain any necessities at all. I consider,
but reject, the suggestion that the notion of a possible case could itself
be “conventionalised”, before I suggest my preferred way forwards: The
9. First Principles
adherent of the linguistic approach should aim to explain how a sentence
gets to hold in every possible case by explaining why no scenario in which
the sentence doesn’t hold gets to count as a possible case.
In the remainder of the chapter I offer two explanations aimed to illus-
trate this idea and act as “proofs of concept”: an explanation of the validity
of conjunction elimination (9.5), and an explanation of (a version of) the
law of non-contradiction (9.6).
9.1 The Problem
Consider the following passage from Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic:
We see, then, that there is nothing mysterious about the apodeictic
certainty of logic and mathematics. Our knowledge that no observa-
tion can ever confute the proposition ‘7 + 5 = 12’ depends simply on
the fact that the symbolic expression ‘7+5’ is synonymous with ‘12,’
just as our knowledge that every oculist is an eye-doctor depends on
the fact that the symbol ‘eye-doctor’ is synonymous with ‘oculist.’
And the same explanation holds good for every other a priori truth.
(1936a: 114–5)1
There are – quite clearly – plenty of problems with this passage. However,
the objection most relevant to our present purposes tends to be associated
with Quine, who pointed out that definition – by which he understood
the introduction of one expression as an abbreviation for another – cannot
explain necessary truth “from scratch”:
Considered in isolation from all doctrine, including logic, a definition
is incapable of grounding the most trivial statement; even ‘tan π =
sin π
cos π ’ is a definitional transformation of an antecedent self-identity,
rather than a spontaneous consequence of the definition.’ (1936: 91–
2; cf. also 1960a: 361 and Lycan 1994: 270.)
1Cf. also Hahn (1933b: 29).
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Applied to Ayer’s example, the point is that the synonymy in question does
not suffice to explain the necessity of ‘every oculist is an eye-doctor’ since the
necessity of ‘every eye-doctor is an eye-doctor’ must be assumed and remains
unexplained. The general lesson is that synonymy-based explanations are
incapable of getting the linguistic approach off the ground.2
This by itself, though, is not much on a problem. It is quite clear, after
all, that not all linguistic conventions take this form, and so it remains
open to an adherent of the linguistic approach to maintain that we must
appeal to rules of a different kind to get things going. However, alternative
suggestions seem to give rise to analogous problems. Consider Hans Hahn’s
way of accounting for (an instance of) the laws of non-contradiction (LNC)
and excluded middle (LEM):
Take for instance objects which can be assigned a colour. We learn –
by training, as I should like to put it – to assign the designation ‘red’
to some of these objects, and we make an agreement to assign the
designation ‘not red’ to any others. On the basis of this agreement
we can now state the following proposition with absolute certainty:
None of these objects is assigned both the designation ‘red’ and the
designation ‘not red’, which is usually expressed briefly as follows:
No object is both red and not red. And since we have made the
agreement to assign the designation ‘red’ to some of these objects
and the designation ‘not red’ to any others, we can also state the
following proposition with absolute certainty: Every one of these
objects is assigned either the designation ‘red’ or the designation
‘not red’, which is usually expressed briefly as follows: Every object
is either red or not red. (1933b: 29–30)3
2Interestingly, Ayer appears to implicitly concede that an antecedent principle is
needed when he mentions Poincaré’s objection that ‘if everything is to proceed from the
principle of identity, everything must be reducible to it’ (1936a: 115; cf. Poincaré 1902:
1–2). However, he never discusses the source of this principle.
3A similar but more rigorous attempt at explaining the law of excluded middle can
be found in Carnap (1947: 9–11). Cf. also Carnap (1942: 79) for a slightly different
approach. The shortcomings are largely the same however.
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Before considering the problems with this passage, it is worth pointing out
that Hahn’s idea is that the logical necessities arise from how the semantic
application-conditions of ‘red’ and ‘not red’ are related through the rules
which we lay down. This is noteworthy because this idea is rarely considered
in much detail by critics of the linguistic approach who tend to focus on
truth-stipulation or conventions establishing purely syntactic relationships.
Now, Hahn’s claim that we learn to apply ‘red’ to certain objects is
potentially misleading, since it suggests that the use of ‘red’ is taught by
enumerating the objects to which it correctly applies. That, of course, is
incorrect: We don’t learn which objects can be designated ‘red’; we learn
what an object must be like in order for ‘red’ to be applicable. We learn,
that is, to associate a certain – presumably vague – criterion with ‘red’.
Once we acknowledge this, however, Hahn’s explanations amount to
little more than applying the relevant logical principles in the metalanguage.
Thus, the explanation of why LEM holds clearly relies on the assumption
that the criterion determinately either applies or fails to apply in any given
case. Correspondingly, in the case of non-contradiction, it is simply assumed
that we could never find that the criterion both is and is not satisfied.4
Again, then, we see that the proposed explanations do not get going un-
less some basic principles of logic are taken for granted. Indeed, in this case
the problem is deepened by the fact that the principles taken for granted
are the very principles that are supposed to be explained.
9.2 Rule-Circular Explanations
Now, it might well be thought that this predicament is unavoidable and
obviously so. After all, the task of explaining something without employing
any kind of reasoning is clearly insurmountable. And where there is reason-
ing there is presumably – hopefully – logic. Thus it seems plain that there
can be no explanation at all which does not take some logic for granted.
4Indeed, even if we did proceed via enumeration, we should ask: Why are we confident
that every relevant object was accounted for, and that no object was treated twice?
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As Henry Sheffer put it, we are in a ‘logocentric predicament’: ‘In order to
give an account of logic, we must presuppose and employ logic.’ (1926: 228)
This is perfectly true. So, if there is to be any hope for the linguistic
approach – or, indeed, any other attempt to account for the basis of logical
truth and validity – it must be possible to appeal to logic – in the course
of explaining logic – without thereby rendering the explanation viciously
circular.
Fortunately, an influential (though by no means uncontroversial) sugges-
tion by Dummett opens up precisely this possibility.5 We must distinguish,
Dummett thinks, between gross circularity, which ‘consists of including the
conclusion to be reached among the initial premises of the argument’ (1991:
202), and pragmatic circularity, where at least one of the inferential steps
in the argument relies on the logical law whose validity we are attempting
to justify (1991: 202). While gross circularity is always bad, pragmatic
circularity need not be so. If the argument is supposed to be suasive – that
is, capable of convincing someone who doubts the law in question – then
pragmatic circularity must indeed be avoided. However, if the argument is
merely intended to explain the validity of law – in a context where no one is
doubting its correctness – then ‘pragmatic circularity need do it no harm.’
(1991: 202)6
Why is this so? The reason given by Dummett is that gross circularity
is always bad because ‘if one sets oneself to derive a conclusion from a set
of premisses that contains that conclusion, one cannot fail; and succeeding
at a task at which one cannot fail neither proves anything nor explains
anything.’ (1991: 202) ‘The mere occurrence of a pragmatic circularity’, on
the other hand, ‘does not guarantee success’ (1991: 202).
I agree with Dummett that pragmatic circularity might be harmless in
5Dummett’s suggestion has inspired a lot of literature on the subject – and continues
to do so. Relatively early discussions include Friedman (1979: 372–3) and Haack (1982),
but more recent discussions tend to focus on Boghossian’s use of these ideas (notably in
his 2000 and 2001). Such recent discussions include Wright (2001; 2004), Hale (2002a),
Ebert (2005), Tennant (2005), Giaquinto (2008), and Dogramaci (2010).
6Cf. also Dummett (1973: 9–10).
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a purely explanatory context. However, some of Dummett’s remarks are
potentially misleading. It is natural to read the distinction between gross
and pragmatic circularity as a distinction between appealing to the logical
law we are trying to explain as an axiom, and appealing to it as a rule of
inference. This should give us some pause since this latter distinction is
quite feeble, in the sense that it is typically straightforward to swap axioms
for inference rules without diminishing the strength of our proof system.
We might suspect, therefore, that if gross circularity is going to “guarantee
success”, then exchanging this circularity for the pragmatic variant won’t
affect this.
However, the crucial distinction is not between appealing to axioms
and appealing to rules of inference, but between appealing to what we are
trying to explain in the “explanans” and appealing to it in the course of
transitioning from the explanans to the explanandum. This is important
because, as we shall see, a rule of inference might play either of these roles,
and if we appeal to a rule of inference in the explanans while attempting
to explain the validity of that very rule, we will indeed have a case of gross
circularity.
Consider the following “explanation” of the validity of modus ponens:
Take two arbitrary sentences ‘p’ and ‘q’ and assume that ‘p’
and ‘p→ q’ are both true. Using the rule of modus ponens, we
may then conclude that ‘q’ is true. We have thus shown, for
arbitrary sentences ‘p’ and ‘q’, that if ‘p’ and ‘p → q’ are both
true, then so is ‘q’. This explains the validity of modus ponens.
This explanation should be regarded as grossly circular. But this is not
entirely clear from Dummett’s discussion since the use of modus ponens here
could reasonably be described as confined to taking a step in accordance
with the rule. However, I would suggest that the true nature of the appeal
to modus ponens here becomes clear if we ask specifically for the explanans.
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We ask, that is: what does this explanation say about why modus ponens
is valid?
It then emerges that what we have here is an explanation where the
explanans itself is a proof.7 Taking a birds-eye view, the form of the ex-
planation is, essentially: modus ponens is valid because, without making
any assumptions about the relevant sentences, it is provable that if ‘p→ q’
and ‘p’ are both true, then ‘q’ is true as well. Since, now, the claim is that
modus ponens is valid because it is provable in a certain way, the resources
needed for the purposes of the proof must be regarded as part of the ex-
planans. And since the proof in question relies on using modus ponens, this
renders, I maintain, the explanation grossly circular; it illegitimately offers
the validity of modus ponens as part of the reason why modus ponens is
valid.
We may contrast this with a different attempt to explain the validity of
modus ponens:8
(1) If modus ponens is in harmony with the introduction rule for ‘→’,
then modus ponens is valid.
(2) Modus pones is in harmony with the introduction rule for ‘→’.
(∴) Modus ponens is valid.
Here too we are using modus ponens, but whatever we may think of this
explanation in general, it is not, I maintain, grossly circular, and what
sets it apart from the explanation considered above is that we are not
here appealing to a proof using modus ponens in the explanans. Indeed,
the explanans here – that is (1) and (2) – does not consist of a proof at
all. The claim is not that modus ponens is valid because it is provable; it
is that modus ponens is valid because it is in harmony with the relevant
introduction rule. It is true that explanation as a whole takes the form of
a proof which uses modus ponens – herein lies the pragmatic circularity –
7Another example of the same: citing Euclid’s proof to explain why there is no
highest prime number.
8I am not offering this as my preferred explanation, but as an illustration.
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but the point I am making is that this is crucially different from presenting
a proof which uses modus ponens as the reason why modus ponens is valid.
I maintain, therefore, that pragmatically circular explanations of logical
principles are admissible, and that the way to tell whether an explanation
is grossly or merely pragmatically circular is to get clear about what is
playing the role of explanans. It would be too quick, therefore, to dismiss
any attempt – the linguistic approach included – to explain logical necessity
and validity in general on the grounds that the explanations must use logic.
Clearly, though, this realisation falls massively short of showing that the
linguistic approach manages to avoid our present worries. The explanations
offered by Ayer and Hahn were all grossly circular, and we may reasonably
worry that it is this lesson which generalises.
9.3 Implicit Definition
One widespread strategy, among those advocating the linguistic approach
– or at least elements of the linguistic approach – for avoiding this conclu-
sion is to maintain, essentially, that we should not be trying to show that
valid inferences and basic logical truths are explained by more fundamental
linguistic rules; instead, we should let the linguistic rules themselves take
the form of what we are trying to explain.
We may distinguish two versions of this idea: Firstly, there is the sugges-
tion, typically traced to Hilbert, that we can endow expressions with mean-
ing by stipulating that certain sentences containing those expressions are
to be true.9 Secondly, there is the suggestion, typically traced to Gentzen,
that we can do so by stipulating that certain inferences – introduction and
elimination rules – are to hold.10
As to the latter suggestion – which is, I think, the more plausible one
as far as logic is concerned – I maintain, in accordance with what was
said in chapter 7, that when properly spelt out, it is not clear that it is
9We encountered this idea above in the context of Quine’s regress argument.
10This idea figured prominently in chapter 7 and parts of chapter 8.
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essentially different from the suggestion that we endow logical constants
with meaning by laying down conditions for correctly asserting sentences
where the relevant constant is the main logical connective. This, however,
is the strategy I shall be pursuing below, so I will set this to one side for
the moment.
The idea that we can endow logical constants with meaning by directly
stipulating that certain sentences containing those constants are to be as-
sertible no matter what faces a difficulty that raised its head in chapter 4.
Suppose that it is stipulated that ‘snow is white or snow is not white’ is
to be assertible. Clearly, this cannot be the sole convention governing the
relevant vocabulary; there must be other conventions governing both when
these particular disjuncts are assertible and when disjunctions in general
are assertible.
If so, however, then it would presumably be an option to retain these
latter conventions, but drop the convention that ‘snow is white or snow is
not white’ is to be assertible no matter what. And the problem, now, is that
once we contemplate this option, it is seems quite clear that the sentence
remains assertible no matter what even if the convention that stipulates
that this is to be so is dropped, which suggest that the hypothesis that
there is a convention to this effect was explanatorily idle to begin with.
It is worth noting that this problem also affects the suggestion that
implicit definition allows us to account for cases of (apparent) necessity that
are recalcitrant to linguistic explanation. It is sometimes suggested that the
necessity of sentences like ‘nothing can be green and yellow all over’ is due to
this being a (partial) implicit definition of the relevant colour predicates (cf.
e.g. Glock (2003a: 156)). But since there are plainly also other conventions
governing the use of ‘green’ and ‘yellow’, this would suggest that if we were
just operating with these latter conventions, then we might give up the
above claim, and this does not appear to be the case.
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9.4 Assertibility in All Cases
Since I am not convinced that appealing to implicit definition is going to
advance matters in this context, I shall revert to focusing on linguistic
rules cast in a more perspicuous form – specifically in terms of assertibility-
or application-conditions, pretty much following in footsteps of Hahn and
Carnap in his semantic phase. The overarching idea here is that these
rules explain necessity by explaining how certain sentences get classified
as assertible no matter what is the case, and that they explain validity by
explaining why certain sentences are guaranteed to be assertible, given that
other sentences are assertible.
A Dilemma about Cases
However, talk about ‘assertibility no matter what is the case’ suggests a
more principled reason (compared to our misgivings over the specifics of
Ayer’s and Hahn’s explanations) why we cannot ‘get the linguistic approach
off the ground’ without making a grossly circular appeal to logic. The worry
I have in mind is inherent in the following passage by Timothy Williamson:
‘All furze is furze,’ unlike many logical truths, is obvious. That does
not justify the idea that it imposes no constraint on the world, rather
than one which, by logic, we easily know to be met [. . . ] What case
does the constraint exclude? That not all furze is furze, of course. To
complain that ‘Not all furze is furze’ does not express a genuine case
is to argue in a circle. For it is to assume that a genuine constraint
must exclude some logically consistent case. (Williamson 2007: 65)
We can put the objection in the form of a dilemma: either the notion of
a case is understood in some completely unrestricted way (so as to include
what we would call impossible cases), in which case there are no prospects
for explaining logical necessity via this route, or we say that we are in-
terested only in the logically possible cases, in which case we are plainly
presupposing exactly what we were supposed to be explaining.
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Thus, it may be said, it is indeed inevitable that we must appeal to
some logic in order to get the explanations of the linguistic approach going
in the first place: We need logic to set boundaries to the notion of a ‘case’
before the linguistic conventions can be used to explain how some sentences
get to be assertible in all cases.
Conventionalising Cases
One suggestion might be to maintain that the the notion of a case could
itself be settled by something like convention. Arguably, Carnap’s notion of
a state-description could be understood along such lines. As mentioned in
chapter 4, one of Carnap’s aim in Meaning and Necessity was to articulate
a notion of L-truth which explicated the notion of necessity, and which
did justice to the idea that a sentence in a language S is necessary iff ‘its
truth can be established on the basis of the semantical rules of the system
S alone, without any reference to (extra-linguistic) facts.’ (1947: 10) His
strategy was to define L-truth as truth in all ‘state-descriptions’ and argue
that the semantical rules suffice in order to establish that certain sentences
have this property.11 A state-description, relative to a language S1 is defined
as ‘a class of sentences in S1 which contains for every atomic sentence either
this sentence or its negation, but not both, and no other sentences’ (1947:
9).
Although Carnap does justify his notion of a state-description in terms
of it ‘obviously [giving] a complete description of a possible state of the
universe of individuals with respect to all properties and relations expressed
by predicates of the system’ (1947: 9), it is difficult to imagine that he would
not have tolerated alternative notions – say intuitionistic state-descriptions
based on the idea of a Kripke model – giving rise to different sets of L-truths.
Given an interpretation along these lines, we could say that Carnap’s notion
11More accurately, he is content with providing an example illustrating the idea (cf.
1947: 11).
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– as an explication of the notion of a ‘possible case’ – is laid down by
something like convention.12
Unfortunately, however, this just moves the bulge in the carpet with
regard to the dilemma. For now it becomes unclear why we should think
that the actual world can be modelled as a possible case in this sense. And
it is crucial that we are confident that this holds, since if it doesn’t, we shall
not be able to infer that a sentence is true from the fact that it is L-true.
In more usual terminology: we lose the inference from necessity to truth
(and from truth to possibility).13
Conventionalising the notion of a possible case, then, is not a promis-
ing strategy. It is worth noting, moreover, that Carnap’s position here is
somewhat unsatisfactory even if we reject this conventionalist interpreta-
tion and fall back on his claim that, essentially, it is obvious that there will
be a state-description corresponding to the actual state of the universe. For
even if this is obvious, it is quite misleading to suggest that he has given
us a definition of L-truth which conforms to the constraint that such truth
can be established on the basis of the semantic rules alone. After all, this
allegedly obvious fact is hardly itself a semantic rule, and this assumption
is doing a lot of work here.
Language Internal Constraints
How, then, should we respond to the above dilemma? Here is the strategy
I shall be pursuing: It is quite correct that the aim should be to explain
why certain sentences are assertible in every possible case. However, the
explanation need not work by assuming the notion of a possible case as
antecedently given. Rather, we should try to explain how a sentence gets to
hold in every possible case by explaining why certain ways of describing are
ruled out by how we have set up the language. The thought would be that
12As Anthony Quinton remarked in a review of the book: ‘Carnap sees himself as
proposing conventions rather than as asserting truths.’ (1959: 201)
13A similar problem might affect some of the “neo-conventionalist” treatments of
modality mentioned in footnote 21 of chapter 4.
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such language-internal considerations relating to our linguistic conventions
suffice to explain why certain sentences are guaranteed to be assertible (thus
circumscribing the notion of a possible case), and how the assertibility of
one (or more) sentence(s) might guarantee that of another.
What the dilemma teaches us is that any attempt to start with some
notion of a ‘case’ and then explain, using the linguistic conventions, why
certain sentences hold in all cases is, in the present context, a non-starter.
What we should be doing is starting with our linguistic practices and try
to explain how, for some sentences, these make no room for the possibility
that it might be correct to assert them. Thus, certain “cases” are ruled out,
not because they are antecedently classified as impossible, but because we
find that our linguistic conventions don’t allow for the world to be described
in certain ways.
The question, of course, is whether the adherent of the linguistic ap-
proach can point to any mechanisms which could have this effect. Or,
put differently: whether we can explain how the assertibility of a sentence
could be guaranteed by our linguistic conventions without relying on an
antecedently constrained notion of a possible case. I think we can, and in
the remainder of this chapter I shall aim to illustrate this idea and argue
for its coherence via two “case studies”: an explanation of the validity of
conjunction elimination and an explanation of the necessity of (one version
of) the law of non-contradiction.
9.5 Case Study I: Conjunction Elimination
An initial attempt at a linguistic explanation of conjunction elimination
might go as follows: We start by articulating a linguistic convention claimed
to govern the assertibility of conjunctive statements:
(Conjunction). ‘ϕ and ψ’ can be correctly asserted iff ‘ϕ’
can be correctly asserted and ‘ψ’ can be correctly asserted.
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We then say that, against the background of this linguistic convention,
we know that any situation in which ‘ϕ and ψ’ can be asserted, will be a
situation in which ‘ϕ’ can be asserted. Assertibility, therefore, is guaranteed
to be preserved in moving from one to the other.
In response to this we might imagine someone objecting along the lines
of Williamson:
Sure, this explanation works if we assume that all cases conform
to this pattern. If, however, we also allow cases in which it is true
that ϕ and ψ, but not true that ϕ, then the explanation collapses.
Consequently, the validity of the inference is not explained by
(Conjunction) alone; it relies, also, on an antecedent (and so
far unexplained) restriction of the notion of a possible case.
To this the adherent of the linguistic approach can respond that (Con-
junction) also explains why such “cases” are spurious and why we are
completely justified in setting them aside. Firstly, they insist on a “lan-
guage first” approach where our grasp on the notion of a ‘case in which it
is true that ϕ and ψ’ is given by our grasp on what it takes for a case to be
such that asserting ‘ϕ and ψ’ would be correct, and similarly for ‘ϕ’.
Next, they say that the reason why no case is such that ‘ϕ and ψ’, but
not ‘ϕ’ is assertible, is that the criterion which we ourselves laid down for
the assertibility of the former involves the assertibility of the latter. So,
quite without making any prior assumptions about what the world must be
like, we know – on the basis of the linguistic rule we laid down – that if it
is such that ‘ϕ and ψ’ is assertible, then it is also such that ‘ϕ’ is assertible.
Thus, we set aside the “counter-case” not because it represents an im-
possibility in some robustly metaphysical and language-antecedent sense,
but because our linguistic practices – and (Conjunction) in particular –
do not allow for the world to be described like this. And the reason for that
is that our criterion for assessing the assertibility of ‘ϕ and ψ’ is such that if
this sentence is found to be assertible, there is no further question, no fur-
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ther investigation that could be carried out, as to whether ‘ϕ’ is assertible.
This has already been established.
(Conjunction) alone, then, suffices to tell us that no matter what a
case is like, it is going to be such that if it licenses an utterance of ‘ϕ and
ψ’, then it also licenses an utterance of ‘ϕ’. The reason is that our only
criterion for assessing the assertibility of the former involves determining
that the latter is assertible.
These are thorny issues, so it might worth recapping some of the essential
points of the dialectic. The claim is that if I suppose that the world is such
that ‘ϕ and ψ’ is assertible, then I am also in a position to know – solely via
my knowledge of how the assertibility-conditions of conjunctive statements
relate to the assertibility-conditions of the conjuncts – that ‘ϕ’ is assertible.
I am not antecedently ruling out certain cases as impossible – just relying on
the fact that the assertibility of one sentence also establishes the assertibility
of the other because of how we have set up the language.
Now, it might be asked: why not just say that if I know that ϕ and ψ,
then I also know that ϕ, since I know that the latter fact is, so to speak,
contained in the former? Isn’t this to make the same point, but without
going via the linguistic rules? To this the adherent of the linguistic approach
should say that while all of this may well be true, the real question is how
you know this. This is what is explained, as they see it, via knowledge of
assertibility-conditions which we ourselves have laid down.
More importantly, there is a point to understanding what we know along
these lines, which is to avoid the problem of inexplicable agreement that we
found articulated in the writings of both Kant, Wittgenstein and the logical
positivists. For if we say that we know that one fact is included in another,
then we should ask what reason we have to think that this is indeed so, and,
furthermore, that it must be so. Why should the facts be so related just
because you think they are? It is this question that the linguistic approach
is meant to dissolve by recasting the knowledge in question as self-reflective
knowledge concerning the assertibility-conditions of sentences.
229
9. First Principles
9.6 Case Study II: The Law of
Non-Contradiction
The foregoing is, as I see it, an acceptable explanation of the validity of
conjunction elimination which conforms to the constraints of the linguis-
tic approach. It might quite reasonably be said, however, that this is a
particularly straightforward case. I shall now turn to a much more compli-
cated issue: how we might go about explaining why instances of the law of
non-contradiction are necessarily true.
There is no chance of doing justice to all the complexities here, and it
should be noted that my goal is not to offer anything like a justification of
classical logic against the objections of someone like the dialetheist (recall
Dummett’s distinction between suasive and explanatory contexts). Rather,
my goal is the more limited one of showing that it is in principle possible to
get the linguistic approach of the ground in a way that isn’t grossly circular,
and simultaneously illustrate how explanations of necessity in accordance
with the linguistic approach might go.
Note, in particular, the following limitation: I shall be content with
explaining the validity of one principle which may, I claim, legitimately
be consider a version of the law of non-contradiction. I am not claiming
that there are no other versions of this law which may lack a proper jus-
tification. The underlying reason is that I shall base the explanation on
a specific understanding of negation without claiming that no connective
could differ from this and still deserve to be called ‘negation’. Nor shall I
claim that the ‘not’ of English is the negation I shall be discussing. This is
acceptable, I maintain, because my overall aim is not to justify the law of
non-contradiction specifically, but to provide a proof of concept with regard
to the linguistic approach.
I shall proceed by first outlining the explanation while glossing over a
number of problematic aspects and then proceed to discuss these problem-
atic aspects.
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Outline of the Explanation
The law of non-contradiction (LNC) comes in many forms.14 One im-
portant distinction, for our purposes, goes between what we may call
‘prohibitive’ and ‘permissive’ laws. A prohibitive law states that, re-
gardless of what is the case, certain utterances will be classified as mis-
taken/unassertible, and a permissive law states that, regardless of what is
the case, certain utterances will be classified as correct/assertible.
The permissive law we will be aiming to explain – in accordance with
the overall commitments of the linguistic approach – is:
(LNC+). Sentences of the form ‘¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)’ are classified as
assertible regardless of what is the case.
However, the route I shall propose for explaining (LNC+) goes via two
prohibitive laws, which may be called, respectively, the ‘distributive’ and
the ‘collective’ law of non-contradiction:15
(LNCD). Regardless of what is the case, we could never find
that both ‘ϕ’ and ‘¬ϕ’ are assertible.
(LNCC). Regardless of what is the case, we could never
find that a sentence of the form ‘ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ’ is assertible (i.e. such
a sentence fails to be assertible no matter what is the case).
The first step is to explain (LNCD) by appealing to the following linguistic
convention governing negation:
(Negation). ‘¬ϕ’ is assertible if and only if ‘ϕ’ fails to be
assertible.
The core idea is that if this is the sole criterion for determining whether a
sentence of the form ‘¬ϕ’ is assertible, then we can rule out counterexamples
14For a comprehensive survey, see Grim (2004).
15For more on this distinction, and some of the complexities involved, see Varzi (2004).
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to (LNCD) via reasoning similar to that employed to rule out counterex-
amples to conjunction elimination. There we said that if a conjunction has
been found to be assertible, then there is no further question as to whether
the conjuncts are assertible. In the case of (LNCD) the reasoning I have
in mind would go roughly as follows:
In order to have a counterexample to (LNCD), it needs to be
the case that ‘ϕ’ is assertible. But if ‘ϕ’ is assertible and (Nega-
tion) provides the only route to finding that negative sentences
are assertible, then there is no further question as to whether
‘¬ϕ’ is assertible. For if the question of assertibility has been
answered affirmatively, then the question of “failure of assert-
ibility” has thereby been answered negatively. That is: if a
sentence is found to be assertible, there is no further question
as to whether it might also fail to be assertible. Thus, the as-
sertibility of ‘¬ϕ’ is ruled out by the very same procedure that
establishes the assertibility of ‘ϕ’, and so we could never find
that both these sentences are assertible.16
To be clear: there are a number of potential problems here which we shall
consider shortly. For now, I want to outline the rest of the explanation.
The step from (LNCD) to (LNCC) is explained via an appeal to (Con-
junction).17 Provided that this is the only route to assertibility for con-
junctions, it is clear that if there can be no counterexamples to (LNCD),
then there can be no counterexamples to (LNCC) either. This is because
the only way for a sentence of the form ‘ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ’ to be assertible would be
16It is worth noting that the proof-theoretic approach to explaining logical validity
notoriously struggles to explain principles like (LNCD). Thus, Dummett concludes that
‘the principle of consistency is not a logical principle: logic does not require it, and
no logical laws could be framed that would entail it.’ (1991: 295) And Neil Tennant
suggests that at this point ‘one needs a metaphysical basis for logic’, which he believes
‘is to be found in our sense of contrariety, a sense that follows inexorably from out
deploying perceptual concepts and objectual categories, and from our understanding of
the fundamental features of bodies and events occupying space and time.’ (1999: 217)
17Modified so as to govern ‘∧’ rather than ‘and’.
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for both conjuncts to be assertible, and this is what has just been ruled out.
Such sentences, therefore, will fail to be assertible, no matter what.18
The step to (LNC+) is now straightforward. Given that such sentences
fail to be assertible no matter what, and (Negation) tells us that if a
sentence fails to be assertible, then this suffices for its negation to be as-
sertible, we can see that sentences of the form ‘¬(ϕ∧¬ϕ)’ will be assertible
no matter what.
This, then, is the outline of the explanation. I shall now turn to the wor-
ries that were glossed over above, and in particular the perfectly reasonably
worry that this explanation is grossly circular.
The Threat of Gross Circularity
With regard to any purported explanation or justification of LNC, the nat-
ural suspicion is going to be that it all boils down to applying the law in
the meta-language. It might well be thought that this is what is happening
above, and that nothing said so far constitutes much of an improvement on
for instance the explanation provided by Hahn.
Here is an immediate worry along such lines: We said that ‘¬ϕ’ is as-
sertible iff ‘ϕ’ fails to be assertible, and argued from here that if we find
that ‘ϕ’ is assertible, then that is the end of the matter as far as ‘¬ϕ’ is
concerned, which thus fails to be assertible. But here it may be asked: isn’t
this just to assume, at the outset, that ‘ϕ’ could not both be and fail to be
assertible? And isn’t just a disguised appeal to something like LNC?
There are, in fact, two potential issues here which should be kept apart:
First of all, it is natural to worry that we might have a sentence whose
assertibility is governed by criteria which could conflict so that the sentence
fails to be assertible by some standard(s) and yet gets classified as assertible
by other(s). We might thus end up with grounds for classifying a sentence
18Note that ‘failure of assertibility’, as it is understood here, is not a constructive
notion. Notably, we cannot infer from the fact that a conjunction fails to be assertible
that one of the conjuncts must fail to be assertible.
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as assertible and yet also grounds for saying that it fails to be assertible,
and this threatens to yield a counterexample to (LNCD). I shall treat this
issue below under the heading of ‘Conflicting Conventions’.
In this kind of counterexample our reason for saying that the sentence
fails to be assertible is not merely that we “lack” any grounds for deeming it
assertible. The thought, rather, is that we have both grounds for classifying
it as assertible and grounds for saying that it fails to be assertible. However,
we could also imagine someone objecting that it is grossly circular to assume
that we could not both lack any adequate grounds for asserting a given
sentence and yet also have grounds for asserting it. Before I turn to the
issue of conflicting conventions, I shall argue that this idea can be rejected
as incoherent.
I shall argue, that is, that we can defend the following principle without
making the proposed explanation of (LNCD) grossly circular:
It is incoherent to suppose that we could both lack any grounds
for asserting a given sentence and yet also find it to be assertible.
As circumstantial evidence that an appeal to this principle is not just a
covert appeal to some version of LNC, we may note that the most prominent
critic of LNC explicitly endorses it:
With dialetheism assumed, let us return to the issue [. . . ] of the
conditions under which a negated sentence is true. There, I argued
that the mere failure of the truth of α is sufficient ground for the
truth of ¬α . Now consider the situation in which both α and ¬α are
true. Here the Fact in virtue of which ¬α is true cannot be the mere
“negative” one that that α is not true. There must be a “positive”
Fact. (Priest 2006: 67)
It should also be noted that – at least as far as I know – there are no
candidates in the literature which suggest that we could ever find that
it would be correct to assert a particular sentence, and yet also find that
there is a complete lack of reasons for deeming it assertible. All the putative
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counterexamples to LNC are cases where we have, so to speak, too many
reasons – i.e. we have reason to assert a sentence and also reason to deny
it or utter its negation.
The fact that no alleged counterexample to LNC tells against the above
principle, and the fact that Graham Priest explicitly endorses it, strongly
suggests that appealing to it is not a grossly circular appeal to LNC. Still,
we need to say more about where this principle comes from in order to assess
whether appealing to it is compatible with the constraints of the linguistic
approach. How, then, do we rule out the idea that a sentence might be
assertible and, in addition, be such that adequate grounds for asserting it
are completely lacking?
Relating this back to the above dilemma, we may imagine some objecting
that this relies on an unexplained restriction with regard to the notion of a
case: We are simply assuming that no case is such that it both: i) delivers
the verdict that a particular sentence is assertible, and ii) delivers the verdict
that there are no adequate grounds for asserting this sentence.
Again, however, the response is that this does not represent an an-
tecedent, “metaphysical” restriction on the notion of a case, but is itself
explained by our linguistic practices. For – quite in accordance with the
subjective-constitutive strategy – it is we who settle what it is for a case
to be such that a particular sentence is assertible. And we can legitimately
insist that if we find that the sentence is assertible, then there is no further
question as to whether we might also lack any reason for deeming it assert-
ible. The very practice of evaluating the assertibility of sentences ensures
that any such question has thereby been answered negatively.
This is not – an adherent of the linguistic approach should insist –
based on appreciating some robustly metaphysical fact to the effect that
the presence of a ground for asserting a sentence is incompatible with the
absence of such grounds. Rather, it is a matter of reflecting on how we
evaluate assertibility and what we count as having or lacking grounds for
deeming sentences assertible.
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Conflicting Conventions
I now turn to the question of whether our linguistic conventions could deliver
conflicting verdicts with regard to the assertibility of a given sentence, and
thus give us both reason to say that it is assertible and reason to say that
it fails to be assertible.
Here is a variation on an example suggested by Priest (2006: 68): Con-
sider the expression ‘right-wing’ as used to describe political parties. There
is no single test for whether a party is right wing; rather, we have a set of
conditions associated with this predicate and no precise rules for settling
how many conditions must be satisfied, or which conditions take priority.
It seems quite conceivable, therefore, that we could be confronted with
a party, P, which has a set of characteristics such that we should ordinary
say that the ‘P is right-wing’ is assertible, but which also has a set of
characteristics such that we should typically say that it would be a mistake
to call it right-wing – that is: We should say that ‘P is right-wing’ fails to
be assertible.
To make things more definite, let us imagine a linguistic community
which takes advocating laissez-faire capitalism as a necessary and sufficient
conditions for applying ‘right-wing’ to a political party – sufficient because
they take this to automatically license the assertion of ‘x is right-wing’;
necessary because they criticise those who assert ‘x is right-wing’ when x
does not advocate laissez-faire capitalism.
Let us suppose, however, that they also take advocating a form of social
conservatism to be a necessary and sufficient condition in exactly the same
way. Of course, it is plain to us that these conventions can come into
conflict, but we may imagine that this linguistic community has never paid
much attention to this. All the political parties they have had to deal with
have had either both these traits or none of them, and the community is not,
we may suppose, really in the habit of reflecting on their use of language.
Suppose, now, that they are confronted with party, Q, that advocates
laissez-faire capitalism, but is in no sense socially conservative. In this case,
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we might well say that, by their standards, the sentence ‘Q is right-wing’
both is and fails to be assertible.
The question I am interested in is: do examples like this threaten the
above explanation of (LNCD)? First impressions might suggest that they
do. For if we get the verdict that the sentence both is and fails to be
assertible, then (Negation) would seem to straightforwardly deliver that
both the sentence and its negation are assertible.19
Now, I do not want to deny that we could (and even sometimes do)
react to such cases in this way. It is quite intelligible that the linguistic
community above might decide to accept the sentence ‘Q is right-wing and
Q is not right-wing’. However, I do want to deny that this is forced even
against the background of (Negation). That is, I claim that it is possible
to understand this convention in such a way that the explanation offered
above is immune to cases, such as the above, where multiple criteria come
into conflict.
We must be cautious here since we are essentially operating with two
distinct notions of assertibility at this point. There is, on the one hand,
the idea that a sentence can be assertible by some standard, and, on the
other hand, the question of assertibility tout court – the question, that
is, of whether a sentence is in fact treated as assertible in practice when
everything has been accounted for. The former does not entail the latter
since if we find that our conventions deliver conflicting verdicts with regard
to a sentence, there is still the question of how we handle this: Do we treat
this as a license to utter the sentence? Do we treat such utterances as
exempt from criticism?
When, for instance, the above linguistic community finds that ‘Q is
right-wing’ is assertible by one of their standards, but that there is a conflict,
there is a question of whether they in fact end up treating this sentence as
assertible in practice.
19We also seem to get a straightforward counterexample to (LNCC). Whether we
would need to give up (LNC+) is a more complicated matter.
237
9. First Principles
If, now, we understand the occurrence of ‘fails to be assertible’ in
(Negation) as ‘fails to be assertible by some (i.e. at least one) standard’,
then cases like the above will deliver counterexamples. However, on a dif-
ferent reading, (Negation) tells us that ‘¬ϕ’ is assertible iff ‘ϕ’ fails to be
assertible tout court, and on this reading, I maintain, the explanation given
above is not troubled by conflicting conventions.
The point is that (Negation) then tells us to use the very same stan-
dard when evaluating the assertibility of a sentence, as when evaluating its
assertibility in the context of evaluating its negation. Thus, if we suppose
that our conventions yield conflicting verdicts with regard to a sentence
‘ϕ’, then the question is: what do we do now? How do we in fact treat this
sentence? It is clear that if we are to get a counterexample to (LNCD),
we must treat it as, after all, assertible. But now (Negation) tells us that
it is this verdict which is relevant when it comes to settling whether ‘¬ϕ’
is assertible, and thus delivers the verdict that asserting ‘¬ϕ’ would be a
mistake. Since, now, (Negation) by hypothesis provides the only route to
assertibility for negative sentences, we see that counterexamples to (LNCD)
remain ruled out.
This is important because it allows us to deny that we are appealing to
an implausibly “neat” – and grossly circular – conception of the possible
outcomes when we attempt to assess the assertibility of a sentence. After
all, it would clearly be inadmissible to assume, in this context, that we will
always receive, straightforwardly, either a positive or a negative verdict and
never both (this was essentially our objection to Hahn’s brief explanation).
However, we are now allowing that reaching a verdict here might be a
thoroughly messy process. It might be that we reach no verdict at all, or
that different criteria pull us in opposite direction. Still, the thought is that
if we are to get a counterexample to (LNCD) from this, the mess needs to
be tidied up in a certain way. Specifically: we need to treat cases of conflict
as cases where the sentence in question is, after all, assertible in practice.
This is because we need clear-cut assertibility in order to have a clear-
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cut counterexample to (LNCD) (which is a matter of joint assertibility).
And now we can say – based on the present understanding (Negation) –
that we still do not get a counterexample because by deeming the conflicted
sentence assertible tout court, we have thereby removed any reason we might
have had for deeming its negation assertible.
Conclusion Regarding the Law of Non-Contradiction
I maintain that this is an explanation (or at least a decent sketch of an
explanation) of why instances of ‘¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)’ are necessary (guaranteed to
be true no matter what is the case) provided that the linguistic conventions
stated above are in force. And I maintain that this explanation conforms
to the restrictions of the linguistic approach. It is based solely on what can
be gathered from reflecting on the relevant linguistic practices and it does
not introduce an external standard of correctness which would result in a
problem of inexplicable agreement. These practices alone, that is, suffice to
guarantee the assertibility of the sentences in question.
Still, it should be noted that the explanation does appeal to principles
which it would hardly be appropriate to describe as linguistic conventions.
Notably, the principle that we could not both have an adequate reason for
asserting a sentence and yet lack any such reason fits awkwardly with this
terminology, since it is far from clear that we could have chosen to adopt a
linguistic practice which rejects it.
However, to say that this principle is an inevitable part of our linguistic
practices is not to say that it is forced upon us by an external standard
of correctness. It might just be integral to the very practice of evaluating
whether sentences are assertible or not. There is then no mystery – no
problem of inexplicable agreement – concerning how we can reach a justified
belief in this principle simply by reflecting on this practice: For although it
is inevitable, it is not in the business of accurately reflecting some language-
independent domain.
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Conclusion
Nothing I have said licenses anything like the conclusion that the linguistic
approach solves the problem of necessity which Dummett nicely formulated.
However, I hope to have shown that it deserves to be counted among genuine
candidates for a solution – and, indeed, a moderately promising one.
My main aim has been to argue that we do not have sufficient grounds for
the currently orthodox view that this approach may be dismissed because
it is thoroughly misguided and doomed to failure. And my contention is
that none of the objections considered above are as devastating as they are
often made out to be: Some miss the mark entirely, some can be answered
head-on, and some point to genuine challenges and constraints which put
pressure on the linguistic approach, but do not warrant rejecting it.
The challenge which emerges from the rule-following considerations –
concerning how to account for a rationally constrained notion of proof – is,
as I see it, a particularly difficult one. Although I have argued that there
is a strategy available here, I fully concede that further work needs to be
done in order to determine whether it can, in the end, do the job.
Apart from this concern (and various others mentioned along the way),
the major question is, of course, whether the linguistic approach can account
for all the necessities that need accounting for. My examples throughout
have been either logical necessities or traditional analyticities, and it is
certainly not unreasonable to worry that even if the linguistic approach can
be employed with some success in these areas, there will be other necessities
Conclusion
which it cannot adequately account for. This, however, is not a reason to
dismiss the approach, but a reason to engage in detailed investigations of
what it can and cannot explain.
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